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Summary	  The	  European	  Parliament	  was	   from	  the	  start	  viewed	  and	  treated	  as	   the	  Weaker	  part	   in	   the	   EU	   in	   comparison	   to	   the	   Council	   and	   the	   Commission.	   But	   the	   power	   and	  influence	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  has	  been	  rising	  step	  by	  step	  to	  the	  position	  it	  holds	  today.	  This	  study	  puts	  the	  searchlights	  on	  the	  organisation	  and	  organisational	  changes	  that	  has	  happened	  to	  the	  staff	  in	  the	  European	  Parliament	  during	  the	  last	  three	  treaties.	  It	   focuses	  especially	  on	   the	  changes	  regarding	   the	  staff	   that	  provides	  assistance	   to	   the	  MEPs,	  and	  in	  that	  sense	  are	  connected	  to	  the	  treatment	  of	  the	  political	  decision-­‐making.	  The	  previous	  research	  in	  this	  area	  are	  not	  extensive,	  but	  the	  results	  has	  pointed	  in	  the	  direction	  of	   that	   the	  staff	  plays	  an	   important	   role	   in	   supporting	   the	  MEPs	  and	  helping	  them	   to	   handle	   the	   informational	   deficit	   that	   they	   might	   face	   when	   making	   policy	  choices.	   The	   staffs’	   role	   in	   supporting	   the	   parliaments	   position	   in	   relation	   to	   its	  executive	  has	  also	  been	  lifted.	  	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  study	  to	  investigate	  changes	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  administrative	  support	  in	  the	  European	  Parliament,	  and	  also	  look	  at	  the	  explanations	  for	  these	  changes;	  what	  caused	  the	  changes	  to	  happen	  and	  why	  the	  EP-­‐administration	  was	  designed	  in	  the	  way	   it	   is.	   By	   using	   the	   same	   analytical	   framework	   as	   is	   used	   for	   government	  administrations	  in	  nation	  states	  I	  argue	  that	  we	  can	  see	  interesting	  patterns	  that	  help	  us	  understand	  more	  about	  these	  questions.	  The	  explanatory	  factors	  have	  been	  drawn	  from	  two	   core	   theoretical	   perspectives	   on	   organisations,	   the	   instrumental	   and	   the	  institutional	   perspective.	   I	   have	   used	   process	   tracing	   as	   method	   to	   look	   at	   two	  main	  reform	   processes	   and	   the	   snowball	   method	   has	   been	   used	   to	   find	   the	   investigated	  documents.	  	  The	  main	  conclusions	  is	  that	  there	  has	  been	  both	  intentional	  changes	  and	  changes	  that	  comes	  as	  consequences	  of	  decisions	  that	  are	  not	  entirely	  up	  to	  the	  parliament	  itself.	  As	   regards	   the	  assistance	   to	  MEPs	   the	  organisation	  of	   the	  administration	  has	   changed	  significantly	  towards	  providing	  faster	  and	  more	  qualified	  support	  to	  ensure	  the	  quality	  of	   the	   legislature	   and	   meet	   the	   needs	   of	   the	   MEPs.	   The	   reform	   processes	   has	   been	  characterised	  by	  that	  the	  parliament	  is	  a	  strongly	  institutionalised	  organisation	  and	  by	  negotiations	  between	  the	  relevant	  stakeholders,	  rather	  than	  a	  rational	  design	  approach.	  The	   proposals	   put	   forward	   in	   the	   reform	   process	   was	  motivated	   from	   dissatisfaction	  amongst	  the	  MEPs,	  and	  also	  from	  that	  the	  parliament	  needed	  to	  adapt	  to	  a	  new	  situation	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with	   greater	   powers	   and	   an	   enlarged	   EU.	   The	   negotiations,	   as	   well	   as	   political	  compromises,	  have	  restrained	  a	  rational	  design	  of	  the	  Parliament.	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Foreword	  My	  interest	  for	  the	  EU	  goes	  back	  many	  years	  so	  it	  was	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  for	  me	  to	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  a	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  scholarship	  student	  there	  and	  for	  the	  financial	  support	  during	  my	  project.	  It	  was	  a	  great	  and	  inspiring	  time.	  Especially	  I	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  my	  fellow	  student	  Mats	  Petter	  Sydengen	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  contributing	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  working	  environment	  at	  ARENA	  and	  for	  support.	  	  A	  big	  thanks	  to	  all	  my	  fellow	  students	  who	  made	  the	  time	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Oslo	  to	   such	   a	   stimulating	   and	   fun	   period	   as	   it	   has	   been.	   My	   family	   and	   loved	   ones	   also	  deserves	   a	   great	   thanks	   for	   the	   support	   in	   this	   project	   and	   throughout	   the	   university	  studies	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  	  Thanks	  to	  Mari	  Svardal	  and	  Kristoffer	  Løvmyr	  for	  reading	  the	  thesis	  and	  for	  the	  good	  feedback.	  	  Finally	  I	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  the	  European	  Parliaments	  services	  for	  providing	  the	  necessary	  documents	  to	  make	  this	  study	  possible.	  	  	  Stockholm,	  21	  October	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Table	  of	  Abbreviations	  	  EP	   European	  Parliament	  EC	   European	  Commission	  Council	   European	  Council	  MEP	   Member	  of	  Parliament	  EPP	   European	  Peoples	  Party	  S&D	   Socialists	  and	  Democrats	  	  When	  politicians	  are	  presented	  I	  will	  put	  their	  nationality	  and	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  affiliation	  in	  brackets	  after	  their	  name.	  For	  example	  James	  Provan	  is	  a	  British	  MEP,	  affiliated	  with	  the	  European	  Peoples	  Party,	  I	  will	  therefore	  write;	  James	  Provan	  (UK,	  EPP).	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1 A	  European	  legislative	  assembly	  The	  history	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (EU)	  starts	  with	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Coal	  and	  Steel	  Community	  in	  1952.	  It	  established	  all	  the	  four	  main	  institutions	  that	  we	  today	  know	   as	   The	   European	   Commission	   (EC),	   Union	   Council	   (Council),	   The	   European	  Parliament	   (EP)	   and	   The	   European	   Court	   of	   Justice	   (ECJ)	   (Cini	   &	   Pérez-­‐Solórzano	  Borragán	  2010).	  For	  a	  long	  time,	  the	  EP	  has	  been	  viewed	  and	  treated	  as	  the	  weaker	  part	  of	  the	  EU,	  much	  because	  of	  the	  limited	  powers	  that	  were	  assigned	  to	  the	  EP	  in	  the	  first	  treaties	  of	  the	  EU.	  The	  gradual	  and	  stepwise	  way	  which	  the	  EPs	  power	  was	  increased	  in	  did	   not	   change	   this	   much.	   Today	   the	   situation	   has	   changed	   radically:	   The	   EP	   has	  developed	  into	  a	  real	  force	  within	  the	  EU’s	  legislative	  and	  budgetary	  processes,	  and	  one	  of	  the	  leading	  advocators	  for	  greater	  democratic	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  process	  of	  European	  integration	  (Hayes-­‐Renshaw	  &	  Wallace	  2006,	  p.	  207	  and	  Neunreither	  2003:54).	  	  With	   the	   Lisbon	   treaty	   the	   former	   co-­‐decision	   method	   was	   turned	   into	   the	  ordinary	   legislative	  procedure	   and	   also	   extended	   to	   almost	   all	   regulatory	   fields	   of	   the	  EU,	   the	   procedure	   now	   covers	   eighty-­‐five	   of	   the	   Treaty	   articles	   (Neuhold	   &	   Dobbels	  2012,	  p.	  1).	  Some	  80	  %	  of	  all	  EU	  legislation	  needs	  Parliaments	  consent	  (Kreppel	  2003,	  p.	  906).	   The	   ordinary	   legislative	   procedure	   makes	   the	   parliament	   co-­‐legislator	   together	  with	  the	  Council	  by	  giving	  the	  two	  institutions	  the	  same	  weight	  in	  the	  legislative	  process	  (European	  Parliament	  2013d).	  The	  two	  institutions	  can	  therefore	  be	  described	  as	  parts	  of	  a	  bicameral	  legislature.	  	  Whilst	   the	   EP	   gradually	   has	   gained	  more	   power;	   the	   scholarly	   interest	   for	   the	  parliament	  has	   also	  been	  growing.	  However,	   there	  has	  not	  been	  much	   research	   about	  the	   staff	   in	   the	   EP.	   We	   do	   however	   know	   that	   the	   structure	   and	   behaviour	   of	   staff	  matters	   and	   influences	   the	   decision-­‐making.	   There	   has	   not	   been	   particularly	   much	  scholarly	  attention	  paid	  to	  legislative	  staff	  in	  general	  either,	  even	  though	  there	  are	  some	  studies,	  as	  we	  will	  see.	  	  This	  is	  what	  I	  want	  to	  make	  a	  contribution	  to	  change.	  This	  study	  aims	   to	   investigate	   changes	   in	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   administration	   in	   the	   EP,	   and	  especially	   their	   role	   in	   supporting	   the	   MEPs.	   The	   research	   question	   is	   about	   the	  organisation	  of	   change;	   how	   the	   structure	  of	   an	  organisation	   changes,	  why	   it	   does	   so,	  and	   the	   factors	   that	   shape	   organisational	   change	   processes.	   I	   will	   study	   this	   in	   the	  context	  of	  the	  EP.	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It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   the	   EP	   is	   the	   only	   directly	   elected	   transnational	  representative	   institution	   in	   the	  world.	   In	   that	   sense	   the	   chosen	   case	   in	   this	   study	   is	  unique,	  a	  sui	  generis.	  The	  scope	  of	   this	  study	  could,	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  be	  understood	  in	  a	  range	  of	  settings.	  The	   first	   is	   in	   the	  setting	  of	  administrative	  change	   in	  general,	  and	   in	  public	   organisations	   in	   particular.	   The	   EP-­‐administration	   does,	   despite	   its	   unique	  features,	  in	  many	  ways	  share	  the	  same	  organisational	  features	  as	  other	  administrations.	  	  And	  many	   of	   the	   general	   assumptions	   of	   how	   organisations	  work	   and	   change	   can	   be	  applied	   also	   to	   the	   EP-­‐administration	   as	   well.	   Secondly,	   the	   EP-­‐administration	   is	   a	  parliamentary	   administration	   and	   could	   be	   related	   to	   other	   parliaments	   in	   other	  organisations	  and	  also	  to	  parliaments	  in	  nation	  states.	  One	  could	  therefore	  also	  see	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  EP-­‐administration	  as	  an	  example	  of	  parliamentary	  change	  and	  relate	  it	  to	  other	   similar	   cases.	   Thirdly,	   the	   EP-­‐administration	   can	   be	   related	   to	   administrative	  services	  within	  the	  other	  institutions.	  As	  we	  will	  see,	  the	  EU	  has	  one	  common	  European	  Civil	   Service	   for	   all	   the	   EU	   institutions.	   This	   and	   other	   factors	   lead	   to	   close	   contacts	  between	  the	  institutions.	  	  Today	  the	  EP’s	  administrative	  support	  structure	  is	  organised	  in	  three	  main	  parts.	  1)	   The	   General	   Secretariat	   2)	   the	   staff	   of	   the	   EP’s	   political	   groups,	   and	   3)	   the	  MEPs’	  personal	   assistants.	   The	  General	   Secretariat	   is	   the	  main	   part	   of	   the	   EP-­‐administration	  and	  its	  organisational	  design	  is	  elaborate.	  Since	  the	  EP	  was	  established	  there	  has	  been	  a	  dramatic	  growth	  in	  its	  General	  Secretariat,	  which	  employs	  the	  larger	  part	  of	  the	  EP	  staff.	  The	  number	  of	  posts	  increased	  from	  37	  in	  1952,	  almost	  2000	  in	  1979,	  nearly	  3000	  posts	  by	   1984,	   to	   the	   around	   6000	   officials	   currently	   working	   for	   the	   General	   Secretariat	  (Corbett,	  Jacobs	  &	  Shackleton	  2011,	  p.	  226).	  The	  second	  group	  of	  the	  EP-­‐administration	  is	   the	   staff	   of	   the	   political	   groups,	   currently	   about	   900	   posts	   (Corbett,	   Jacobs	   &	  Shackleton	  2011,	  p.	  113).	  The	  expansion	  of	  the	  EP-­‐administration	  has	  come	  in	  the	  wake	  of	   increase	   in	   the	   number	   of	   MEPs	   (from	   78	   to	   785),	   nationalities	   (six	   to	   27)	   and	  working	  languages	  (four	  to	  23),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  major	  task	  expansion	  of	  the	  EP	  (Corbett,	  Jacobs	  &	  Shackleton	  2011,	  p.	  219).	  	  The	  parliament	  staff	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  source	  of	  alternative	  competence	  for	  the	  MEP’s	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   executive	   power,	   the	   Commission,	   which	   has	   the	   greatest	   expert	  competence.	   The	  MEPs	   have,	   as	  we	  will	   see,	   always	   tried	   to	   form	   their	   own	   opinions	  based	   on	   other	   information	   sources,	   rather	   than	   relying	   on	   the	   expertise	   of	   the	  executive.	   The	   quality	   of	   assistance	   provided	   by	   the	   parliament	   is	   therefore	   a	   key	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element	   of	   the	   legislative	   process	   in	   the	   parliament	   (Neunreither	   2002,	   p.	   45).	   Some	  have	  also	  argued	  that	  the	  EP	  staff	  has	  played	  an	  important	  role	  as	  institutional	  defenders,	  not	   least	  because	  MEPs	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  temporary	  participants	  -­‐	  whilst	  the	  EP	  staff	  has	  represented	  continuity	  and	  managed	  knowledge	  and	  understanding	  of	   the	  EU	  decision	  making	  system	  (Neunreither	  2002,	  pp.	  45-­‐47).	  	  
1.1 State	  of	  the	  Art:	  Previous	  research	  How	   a	   legislature	   is	   organised	   differs	   on	   some	   important	   factors	   from	   the	  organisation	  of	  bureaucracies.	  Legislatures	  have	   the	  power	   to	  organise	   themselves,	  no	  outside	  authority	  can	  decide	  upon	  their	  organisation.	  The	  members	  of	  a	  legislature	  are	  formally	   equal	   to	   each	  other	  and	   they	  do	  not	   stand	   in	   the	   relationship	  of	   authority	  or	  subordination	  of	  each	  other,	  as	  members	  of	  hierarchical	  organisations.	  Loewenberg	  and	  Patterson	   (1979,	   p.	   164)	   argues	   that	   legislatures	   rely	   extensively	   on	   precedents,	  customs,	   and	   informal	   norms,	   and	   relatively	   little	   on	   formal	   rules.	   Even	   so,	   all	  legislatures	  have	  appointed	   leaders	  with	  specified	   tasks	  and	  are	   therefore	  hierarchical	  organisations	   (Judge	  &	  Earnshaw	  2008,	   p.	   159).	  But	   as	   Judge	   and	  Earnshaw	   (2008,	   p.	  159)	  explain,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  full	  story	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  EP.	  The	  EP	  is	  a	  co-­‐legislator	  together	  with	  the	  intergovernmental	  Council,	  which	  in	  turn,	  also	  is	  part	  of	  what	  one	  can	  see	   as	   a	   dual	   executive	   together	   with	   the	   Commission	   (even	   though	   most	   executive	  power	  still	  lies	  within	  the	  Commission).	  This	  means	  that	  the	  parliament	  has	  got	  a	  special	  relationship	   to	   these	   institutions.	   Many	   of	   the	   unique	   features	   of	   the	   EP	   will	   be	  presented	  in	  depth	  later,	  but	  several	  of	  them	  are	  associated	  with	  that,	  as	  stated	  above,	  the	   EP	   is	   a	   sui	   generis	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	   is	   the	   only	   directly	   elected	   transnational	  representative	  institution	  in	  the	  world.	  	  Together	   with	   the	   EPs	   growing	   power	   in	   EU	   decision-­‐making,	   the	   EP	   has	   also	  gained	  greater	  attention	  from	  scholars.	  However,	  as	  mentioned	  above,	  little	  research	  has	  looked	   on	   the	   internal	   organisation	   of	   the	  EP,	   and	   the	   literature	   on	   its	   administrative	  apparatus	   remains	   even	   thinner	   (Egeberg	   et	   al.	   2011,	   p.	   5).	   Whilst	   the	   number	   of	  employees	   in	  the	  EP	  has	  been	  growing,	  there	  has	  not	  been	  much	  research	  made	  about	  their	  organisation	  or	  role	  in	  the	  parliament.	  There	  has	  been	  some	  research	  on	  legislative	  staff	   in	  the	  US	  Congress	  that	  can	  be	  relevant	  when	  looking	  on	  the	  context	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  well.	  The	  research	  has	  shown	  how	  the	  staffing	  of	  the	  legislatures	  varies	  in	  terms	  of	  size	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and	  organisational	  setup	  –	  From	  the	  US	  Congress	  where	  each	  MEP	  and	  committee	  have	  a	  vast	   body	   of	   professional	   staff	   at	   their	   disposal,	   to	   parliamentary	   committees	   that	  borrow	   staff	   from	   their	   executive’s	   bureaucracies.	   The	   variation	   has	   generally	   been	  explained	  by	  different	  constitutional	  principles	  of	  the	  political	  systems.	  The	  separation	  of	   powers	   has	   explained	   the	   elaborated	   organisation	   of	   the	   staff	   in	   the	   US	   Congress	  (Egeberg	  et	  al.	  2011,	  p.	  3).	  The	  European	  Union	  does	  not	  have	  the	  same	  clear	  principle	  of	  separation	  of	  powers	  as	   the	  US,	   so	  we	  will	  have	   to	   look	   for	  other	  explanations	   for	   the	  growth	  of	  parliament	  staff	  in	  the	  EP.	  Andrea	  Pegan	  (2012,	  p.	  20)	  examined	  the	  growth	  of	  the	   legislative	   staff	   in	   the	   EP,	   showing	   that	   organisational	   complexity,	   rather	   than	  increasing	  workload	   is	   likely	   to	   increase	   the	  number	  of	   administrative	   	   (AD-­‐category)	  staff	   in	   the	   secretariat	   and	   the	   political	   groups	   of	   the	   EP.	   Pegans	   quantitative	   study	  concludes	  that	  the	  EP	  has	  not	  increased	  its	  staff	  when	  a	  new	  treaty,	  giving	  the	  EP	  more	  power,	  has	  entered	  into	  force,	  but	  rather	  when	  membership	  and	  the	  number	  of	  political	  committees	   have	   increased.	   It	   also	   shows	   that	   the	   organisational	   complexity	   of	   the	  secretariat,	   here	   operationalised	   as	   number	   of	   Directorate-­‐Generals,	   has	   a	   negative	  influence	  on	  the	  number	  of	  staff.	  These	  conclusions	  support	  my	  interest	  in	  studying	  the	  organisational	  structure	  of	  the	  EP-­‐staff.	  	  Attention	   has	   also	   been	   drawn	   to	   how	   the	   institutional	   resources	   affect	   the	  parliaments	   influence	   over	   policy	   and	   how	   the	  MEPs	   handle	   the	   informational	   deficit	  they	  might	  face	  when	  making	  policy-­‐choices	  and	  in	  their	  voting	  behaviour.	  Some	  studies	  have	  pointed	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  administrations’	  role	  in	  supporting	  the	  parliament’s	  power	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   executive.	   More	   explicit,	   a	   change	   in	   the	   role	   for	   the	   EP-­‐administration	  has	  been	  noted;	  this	  supports	  the	  research	  question	  that	  this	  study	  seeks	  to	  answer.	  The	  growth	   in	   the	  administrative	  support	  should	  however	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  increasing	  administrative	  power	  within	  the	  parliament	  (Egeberg	  et	  al.	  2011,	  pp.	  3-­‐5).	   An	   interview	   study	   on	   the	   EP	   committee	   staff	   and	   MEP’s,	   concluded	   that	  interviewees	  stressed	  the	   importance	  of	   the	  staff	  when	   it	  comes	  to	  drafting	  reports	  or	  opinions	   and	   shaping	   the	   informational	   foundations	   of	   the	   policy	   making.	   Yet	   the	  boundaries	   of	   their	   role	   seem	   fluid	   and	   their	   autonomy	   is	   under	   the	   hierarchical	  constraints	  of	  political	  superiors	  (Winzen	  2011,	  p.	  40).	  Egeberg	  et	  al.	  (2011,	  pp.	  19-­‐21)	  has	  showed	  that	  officials	  in	  the	  EP	  perform	  tasks	  that	  might	  involve	  policy-­‐shaping,	  such	  as	  providing	  background	   information	  and	  various	  kinds	  of	  advice,	  drafting	  documents,	  facilitating	  compromises,	  etc.	  The	  organisational	  structure	  that	  surrounds	  the	  individual	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official	  has	  been	  stressed	  as	  the	  most	  important	  factor	  when	  explaining	  their	  behaviour.	  Egeberg	  et	  al.	  point	  out	  that	  their	  study	  is	  one	  of	  the	  first	  to	  focus	  explicit	  on	  the	  EP	  staff	  as	   such	   and	   therefore	   argues	   that	   more	   scholarly	   attention	   should	   be	   drawn	   to	   the	  parliament	  officials	  (Egeberg	  et	  al.	  2011,	  pp.	  19-­‐21).	  	  A	  study	  made	  by	  Kreppel	  has	  drawn	  attention	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  treaty	  reform	   and	   the	   internal	   development	   of	   the	   EP.	   Keppel’s	   study	   is	   focusing	   on	   “the	  balance	   between	   required	  Rules	   [of	   Procedure]	   reforms	   and	   internally	   and	   externally	  oriented	   strategic	   reforms”	   (Kreppel	   2003,	   p.	   884).	   The	  Rules	   of	   Procedure,	   however,	  mostly	  concerns	  the	  ‘political’	  side	  of	  the	  EP,	  that	  is	  procedures	  and	  organisation	  of	  the	  work	   of	   parliamentary	   committees,	   the	   President,	   political	   groups	   etc.,	   and	   will	  therefore	  not	  be	  playing	  a	  significant	  role	   in	  my	  study	  as	  such.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  study	  shows	   some	   interesting	   results	   and	   therefore	   deserves	   a	   presentation	   here.	   Kreppel	  underlines	  the	  importance	  of	  understanding	  the	  role	  that	  the	  treaty-­‐changes	  have	  had	  in	  providing	  opportunities	  for	  strategic	  internal	  reforms,	  however	  not	  directly	  and	  explicit	  linked	   to	   the	   treaties.	   She	   clearly	   links	   the	   revisions	   of	   the	   Rules	   of	   Procedure	   to	   the	  treaty-­‐reforms	   and	   also	   stresses	   their	   importance	   in	   governing	   the	   relationships	  between	  the	  actors	  within	  the	  EP.	  At	  every	  possible	  opportunity	  the	  EP	  has	  “used	  treaty	  reform	   as	   an	   opportunity	   to	   thoroughly	   review	   and	   revise	   its	   internal	   structures	   to	  adapt	   to	   the	   new	   political	   realities	   created	   by	   the	   various	   treaties”	   (Kreppel	   2003,	   p.	  904).	   But	   the	   EP	   did	   more	   than	   just	   modify	   its	   RoP	   to	   narrowly	   deal	   with	   the	   new	  realities	  created	  by	  treaty	  reform;	  it	  also	  consistently	  attempted	  to	  make	  the	  most	  of	  the	  new	  situation.	  The	  EP	  has	  used	  two	  strategies	  to	  achieve	  this:	  	  -­‐ The	   first	   tactic	  has	  been	  externally	  oriented,	   focused	  on	  unilaterally	  asserting	  
its	   own	   powers	   and	   rights	   or	   by	   placing	   new	   obligations	   on	   the	   other	   EU	  
institutions/organisations	  by	  incorporating	  them	  into	  the	  RoP.	  	  -­‐ The	  second	  strategy	  has	  been	  to	  focus	  internally	  and	  ‘streamline’	  its	  procedures	  
and	   organisational	   structures	   to	   maximize	   efficiency	   (i.e.	   its	   ability	   to	   wield	  
influence),	  often	  through	  the	  centralization	  of	  many	  powers	  and	  activities.	  	  	   (Kreppel	  2003,	  pp.	  904-­‐05)	  The	   first	   of	   these	   tactics	  was	  most	   commonly	  used	  by	   the	  EP	  up	  until	   the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  because	  the	  Parliament	  then	  was	  dissatisfied	  with	  its	  own	  position	  among	  the	  EU	  institutions.	   Together	   with	   the	   Parliaments	   rising	   status	   and	   influence,	   its	   focus	   has	  shifted	  towards	  the	  second	  strategy:	  improving	  its	  ability	  and	  efficiency	  to	  act	  within	  the	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legislative	  process	  to	  make	  the	  most	  of	   its	  newly	  acquired	   legislative	  power.	  But	  these	  increases	  in	  efficiency	  do	  not	  come	  without	  a	  price.	  “These	  costs	  and	  benefits	  are	  quite	  clear	  in	  the	  [political]	  debates	  [in	  the	  EP],	  particularly	  those	  during	  the	  Amsterdam	  and	  Nice	   revisions”	   (Kreppel	   2003,	   pp.	   906-­‐907).	   It	   is	   obvious	   that	   there	   is	   a	   general	  consensus	   that	   the	   reforms	   in	   the	   Rules	   of	   Procedure	   has	   led	   to	   a	   significant	  concentration	  of	  power	  to	  the	  two	  largest	  party	  groups	  in	  the	  parliament,	  especially	  in	  the	  plenary	  sessions	  and	  in	  the	  Leadership	  of	  the	  parliament,	  but	  also	  in	  the	  committees.	  Kreppel	  argues	  however	  for	  the	  necessity	  of	  these	  reforms;	  “Formal	  treaty	  revisions,	  in	  and	  of	  themselves,	  would	  have	  been	  insufficient	  to	  transform	  the	  EP	  from	  a	  chamber	  of	  debate	   into	   an	   efficient	   legislative	   body”	   (Kreppel	   2003,	   pp.	   906-­‐07).	   This	   conclusion	  clearly	   shows	   how	   the	   internal	   power	   balance	   in	   the	   EP	   has	   shifted	   towards	   the	   two	  large	  party	  groups.	  This	   is	   an	   important	   factor	   to	  bring	  with	   in	  my	   study	  as	  well.	  The	  obvious	  question	   is	  whether	  one	  can	  see	   the	   same	  development	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	  decision-­‐making	  on	  changes	  in	  the	  administrative	  support.	  	  The	   most	   recent	   and	   far-­‐reaching	   administrative	   reform	   in	   the	   General	  Secretariat	  of	  the	  EP	  is	  the	  so	  called	  ‘Raising	  the	  Game’-­‐	  reform.	  In	  a	  short	  article,	  Kungla	  analyses	  what	  factors	  that	  has	  “triggered	  and	  shaped”	  (Kungla	  2007,	  p.	  71)	  this	  reform,	  which	   also	   will	   be	   part	   of	   my	   study	   and	   its	   content	   will	   be	   further	   presented	   later.	  Basically,	   the	   reform	   covers	   the	   scientific	   support	   given	   to	   MEPs	   from	   the	   General	  Secretariat	   (Kungla	   2007,	   p.	   75).	   Both	   external	   factors,	   which	   are	   changes	   in	   the	  environment,	   and	   internal	   factors,	  which	   are	  distribution	  of	   power	   and	   resources	   and	  the	  presence	  of	  policy	  entrepreneurs	  in	  the	  organisation,	  explains	  this	  reform	  according	  to	  Kungla	  (2007,	  p.	  74).	  The	  debate	  on	  the	  scientific	  support	  to	  MEPs	  goes	  back	  to	  the	  end	   of	   the	   1990s	   and	   a	   series	   of	   steps	   had	   built	   up	   to	   the	   final	   reform.	   These	   are	   for	  example	  internally	  produced	  investigations	  on	  the	  scientific	  support	  as	  well	  as	  internal	  and	  external	  reports	  with	  a	  broader	  scope	  on	  the	  working	  methods	  in	  the	  parliament	  in	  general	  (Kungla	  2007).	  	  All	  of	   these	  studies	  are	  good	  examples	  of	   the	  rising	  scholarly	   interest	   in	   the	  EP-­‐administration.	   One	   of	   the	   lessons	   from	   their	   studies	   is	   that	   different	   types	   of	  organisational	  changes	  in	  the	  parliament	  can	  have	  different	  origins	  and	  motives.	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1.2 Research	  question	  We	   know	   that	   the	   staff	   in	   parliament’s	   matters	   and	   also	   that	   the	   number	   of	  employees	   in	   the	   EP	   has	   been	   growing	   ever	   since	   the	   parliament	   was	   established.	  Generally,	   studies	  have	  shown	  that	  organisational	  structure	  matters	   for	  how	  members	  of	   an	   organisation	   act	   and	   for	   how	   institutions	   act.	   We	   also	   know	   how	   the	   EP-­‐administration	   is	   organised	   today	   and	   where	   the	   formal	   power	   to	   decide	   upon	   the	  internal	  organisation	  lies.	  However	  there	  are	  no	  systematically	  expositions	  on	  how	  the	  organisation	  of	  the	  staff	  has	  changed	  over	  time	  or	  how	  and	  why	  the	  decisions	  about	  the	  organisational	   changes	   have	   been	   made	   (Pegan	   2011,	   p.	   4).	   This	   is	   what	   this	   study	  contributes	  to.	  Therefore	  my	  research	  question	  is:	  	  	  
How	   has	   the	   formal	   organisational	   structure	   of	   the	   European	   Parliament-­‐
administration	  changed	  over	  time	  and	  how	  can	  these	  changes	  be	  explained?	  	  	  The	  study	  will	  be	  limited	  to	  the	  period	  from	  1999,	  when	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Amsterdam	  was	   about	   to	   enter	   into	   force	   and	   until	   2012.	   The	   time	   frame	   are	   chosen	   because	   it	  ensures	  the	  possibility	  to	  study	  the	  development	  under	  the	  last	  three	  treaties,	  and	  as	  we	  will	   see,	   the	   EP-­‐administration	   remained	   basically	   unchanged	   until	   that	   time	  (Neunreither	   2002,	   p.	   55	   and	   Kungla	   2007:77).	   As	   the	   question	   indicates,	   the	   formal	  organisational	  structure	   is	   the	  dependent	  variable	   in	   this	  study.	  The	  main	  explanatory	  factors	  are	  drawn	  from	  two	  core	  theoretical	  perspectives	  on	  organisations,	  these	  will	  be	  presented	  in	  the	  theory	  chapter	  hereunder.	  	  An	  important	  demarcation	  to	  stress	  is	  that	  this	  study	  focuses	  on	  the	  organisation	  of	   the	  administration	   in	   the	  EP,	  and	  especially	  on	   the	  administrations	  role	  of	  assisting	  the	   Parliaments	   Members.	   This	   means	   that	   the	   study	   does	   not	   cover	   the	   whole	  organisational	  structure	  in	  the	  EP.	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  example	  of	  in	  Keppel’s	  study,	  many	  changes	   has	   happened	   to	   the	   ‘political	   side’	   of	   the	   parliament	   during	   the	   last	   two	  decades.	   Changes	  have	   also	  happened	   in	  what	   role	   that	   organised	   interests	   and	   lobby	  groups	  play	   in	  the	  day	  to	  day	   life	   in	  the	  EP	  (see	  for	  example	  Neunreither	  2002,	  p.	  53).	  These	   changes	  will	   not	   be	   covered	   in	   this	   study,	   but	   are	   factors	   to	   keep	   in	  mind.	   The	  demarcation	  is	  made	  based	  on	  an	  analysis	  that,	  the	  assistance	  to	  Members	  of	  Parliament	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is	   the	  most	   interesting	  part	   of	   the	   administration,	   since	   it	   is	   directly	   connected	   to	   the	  ‘product’	  that	  the	  Parliament	  produces,	  namely	  the	  political	  decisions.	  	  The	  following	  parts	  of	  this	  thesis	  will	  be	  structured	  as	  follows:	  First	  I	  will	  present	  the	  theoretical	   framework	  for	  answering	  both	  parts	  of	  my	  research	  question.	  This	  will	  include	  a	  framework	  for	  analysing	  organisational	  key	  variables,	  and	  the	  perspectives	  on	  how	   organisations	  work	   and	  why	   they	   change.	  Moving	   on,	   there	  will	   be	   a	   discussion	  about	  methodology,	   reliability,	   and	  validity	  and	  how	   I	   as	   researcher	   relate	   to	   the	  data	  sources	   that	   are	   used	   in	   this	   study.	   The	   following	   chapter	   will	   present	   the	   empirical	  findings,	   including	   first	   a	   presentation	   of	   the	   formal	   structure	   of	   the	   parliament’s	  internal	   organisation	   as	   of	   today,	   and	   how	   decisions	   about	   it	   are	   formally	   made.	  Secondly	  the	  chapter	  will	  go	  in	  depth	  with	  the	  identified	  reform	  processes	  and	  trace	  the	  steps	   in	   these	   processes	   that	   have	   led	   to	   a	   decision	   about	   the	   formal	   organisational	  structure.	   Finally,	   an	  analysis	  of	   the	   findings	  will	   be	  presented	  where	   the	   findings	  are	  related	   to	   the	   theoretical	   perspectives	   to	   try	   to	   make	   the	   patterns	   more	   visible.	   The	  thesis	  will	  end	  with	  a	  summary	  and	  presentation	  of	  my	  key	  conclusions.	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2 Theory:	  Organisational	  perspectives	  There	   are	   many	   theoretical	   approaches	   to	   use	   when	   analysing	   how	   an	  organisation	   has	   changed	   and	   trying	   to	   explain	   these	   changes.	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   most	  fruitful	  way	  of	  analysing	  the	  EP	  administration	  is	  to	  review	  it	  under	  the	  same	  kinds	  of	  theories	  and	  approaches	  that	  are	  used	  for	  analysing	  government	  structures	  in	  the	  nation	  states.	  Tallberg	  (2010,	  p.	  634)	  formulated	  a	  good	  analytical	  point	  when	  he	  wrote	  “that	  ‘institutions	  and	  matter’	  is	  not	  a	  claim	  in	  this	  literature;	  it	  is	  an	  analytical	  starting	  point.”	  	  The	   organisational	   perspective	   is	   based	   on	   the	   notion	   that	   the	   bureaucratic	  structure	   matters	   and	   affects	   the	   actual	   decision	   behaviour	   in	   an	   organisation.	   By	  changing	   the	   organisational	   structure	   of	   the	   bureaucracy,	   one	   can	   affect	   the	   policy	  process	   and	   eventually	   also	   shape	   its	   outputs	   (Egeberg	   2012,	   pp.	   69-­‐72).	   Ullström	  (2011,	  p.	  37)	  explains	  this	  argument	  further	  when	  she	  writes	  that	  the	  fundamental	  idea	  is	  that	  the	  organisational	  position	  of	  an	  employee	  determines	  what	  they	  do.	  The	  position	  is	   the	   most	   important	   factor	   for	   what	   the	   employee	   does,	   and	   other	   factors	   such	   as	  personal	   values	   and	   cognitive	   perceptions	   also	   play	   a	   smaller	   role	   (Ullström	   2011,	   p.	  37).	  This	  argument	  goes	  back	  to	  Allison	  and	  Zelikow	  (1999,	  p.	  307)	  famous	  research	  on	  the	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis,	  where	  he	  writes	  that	  “where	  you	  stand	  depends	  on	  where	  you	  sit”.	  	   The	  organisational	  perspective	  is	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  bounded	  rationality.	  Hence,	  it	  starts	   from	  the	  notion	  that	  a	  decision	  maker	   is	  unable	  to	  attend	  to	  everything	  at	  the	  same	   time,	   and	   to	   consider	   all	   possible	   alternatives	   and	   their	   consequences	   (Egeberg	  2012,	   p.	   116).	   Organisations	   are	   made	   up	   by	   several	   relations	   that	   are	   predefined	  through	  positions,	   job	  descriptions	  and	  rules	   for	  what	  different	  actors	   should	  do,	  who	  should	  decide	  how,	  when	  and	   in	  what	  speed	  things	  should	  be	  done,	  and	  who	  to	  speak	  with	  whom	  about	  different	  things,	  as	  Ahrne	  (2007,	  p.	  32)	  puts	  it.	  All	  of	  this	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  filters	  and	  selection	  mechanisms	  that	  sorts	  in	  and	  out	  what	  information	  that	  comes	  in	  to	  the	  organisation	  and	  how	  the	  information	  is	  treated.	  	  Applying	  this	  type	  of	  organisational	  perspective	  on	  public	  organisations,	  Egeberg	  (1992)	  identifies	  some	  organisational	  key	  variables	  that	  from	  a	  public	  policy-­‐perspective	  are	  manageable	  and	  affect	  the	  actual	  decision	  behaviour.	  These	  factors	  are	  divided	  into	  three	   main	   parts:	   the	   organisation’s	   formal	   structure,	   its	   demography	   and	   locus	  (Egeberg	  1992).	  When	  studying	  how	  the	  EP-­‐administration	  is	  structured	  today	  and	  how	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it	  has	  developed	  over	  time	  I	  will	  put	  emphasis	  on	  these	  organisational	  key	  variables.	  The	  variables	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  specification	  of	  the	  dependent	  variable	  in	  the	  study,	  they	  are	  a	  way	  of	   categorising	   the	  kinds	  of	  organisational	   changes	   that	   this	   study	  wants	   to	  describe	  and	  explain.	  	  
2.1 Organisational	  key	  variables	  An	  organisational	   perspective	  draws	   attention	   to	   the	   role	   of	   a	   decision	  maker’s	  organisational	   context	   by	   paying	   attention	   to	   an	   organisation’s	   formal	   structure,	  demography	  and	  locus.	  The	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  organisations	  are	  capable	  of	  endowing	  individual	   actors	   with	   goals	   and	   interests	   through	   these	   organisational	   key	   variables	  (Egeberg	  2012,	  p.	  67).	  	  The	  first	  organisational	  key	  variable	  is	  formal	  organisational	  structure,	  which	  is	  a	  normative	   structure	   made	   up	   by	   rules	   and	   roles	   specifying,	   for	   instance	  working/operational	   instructions,	   impersonal	   norms	   etc.	   Hence,	   these	   rules	   and	  expectations	   define	   the	   interests	   and	   goals	   that	   are	   to	   be	   achieved,	   and	   which	  alternatives	  and	  considerations	  that	  are	  to	  be	  treated	  as	  relevant.	  The	  search	  process	  is	  thereby	  controlled	  and	  it	  also	  biases	  the	  information	  exposure.	  Given	  the	  restrictions	  of	  bounded	  rationality	   there	   seems	   to	  be	  a	  match	  between	   the	  decision	  makers	  need	   for	  simplification	  and	  the	  selection	  and	  filter	  that	  organisation	  provides,	  as	  Egeberg	  (2012,	  p.	  70)	  puts	  it,	  referring	  to	  Schattschneiders	  (1975,	  p.	  30)	  	  argument	  that	  “the	  structure	  of	  an	  organisation	   can	   therefore	  never	  be	  neutral,	   it	   always	   represents	   a	  mobilisation	  of	  bias	  in	  preparation	  for	  action”.	  	  More	  specifically	  there	  are	  some	  main	  indicators	  that	  can	  be	  used	  when	  looking	  at	  the	  organisational	  structure;	  the	  size	  of	  the	  organisation,	  such	  as	  number	  of	  employees,	  can	  be	  an	  indicator	  of	  the	  organisations	  capacity	  to	  initiate	  policies,	  develop	  alternatives	  or	  to	  implement	  final	  decisions.	  Horizontal	  specialisation	  defines	  how	  issues	  and	  policy	  areas	  are	  linked	  together	  or	  separated	  from	  each	  other,	  for	  instance	  transportation	  and	  environmental	  protection.	  There	  are	  four	  main	  principles	  that	  can	  be	  used	  in	  horizontal	  specialisation:	  territory,	  purpose	  (sector),	  function	  (process)	  or	  clientele	  served.	  Which	  one	   of	   these	   principles	   organisations	   are	   organised	   according	   to,	   matters	   for	   which	  conflict	   lines	   that	   will	   be	   lifted	   up	   to	   different	   levels.	   If	   the	   political-­‐administrative	  institutions	   are	   mainly	   organised	   among	   territorial	   lines,	   there	   will	   mainly	   come	   up	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conflicts	   about	   this	   to	   the	  political	   level,	   but	   if	   the	  political-­‐administrative	   institutions	  instead	  are	  organised	  according	  to	  the	  sector-­‐principle,	  conflicts	  that	  deals	  with	  this	  will	  be	   lifted	  up	  to	  the	  political	   level.	  This	   is	  explained	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  those	  areas	  that	  are	  covered	  by	   the	   same	  organisational	  unit	   are	  more	   likely	   to	  be	   coordinated	   than	   those	  that	  belong	  to	  different	  units.	  It	  has	  been	  shown	  that	  cooperation	  and	  information	  flows	  usually	   follows	   the	   formal	   structure	   of	   the	   organisation	   (Egeberg	   1992,	   pp.	   193-­‐196).	  
Vertical	   specialisation	   deals	   with	   the	   intended	   division	   of	   labour	   across	   hierarchical	  levels	  within	  or	  between	  organisations,	  as	  Egeberg	  (2012,	  pp.	  74-­‐75)	  puts	  it.	  Method	  of	  coordination	   is	   expressed	   through	   the	   organisational	   structure,	   and	   it	   can	   be	  hierarchical	   or	   collegial.	   A	   collegial	   structure	   implies	   that	   decisions	   usually	   are	  made	  through	   bargaining,	   arguing	   or	   voting	   rather	   than	   through	   command.	   Government	  organisations	  are	  usually	  hierarchically	  organised	  even	  though	  collegial	  bodies,	  such	  as	  committees,	   to	   a	   greater	   degree	   are	   used	   to	   complement	   the	   hierarchical	   structures.	  Studies	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  and	  onwards	  have	  shown	  that	  organisational	  units	  are	  more	  and	  more	  woven	  together,	  which	  has	  led	  to	  a	  kind	  of	  network	  administration.	  	  Most	   committees	   engage	   people	   from	  many	   different	   organisational	   units.	   This	  means	   the	   participants	   have	   their	   secondary	   affiliation	   in	   the	   committees.	   There	   is	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  participants	  in	  the	  committees	  are	  affected	  to	  some	  degree	  by	  the	  agendas,	  alternatives	  and	  actors	  that	  they	  meet	  in	  the	  committees,	  even	  though	  we	  can	  expect	  the	  impact	  to	  be	  less	  profound	  than	  from	  the	  organisation	  where	  they	  have	  their	   primary	   affiliation	   (Egeberg	   2012,	   pp.	   74-­‐75).	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   EP	   it	   is	   more	  relevant	   to	  differentiate	  between	  permanent	   actors	   like	   the	   staff,	   and	  more	   temporary	  actors	   like	   the	  MEPs.	   It	   is	   known	   that	   the	   EP	   has	   got	   a	   higher	   turnover	   rate	   than	   the	  European	  national	  parliaments	   in	  general	  (Hagemann	  2009,	  p.	  12).	  This	  fact	  can	  imply	  that	   the	   staff	   in	   the	   parliament	   might	   have	   a	   more	   long-­‐term	   perspective	   on	   the	  evolution	  of	  the	  EP,	  whilst	  one	  could	  imagine	  that	  the	  shifting	  of	  MEPs	  might	  affect	  their	  capacity	  to	  get	  involved	  in	  the	  process	  of	  shaping	  the	  parliaments	  functioning.	  	  Organisational	  demography	  refers	  to	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  personnel	  as	  regards	  to	  age,	  gender,	  ethnicity,	  nationality,	  education,	  length	  of	  service	  within	  the	  studied	  case	  etc.	   These	   types	   of	   factors	   are	   usually	   expected	   to	   have	   some	   impact	   on	   decision	  behaviour.	  The	  strength	  of	   the	   impact,	  however,	   is	  dependable	  on	  the	  characteristic	  of	  the	  organisational	  structure,	  and	  studies	  show	  that	  they	  generally	  do	  not	  have	  a	  strong	  impact,	  except	  for	  education.	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Organisational	   locus	   is	   the	   least	   covered	   part	   in	   political	   science	   literature.	  However,	  you	  can	  assume	   that	   the	  actual	  physical	   setup	   to	   some	  degree	  has	   influence	  over	  decision	  behaviour	  since	   it	   can	  help	  separate	  or	  bringing	  different	  organisational	  units	   together.	   Studies	   have	   shown	   that	   physical	   distance	   has	   a	   negative	   impact	   on	  contact	  and	  coordination	  between	  ministries.	  This	   is	  probably	  due	  to	  that	   the	  decision	  maker	  usually	  has	  to	  make	  choices	  in	  a	  stressful	  environment,	  it	  is	  then	  understandable	  that	   information	   that	  are	  easier	   to	  get,	   for	   instance	   from	  persons	   that	  are	   in	   the	  office	  next	  by,	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  (Egeberg	  2012,	  pp.	  76-­‐77).	  	  These	  key	  variables	  in	  organisational	  studies	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  this	  study	  since	   they	  can	  be	  used	   to	   specify	   the	  dependent	  variable,	   structure	  my	  analysis	  of	   the	  organisational	  changes	  and	  how	  the	  parliament	  has	  organised	  itself.	  As	  we	  will	  see	  in	  the	  following	  section,	  organisation	  does	  matter	  for	  how	  reorganisation	  takes	  place;	  this	  is	  an	  important	  analytical	  point	  for	  this	  study.	  	  
2.2 How	  do	  changes	  happen?	  The	   aim	   of	   this	   study	   is	   to	   analyse	   how	   the	   organisational	   structure	   of	   the	   EP-­‐administration	  has	  developed	  over	  time,	  and	  also	  to	  look	  at	  what	  caused	  the	  changes	  to	  happen	  and	  why	  the	  EP-­‐administration	  was	  designed	  in	  the	  way	  it	  was.	  To	  do	  this,	  the	  EP-­‐administration	   will	   be	   looked	   upon	   using	   two	   main	   perspectives	   on	   how	   public	  organisations	   work;	   the	   instrumental	   and	   the	   institutional	   perspective.	   These	  perspectives	   highlight	   different	   kinds	   of	   factors	   to	   explain	   organisational	   design	   and	  change,	   and	   they	   specify	   the	   way	   I	   will	   look	   at	   the	   administration,	   they	   form	   the	  spectacles	  that	  will	  be	  used	  in	  the	  study.	  The	  overall	  theme	  of	  the	  perspectives	  is	  on	  how	  organisations	  work	  on	  a	  fundamental	  level	  and	  also	  how	  they	  change.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  stress	   that	   the	   perspectives	   have	   different	   assumptions	   of	   how	   public	   organisations	  work,	  which	  actors	  that	  are	  relevant,	  on	  what	  basis	  they	  act	  and	  where	  the	  driving	  force	  of	   change	  comes	   from.	  Despite	   their	  differences,	   I	   argue,	   it	   is	  not	  necessary	   to	   see	   the	  perspectives	   as	   contradictory	   to	   each	   other,	   they	   are	   rather	   perspectives	   that	   help	   us	  analyse	  and	  understand	  how	  complex	  organisations	  like	  the	  public	  administration	  work	  from	  different	  angles.	  Changes	  may	  come	  as	  a	  result	  of	  conscious	  attempts	  to	  reorganise	  the	   institution	   to	   respond	   to	  changing	  circumstances	  and	  changes	   in	   the	  environment.	  That	   is	   for	   example	  when	   the	   EU	   grows	   and	   gets	  more	   and	  more	  member	   states,	   the	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institutions	  might	  feel	  a	  pressure	  to	  become	  more	  effective	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  work	  also	   in	   the	   new	   setting.	   But	   one	   might	   also	   find	   indications	   on	   that	   changes	   are	  incremental	   and	  path	  dependent,	   and	   that	   changes	  happen	   in	   a	  more	  organic	  way.	  As	  Thelen	  (2003,	  p.	  212)	  writes;	  “[I]f	  institutions	  rest	  on	  and	  reflect	  a	  particular	  foundation	  (whether	   efficiency-­‐based,	   or	   power-­‐based,	   or	   cultural)	   then	   they	   should	   change	   as	   a	  result	  of	  shifts	  of	  these	  underlying	  conditions”.	  Hence,	  there	  are	  changes	  in	  these	  factors	  I	  want	   to	   investigate,	  but	  also	  what	   the	  process	   that	   leads	  up	  to	  changes	   in	   the	   formal	  organisational	  structure	  looks	  like.	  	  “Change	   is	   a	   constant	   feature	   of	   institutions	   and	   existing	   arrangements	   impact	  how	   institutions	   emerge	   and	   how	   they	   are	   reproduced	   and	   changed”	   (March	  &	  Olsen	  1984,	  p.	  11).	  However,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  note	   the	  difference	  between	  reform	  attempts	  and	   actual	   change	   in	   the	   formal	   organisational	   structure;	   “many	   changes	   are	   not	   the	  result	   of	   reforms	   and	  many	   reforms	   never	   result	   in	   changes”	   as	   Brunsson	   and	   Olsen	  (1993,	  pp.	  3-­‐4)	  note.	  This	  study	  aims	  to	  look	  into	  both	  actual	  changes	  and	  the	  conscious	  reform	   projects	   themselves;	   what	   background	   they	   have,	   what	   intentions	   reformers	  might	  have	  had	  and	  how	  the	  reforms	  has	  been	  shaped.	  	  
2.2.1 The	  instrumental	  perspective	  The	   first	   perspective	   is	   an	   instrumental	   perspective	   on	   change,	   and	   hereunder	  two	   versions;	   one	   emphasising	   instrumental	   design	   as	   an	   analytical/problem	   solving	  tool	   and	   one	   emphasising	   the	   role	   of	   bargaining/negotiations	  when	  making	   decisions	  about	   organisational	   design.	   The	   instrumental	   perspective	   views	   the	   organisations	   as	  tools	   or	   instruments	   that	   are	   designed	   to	   achieve	   certain	   goals	   that	   are	   considered	  important.	   This	   is	   reflected	   in	   that	   a	   public	   organisation	   and	   its	   members	   acts	  instrumentally	  rational	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  goals	  and	  means	  when	  executing	  the	  tasks,	  and	  that	  the	  desired	  goals	  are	  achieved.	  Instrumentality	  is	  strongly	  associated	  with	  the	  use	  of	   organisational	   key	   variables	   as	   the	   ones	   I	   specified	   above.	   The	   members	   of	   the	  organisation	  are	  assumed	  to	  evaluate	  the	  available	  options	  from	  the	  consequences	  they	  have	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   goals	   that	   are	   set,	   make	   wilful	   choices	   between	   the	   available	  alternatives,	   and	   achieve	   the	   desired	   effects	   through	   these	   choices	   (Christensen	   et	   al.	  2009,	   p.	   33).	   But	   the	   instrumentality	   can	   also	   be	  manifested	   in	   that	   the	   design	   of	   the	  organisational	   structure	   is	   based	   on	   means-­‐ends	   assessments,	   and	   further	   that	   this	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shapes	   the	  way	  which	   tasks	  are	  carried	  out	   in.	  Hence,	   instrumentality	  may	  affect	  both	  the	   organisational	   structure	   and	   the	   process	   in	   which	   the	   organisational	   structure	   is	  shaped	  and	  determined	  (Christensen	  et	  al.	  2009,	  p.	  33).	  	  The	   first	   version	   of	   the	   instrumental	   perspective,	   often	   called	   the	   hierarchical	  variant,	  views	  the	  organisation	  as	  homogenous	  and	  one	  assumes	  that	  the	  leadership,	  or	  the	  ones	   for	  whom	  the	  organisation	   is	  a	   tool	   for,	  has	  a	   clear	  picture	  of	   the	  connection	  between	  means	  and	  ends	  (Christensen	  et	  al.	  2009,	  p.	  34).	  Stacey	  and	  Rittberger	  (2003,	  p.	  864)	   formulates	   this	   in	   what	   they	   call	   a	   functional	   version	   of	   rational	   choice	  institutionalism,	  which	  is	  similar	  to	  my	  perspective.	  The	  authors	  write:	  “The	  functional	  perspective	   stress	   that	   actors	   draw	   the	   joint	   gains	   from	   solving	   certain	   collective	  problems	   mainly	   by	   coordinating	   on	   a	   specific	   outcome”.	   From	   this	   version,	  organisational	   changes	   happens	   when	   the	   environment	   and	   reality	   around	   the	  organisation	  changes.	  This	  can	  be	  changes	  either	  in	  what	  goals	  the	  organisations	  is	  set	  to	  achieve	  or	  changes	  in	  the	  surroundings	  that	  causes	  a	  need	  to	  change	  the	  organisations	  way	   of	   working	   to	   achieve	   the	   same	   objectives	   as	   earlier.	   Hence,	   “change	   […]	   results	  from	  repeated	  interactions	  and	  ‘updating’	  (learning	  effects),	  ‘as	  individuals	  ‘‘craft	  tools’’	  –	   including	   rules	   –	   to	   improve	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   repetitive	   situations	   they	   face’”	  (Stacey	  &	  Rittberger	  2003,	  p.	  865).	  	  This	  also	  raises	  the	  question	  about	  for	  whom	  the	  EP-­‐administration	  is	  a	  tool–	  the	  MEPs,	  heads	  of	  the	  administration	  or	  other	  actors.	  As	  previously	  mentioned,	  legislatures	  have	  the	  power	  to	  organise	  themselves	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  do	  not	  have	  any	  authority	  above	   them	   that	   decides	   on	   their	   organisation.	  However	   this	   does	   not	  mean	   that	   it	   is	  clear	  who	  actually	  has	   the	   formal	  or	   the	  actual	  power	   to	   control	   the	  organisation	  of	   a	  legislature.	  Furthermore,	  Christensen	  et	   al.	   (2009,	  p.	  34)	  writes	   that	   explanations	   that	  springs	   from	   this	   perspective	   focuses	   on	   the	   logic	   of	   consequences	   –	   the	   goals	   and	  means-­‐end	   conceptions	   of	   the	   organisation	   and	   its	  members,	   which	   choices	   of	   action	  they	  make,	  and	  how	  the	  result	  of	  these	  choices	  harmonises	  with	  what	  was	  desired.	  The	  logic	   of	   consequences,	   is	   in	   this	   perspective	   seen	   as	   the	   fundamental	   logic	   of	   action,	  implies	   that	   the	   organisations	   have	   the	   capacity	   to	   carry	   out	   rational	   actions.	   These	  kinds	   of	   action,	   as	   Christensen	   et	   al.	   (2009,	   p.	   35)	   has	   defined	   them,	   consist	   of	   four	  elements:	  	  
• Goal	  or	  problem:	  What	  does	  one	  want	   to	  achieve	  and	  what	   is	   the	  distance	  between	  that	  and	  the	  current	  state	  of	  affairs?	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• Alternatives:	  What	  actions	  are	  possible?	  	  
• (Expectations	  about)	  consequences:	  What	  future	  consequences	  in	  relation	  to	  the	   goals	   might	   follow	   from	   each	   alternative,	   and	   how	   likely	   are	   these	  consequences	  –	  assuming	  that	  the	  alternative	  is	  chosen?	  	  
• Decision-­‐making	  rules:	  How	  to	  make	  the	  choice	  between	  alternatives?	  	  From	   this	   logic,	   all	   actions	   within	   an	   organisation	   are	   based	   on	   a	   rational	  calculation	   of	   the	   possible	   consequences	   that	   different	   actions	   would	   lead	   to.	   This	  includes	   both	   the	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   business	   in	   the	   organisation	   as	   well	   as	   more	   complex	  processes	  such	  as	  a	  reorganisation.	  As	  many	  empirical	  studies	  have	  shown,	  and	  as	  I	  have	  described	  above,	  one	  cannot	  expect	  organisations	  or	  its	  members	  to	  act	  according	  to	  full	  instrumental	  rationality.	  One	  can	  instead	  assume	  that	  the	  actions	  are	  based	  on	  bounded	  rationality.	  This	  concept	  implies	  that	  the	  organisation	  does	  not	  have	  a	  complete	  picture	  of	   all	   available	   alternatives	   and	   consequences.	   An	   organisation	   has	   limited	   recourses	  and	   therefore	   has	   to	   make	   decisions	   based	   on	   limited	   information	   and	   uncertain	  knowledge	  of	  means-­‐ends	  relations.	  From	  this	  it	  follows	  “that	  the	  organisation	  chooses	  an	  alternative	  that	  yields	  good	  enough,	  or	  an	  acceptable	  degree	  of,	  goal	  achievement.	  In	  other	   words,	   the	   organisation	   will	   have	   a	   decision-­‐making	   rule	   built	   upon	   achieving	  satisfactory	   rather	   than	   maximum	   results,	   whereby	   satisfactory,	   but	   not	   necessarily	  optimal,	   solutions	   are	   chosen.	   It	  must	  be	  underscored,	   nevertheless,	   that	   even	  actions	  based	  on	  bounded	  rationality	  are	  marked	  by	  logic	  of	  consequences”.	  (Christensen	  et	  al.	  2009,	  p.	  36)	  	  The	   second	   version,	   often	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   negotiation-­‐based	   instrumental	  
perspective,	   differentiates	   from	   the	   first	   version	   in	   the	   way	   that	   it	   does	   not	   view	   the	  organisations	  as	  uniform	  actors	   that	  make	  wilful	   choices	  based	  on	  agreed	  or	   common	  goals.	  As	  mentioned	  above	  this	  might	  not	  always	  be	  the	  case,	  and	  one	  reason	  for	  this	  can	  be	   that	   different	   individuals	   and	   groups	  within	   the	   organisation	   can	   be	   committed	   to	  different	  and	  partly	  conflicting	  goals	  and	  interests.	  Organisations	  or	  its	  individual	  parts	  must	  also	  relate	  to	  other	  organisations	  that	  might	  have	  other	  goals	  and	  interests.	  From	  this	   version	   of	   the	   instrumental	   perspective,	   organisations	   can	   be	   understood	   as	  coalitions,	   where	   individual	   actors	   or	   groups	   act	   based	   on	   their	   different	   interests	  (Christensen	  et	  al.	  2009,	  p.	  43).	  Negotiations	  between	  the	  actors	  within	  an	  organisation	  get	   a	   central	   role	   in	   understanding	   how	   the	   organisation	  works.	   Interest	   distribution	  may	  be	  rooted	  in	  the	  formal	  organisation	  structures
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carry	  out	  specialised	  tasks.	  The	  resources	  they	  have	  to	  articulate	  their	  own	  interests	  can	  also	   be	   rooted	   in	   the	   formal	   structure,	   for	   instance	   in	   sub-­‐	   or	   super-­‐ordination,	   or	   in	  relation	  to	  horizontal	  coordination	  (Christensen	  et	  al.	  2009,	  p.	  44).	  Stacey	  and	  Rittberger	  (2003,	  pp.	  864-­‐65)	  explains	  this	  argument	  further	  when	  they	  write;	  “the	  distributional	  perspective	   [of	   rational	   choice	   institutionalism]	   emphasizes	   that	   the	   joint	   gains	   from	  cooperation	   may	   be	   unevenly	   distributed.	   Consequently,	   institutions	   reflect	   different	  actors’	   bargaining	  power	   rather	   than,	   say,	   the	  mutually	  perceived	  attractiveness	  of	   an	  efficient	   solution	   to	   a	   given	   collective	   action	   problem”.	   This	   also	   means	   that	   the	  negotiation-­‐based	   version	   has	   other	   assumptions	   about	   how	   change	   in	   organisations	  happen,	  as	  Stacey	  and	  Rittberger	  writes:	  “Institutional	  change	  can	  be	  induced	  either	  by	  a	  change	  in	  the	  distributional	  implications	  of	  existing	  institutions,	  for	  example	  by	  splitting	  dominant	   change-­‐resistant	   actor	   coalitions	   (see	   Tsebelis	   1990:	   110–15),	   say,	   through	  the	   actions	   of	   skilful	   ‘herestheticians’	   (see,	   e.g.,	   Riker	   1984,	   1986;	   McLean	   2001)	   or	  modifications	   in	   the	   bargaining	   power	   of	   the	   actors	   due	   to	   change	   in	   their	   resource-­‐holding	  power	  (Knight	  1992)”	  (Stacey	  &	  Rittberger	  2003).	  	  When	  looking	  at	  the	  way	  organisational	  reforms	  are	  organised,	  the	  instrumental	  perspective	  emphasises	  how	  the	   leadership	   in	  an	  organisation	  choses	  to	  structure	  this	  work.	  Organisational	   questions	   can	  be	  put	   in	   a	   separate	  unit	   that	   gets	   its	   own	  budget	  and	   can	   build	   up	   its	   own	   competence	   in	   the	   area,	   or	   it	   can	   be	   assigned	   to	   an	   already	  existing	   unit	   or	   position	   that	   also	   handles	   other	   issues.	   It	   can	   be	   organised	   in	   a	  hierarchical	   structure	   where	   the	   leadership	   has	   got	   a	   firm	   control	   and	   choses	   which	  interests	  to	  include	  in	  the	  formal	  process	  and	  which	  to	  opt	  out.	  There	  may	  also	  be	  other	  organisational	   forms	   for	  designing	  the	  reform	  process	   that	  substitutes	  or	  supplements	  to	   a	   hierarchy.	   Experts	   can	   be	   involved	   in	   working	   groups	   or	   producing	   their	   own	  organisational	  reports	  commissioned	  by	  the	  organisation’s	  leaders.	  If	  reforms	  are	  wide-­‐ranging	  or	  the	  patterns	  of	  interest	  and	  conflicts	  are	  complex,	  one	  usually	  sets	  up	  a	  broad	  commission	  that	  includes	  many	  of	  the	  interests	  that	  then	  comes	  with	  recommendations	  to	   the	   leadership.	   Participation	   from	   others	   than	   the	   leadership	   means	   a	   more	  negotiation-­‐based	   process.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   organising	   and	   re-­‐organising	   the	  administrative	   support	   in	   the	   EP	   this	   would	   imply	   that	   the	   existing	   structure	   and	   its	  capacities	  do	  matter	   for	  how	  the	  process	   is	   carried	  out,	  how	   information	   is	   filtered	  or	  biased	  and	  what	  alternatives	  that	  are	  evaluated	  etc.	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The	   negotiation-­‐based	   perspective	   raises	   some	   questions	   as	   regards	   to	   what	  conflict	   patterns	   or	   diverging	   interests	   that	   can	   be	   identified	   in	   the	   reorganisational	  processes	   in	   the	   EP;	   Does	   the	   EP-­‐administration/	   EP	   Leadership	   control	   the	   reform	  process?	  Can	  one	  see	  that	  different	  groups	  of	  actors	  have	  different	  interests?	  I	  will	  here	  present	  a	  set	  of	  different	  expectations	  about	  what	  conflict	  lines	  one	  could	  expect	  to	  find	  in	  such	  an	  organisation	  as	  the	  EP:	  	  First;	   as	   mentioned	   earlier,	   one	   division	   that	   has	   been	   argued	   for	   is	   the	   one	  between	  the	  long	  term	  participants	  in	  the	  EP,	  the	  administrators,	  versus	  the	  short	  term	  or	   temporary	   participants,	   the	  MEPs.	   A	   conflict	   between	   these	   groups	   could	   instance	  that	  the	  bureaucrats	  wanting	  to	  match	  the	  structures	  of	  the	  commission	  -­‐	  which	  is	  the	  institution	   that	   they	   have	  most	   contact	  with	   -­‐	   or	   to	  maximise	   their	   own	   budgets	   and	  responsibilities,	  whilst	  the	  MEPs	  that	  want	  supporting	  staff	  and	  helping	  hands.	  	  Secondly;	   an	   probable	   conflict	   line	   is	   a	   partisan	   political	   division	   between	   the	  political	  groups	  in	  the	  parliament,	  for	  instance	  between	  the	  centre-­‐right	  EPP	  (European	  Peoples	  Party)	  group	  and	  the	  centre-­‐left	  S&D	  (Socialists	  and	  Democrats)	  group,	  or	  one	  could	  also	  imagine	  a	  division	  that	  puts	  those	  two	  big	  groups	  on	  one	  side	  and	  the	  smaller	  groups	  on	  the	  other,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  example	  on	  in	  Kreppels	  study.	  	  Thirdly;	  there	  could	  be	  conflicting	  interests	  between	  the	  different	  organisational	  groups	  within	  the	  parliament,	  for	  instance	  between	  the	  EP	  staff	  and	  the	  political	  group	  staff.	   Strengthening	   the	   General	   Secretariat	   might	   be	   perceived	   as	   a	   threat	   to	   the	  legislative	  support	  from	  the	  political	  group	  secretariats.	  	  Fourthly;	   there	   might	   be	   interest	   conflicts	   between	   the	   leadership	   in	   the	  parliament	  and	  the	  employees,	  probably	  aggregated	  through	  unions.	  	  As	   mentioned	   earlier,	   the	   negotiation-­‐based	   perspective	   assumes	   that	   changes	  either	  comes	  from	  changing	  alliances	  between	  the	  stakeholders	  or	  changing	  bargaining	  power	  between	  them	  in	  terms	  of	  distribution	  and	  resources.	  From	  a	  negotiation-­‐based	  instrumental	  perspective,	  this	  study	  aims	  to	  analyse	  how	  these	  interests	  are	  organised	  in	  the	  reorganisation	  processes,	  at	  what	  stages	  they	  come	  in	  and	  in	  what	  way	  they	  are	  included.	   In	   this	   context	   it	   is	   also	   relevant	   to	   analyse	   and	   what	   standpoints	   these	  different	   actors	   take	   and	   how	   they	   articulate	   them,	   as	   we	   have	   seen	   before	   when	  studying	  public	  organisations;	  the	  structure	  matters.	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2.2.2 The	  institutional	  perspective	  The	   second	   perspective	   on	   change	   is	   focusing	   on	   the	   role	   of	   the	   organisational	  history	  and	  culture,	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  cultural	  or	   institutional	  perspective.	  Philip	  Selznick	   (1957)	   draws	   a	   line	   between	  what	   he	   calls	   the	   organisation,	   the	   formal	   and	  instrumental	   as	   it	   is	   described	   above,	   and	   the	   institutional,	   the	   informal	   norms	   and	  values	   that	   gradually	   and	   almost	   organically	   grows	   within	   an	   organisation.	   This	  perspective	   emphasises	   the	   institutionalisation	   of	   organisations,	   this	   means	   that	   the	  organisations	   develop	   its	   own	   norms,	   values	   and	   identities	   that	   have	   an	   independent	  influence	   on	   the	   actual	   political	   and	   administrative	   behaviour.	   Selznick	   describes	   the	  institutionalisation	   as	   a	   process	   where	   “an	   organisation	   acquires	   a	   self,	   a	   distinctive	  identity,	  it	  becomes	  an	  institution.	  This	  involves	  the	  taking	  on	  of	  values;	  ways	  of	  acting	  and	   believing	   that	   are	   deemed	   important	   for	   their	   own	   sake.	   From	   then	   on	   self-­‐maintenance	  becomes	  more	  than	  bare	  organisational	  survival;	   it	  becomes	  a	  struggle	  to	  preserve	   the	   uniqueness	   of	   the	   group	   in	   the	   face	   of	   new	   problems	   and	   altered	  circumstances.”	  (Selznick	  1957,	  p.	  21)	  	  The	   perspective	   starts	   from	   the	   notion	   that	   actual	   behaviour	   is	   influenced	   by	  earlier	   choices,	   experiences,	   institutional	   identity	   and	   history.	   This	   relates	   to	   the	  informal	  norms	  and	  values	   that	   grow	   in	   an	  organisation	  and	   form	   the	  way	  people	   act	  and	  connect	  with	  each	  other	  (Christensen	  et	  al.	  2009,	  pp.	  52-­‐54).	  The	  fundamental	  logic	  of	   action	   from	   a	   institutional	   perspective	   is	   what	   March	   and	   Olsen	   calls	   the	   logic	   of	  appropriateness.	  This	   can	  be	  described	  as	   in	   the	  members	  of	   an	  organisation	   follow	  a	  logic	  where	  there	  actions	  are	  shaped	  by	  what	  is	  seen	  as	  “natural,	  rightful,	  expected	  and	  legitimate”.	   “Members	   of	   an	   institution	   are	   expected	   to	   obey,	   and	   be	   guardians	   of,	   its	  constitutive	   principles	   and	   standards”	   (March	   &	   Olsen	   2006,	   p.	   7).	   Members	   of	   an	  organisation	  gets	  socialised	  into	  the	  identities	  as	  to	  belonging	  to	  that	  organisation,	  and	  also	  to	  the	  specific	  position	  that	  they	  hold	  in	  the	  organisation.	  Because	  of	  this,	  they	  act	  to	  fulfil	   the	   expectations	   that	   follow	  with	   these	   identities	   rather	   than	   rationally	   calculate	  consequences	   of	   their	   actions	   (March	   &	   Olsen	   2006,	   p.	   9).	   A	   strong	   organisational	  culture	  might	  constrain	   the	  possibility	   for	  decision-­‐makers	   to	  control	  and	  change	  how	  the	  organisation	  works,	  a	  kind	  of	  path-­‐dependency	  (Christensen	  et	  al.	  2009,	  pp.	  52-­‐54).	  One	  of	  the	  challenges	  is	  therefore	  to	  explain	  how	  the	  institutionalisation	  processes	  can	  be	   “stabilised	   or	   destabilised,	   and	   which	   factors	   that	   sustain	   or	   interrupt	   on-­‐going	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processes”	   (March	  &	  Olsen	  2006,	   p.	   5).	   In	   other	  words,	   the	   challenge	   is	   about	   how	   to	  explain	  how	  changes	  do	  happen	  in	  political	  institutions,	  like	  the	  EP.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  used	  models	   for	   explaining	   institutional	   change	   is	   Stephen	   Krasner’s	  model	   of	   “punctuated	  equilibrium”.	  As	  Thelen,	  Steinmo	  and	  Longstreth	  (1992,	  p.	  15)	  summarises:	  	  
Briefly,	   Krasner’s	   model	   posits	   that	   institutions	   are	   characterised	   by	  
long	   periods	   of	   stability,	   periodically	   “punctuated”	   by	   crises	   that	   bring	   about	  
relatively	  abrupt	  institutional	  change,	  after	  which	  institutional	  stasis	  again	  sets	  
in.	   Institutional	  arrangements	  help	   explain	  policy	  outcomes	  during	  periods	  of	  
institutional	   stability,	   since	   these	  arrangements	   structure	  political	   conflicts	   in	  
distinctive	  ways.	  In	  Krasner’s	  version,	  institutional	  crises	  usually	  emanate	  from	  
changes	   in	   the	  external	  environment.	  Such	  crises	  can	  cause	  breakdown	  of	   the	  
old	  institutions,	  and	  this	  breakdown	  precipitates	   intense	  political	  conflict	  over	  
shape	  of	  the	  new	  institutional	  arrangements.	  	  However,	  as	  Thelen,	  Steinmo	  and	  Longstreth	  (1992,	  pp.	  15-­‐16)	  notes,	  the	  model	  of	  punctuated	  equilibrium	  only	  focuses	  on	  how	  external	  shocks	  creates	  opportunities	  for	  change.	  This	  can	   indeed	  be	  a	  very	  useful	  analytical	  point,	  but	  research	  has	  shown	  that	  institutional	  change	  also	  can	  happen	  as	  a	  result	  of	  more	  gradual	  learning	  and	  adaptation	  processes.	   As	   mentioned,	   the	   logic	   of	   appropriateness	   means	   that	   individuals	   in	   the	  organisation	   connect	   certain	   expectations	   with	   their	   identity.	   From	   a	   institutional	  perspective,	   reform	   happens	   slowly	   and	   stepwise	   in	   an	   incremental	   process.	   One	   can	  describe	  it	  as	  an	  evolution	  rather	  than	  a	  revolution.	  The	  connection	  between	  the	  formal	  parts	   of	   a	   reform	   and	   the	   actual	   change	  might	   not	   be	   entirely	   clear.	   The	  way	   reform	  processes	  are	  organised	  will	  affect	  what	  solutions	  and	  actions	  that	  are	  deemed	  good	  and	  appropriate,	   but	   it	   is	   still	   the	   informal	   norms	   linked	   with	   organisational	   forms	   and	  methods	  of	  change	  that	  are	  most	  important	  (Christensen	  et	  al.	  2009,	  p.	  155).	  	  From	  this	  perspective,	  it	  would	  be	  relevant	  to	  ask	  if	  the	  different	  actors	  in	  the	  EP	  have	  different	  expectations	  about	  what	  practice	  that	  is	  the	  best.	  For	  instance,	  the	  MEP’s	  come	   from	  a	  national	   context	  and	  many	  of	   them	  have	  been	  members	  of	   their	  national	  parliaments	   before	   they	   come	   to	   the	   EP.	   This	  might	   lead	   to	   a	   cultural	   clash	   between	  different	  groups	   that	   come	   from	   institutions	  where	  what	   is	   seen	  as	  appropriate	  might	  look	  different.	  This	  means	  that	  they	  bring	  with	  them	  their	  own	  expectations	  about	  how	  the	  administrative	  support	  of	  a	  parliament	  should	  work	  and	  what	  support	  they	  should	  be	   provided	  with.	   Historically	   the	   EP	   has	   had	   a	   very	   strong	   and	   independent	   General	  Secretariat	  because	  in	  the	  first	  two	  decades	  of	  the	  parliament’s	  history	  they	  did	  not	  have	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any	   politicians	   working	   permanently	   in	   the	   parliament	   (Corbett,	   Jacobs	   &	   Shackleton	  2011,	  p.	  219).	  We	  know	  that	  what	  is	  considered	  appropriate	  behaviour	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  conditioned	   by	   the	   norms	   and	   values	   that	  were	   formulated	   in	   an	   organisations	   early,	  formative	   years	   (Christensen	   et	   al.	   2009,	   p.	   62).	   Since	   the	   EP,	   compared	   to	   national	  parliaments	  in	  the	  EU,	  has	  got	  a	  rather	  different	  organisational	  background	  in	  this	  sense	  one	  could	  expect	  some	  norms	  and	  traits	  remaining	  from	  that	  time.	  There	  are	  also	  three	  clearly	   different	   types	   of	   administrative	   personnel	   working	   in	   the	   EP,	   and	   one	  might	  expect	   that	   a	   change	   in	   the	   formal	   organisational	   structure	   of	   the	   EP	   administrative	  support	  might	  imply	  different	  things	  for	  these	  groups	  and	  that	  they	  would	  try	  to	  lobby	  their	   own	   interests	   in	   a	   reform	   process.	   The	   institutional	   perspective	   can	   seem	   to	   be	  similar	  to	  the	  negotiation	  based	  instrumental	  perspective,	  but	  there	  are	  differences;	   In	  the	   instrumental	   perspective,	   groups	   are	   expected	   to	   make	   their	   choices	   based	   on	   a	  rational	  evaluation	  of	  different	  alternatives,	  whilst	   in	  the	  institutional	  perspective	  they	  rather	  base	  their	  decisions	  on	  what	  is	  perceived	  as	  appropriate	  based	  on	  the	  norms	  and	  ideals	  in	  the	  group.	  However,	  this	  distinction	  is	  hard	  to	  make	  in	  a	  document-­‐based	  study.	  Often,	  in	  a	  document	  based	  study	  like	  this	  one,	  one	  has	  to	  content	  oneself	  on	  to	  note	  that	  the	   actors	   have	   different	   positions	   and,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   it	   is	   possible,	   analyse	  what	  arguments	  that	  the	  actors	  uses	  as	  argument	  for	  their	  standpoint.	  	  As	  mentioned,	  the	  theories	  have	  some	  fundamentally	  different	  assumptions	  about	  how	  organisations	  work	  as	  regards	  to	  the	  logic	  of	  action	  and	  how	  change	  happens.	  The	  theories	  are	  to	  be	  treated	  as	  complimentary	  to	  each	  other,	  rather	  than	  competing.	  Some	  of	  the	  relevant	  aspects	  that	  these	  theories	  tell	  us	  about,	  and	  give	  us	  tools	  to	  analyse,	  are;	  when	  we	  can	  expect	  change,	  which	  actors	  that	  are	  relevant	  in	  the	  process	  and	  what	  the	  organisational	  thinking	  look	  like.	  The	  research	  question	  of	  this	  study	  is	  asking	  how	  the	  
formal	   organisational	   structure	  of	   the	  EP-­‐administration	  has	  developed	  over	   time	  and	  how	   can	   these	   changes	   be	   explained.	   Hence,	   the	   instrumental	   perspective	   and	  organisational	   key	   variables	   will	   be	   dominating	   in	   answering	   the	   first	   part	   of	   this	  question.	   To	   answer	   the	   second	   part	   of	   the	   question	   I	   will	   focus	   on	   using	   both	  perspectives	   to	   analyse	   how	   the	   changes	   has	   been	  designed,	  what	   the	   process	   looked	  like	  and	  why	  the	  changes	  came	  about.	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3 Method	  and	  data	  sources	  To	  answer	  my	  research	  question	   I	  will	  use	  a	   single	  case	  study-­‐approach,	  where	  the	  administrative	  support	  structure	   in	  the	  EP	  is	   the	  case.	   I	  will	  mainly	  use	  qualitative	  data	  processing	  where	  my	  main	  sources	  are	  official	  documents,	  minutes	  of	  meetings	  etc.	  According	  to	  Gerring	  (2007,	  p.	  7)	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  case	  study	  approach	  is	  that	  it	  gives	  you	  the	  possibility	  to	  go	  deep	  into	  a	  case	  to	  understand	  and	  investigate;	  “the	  product	  of	  a	  good	   case	   study	   is	   insight”.	   George	   and	   Bennett	   (2005,	   p.	   31)	   explains	   this	   argument	  further	  when	  they	  write	  that	  “case	  study	  researchers	  are	  more	  interested	  in	  finding	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  specified	  outcomes	  occur,	  and	  the	  mechanisms	  through	  which	  they	  occur,	  rather	  than	  uncovering	  the	  frequency	  with	  which	  those	  conditions	  and	  their	  outcomes	   arise.”	   In	   other	   words,	   they	   are	   aimed	   at	   understanding	   the	   empirical	  conditions	   or	   reasons	   for	   a	   given	   outcome,	   and	   the	  mechanism	   or	   process	   that	   leads	  from	  cause	  to	  consequence.	  In	  this	  context	  it	  is	  important	  to	  stress	  George	  and	  Bennett’s	  argument	  that	  “there	  is	  no	  single	  case	  study	  design.	  Rather	  different	  case	  study	  research	  designs	   use	   varying	   combinations	   of	   within-­‐case	   analysis,	   cross-­‐case	   comparisons,	  induction	   and	   deduction	   for	   different	   theory	   building	   purposes”	   (George	   &	   Bennett	  2005,	  p.	  49).	  	  	  Furthermore,	   George	   and	   Bennett	   list	   the	   main	   strengths	   with	   the	   case	   study	  approach:	  First,	  the	  case	  study	  does	  not	  require	  all	  variables	  to	  be	  clearly	  identified	  and	  defined	  before	  the	  study	  starts.	  This	  gives	  us	  the	  possibility	  to	  inductively	  identify	  new	  variables,	   generate	   new	   hypothesises	   and	   go	   in	   depth	   with	   the	   causal	   mechanisms	  behind	  a	  phenomena	  (George	  &	  Bennett	  2005,	  p.	  46).	  Second,	  singe	  case	  studies	  can	  test	  individual	   cases	   regarding	   claims	   made	   about	   causal	   mechanisms,	   like	   the	   ones	  presented	  in	  the	  two	  theoretical	  perspectives	  on	  change	  in	  this	  study	  (George	  &	  Bennett	  2005,	   p.	   46).	   To	   answer	   the	   research	  question	   I	  will	   focus	   on	   structuring	   the	   changes	  that	   has	   happened	   to	   the	   formal	   organisational	   structure	   of	   the	   administration	  according	   to	   the	   organisational	   key	   variables,	   using	   documents	   from	   the	   political	  process	  in	  the	  parliament.	  Since	  the	  research	  question	  also	  is	  about	  how	  the	  changes	  can	  be	  explained,	  a	  process	  tracing	  approach	  would	  be	  sufficient.	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3.1 Process	  tracing	  The	   chosen	   theories	  present	   some	  assumptions	  on	  how	   the	   causal	  mechanisms	  work	   in	   public	   organisations,	   e.g.	   which	   factors	   that	   are	   central	   in	   causing	   an	  organisation	  to	  change	  and	  what	  that	  change	  will	  look	  like.	  George	  and	  Bennett	  (2005,	  p.	  205)	   argue	   that	   process	   tracing	   is	   the	  most	   appropriate	  method	   for	   uncovering	   such	  causal	   mechanisms.	   The	   authors	   write:	   “In	   process	   tracing,	   the	   researcher	   examines	  histories,	   archival	  documents,	   interview	   transcripts,	   and	  other	   sources	   to	   see	  whether	  the	   causal	   process	   a	   theory	   hypothesizes	   or	   implies	   in	   a	   case	   is	   in	   fact	   evident	   in	   the	  sequence	  and	  values	  of	  the	  intervening	  variables	  in	  that	  case”	  (George	  &	  Bennett	  2005,	  p.	  6).	  Different	   types	  of	  evidence	  are	  often	  used	  to	  explain	  a	  certain	  outcome	  and	   long	  causal	  chains	  are	  often	  constructed	  (Gerring	  2007,	  pp.	  172-­‐173).	  Each	  types	  of	  evidence	  are	   sampled	   from	   a	   different	   population,	   and	   this	   means	   that	   the	   evidence	   is	   non-­‐comparable	  in	  its	  nature	  (Gerring	  2007,	  p.	  179).	  The	  strength	  of	  process	  tracing	  lies	  in	  its	  basic	  assumptions.	  The	   foundations	  of	   the	  study	   is	   formalised	   through	  the	  outlined	  causal	  relationships.	  Checkel	  (2008,	  pp.	  2-­‐3)	  writes	  about	  the	  use	  of	  mechanisms	  when	  tracing	   processes.	   “Mechanisms	   operate	   at	   an	   analytical	   level	   below	   that	   of	   a	   more	  encompassing	   theory”,	   they	   are	   the	   factors	   that	   under	   certain	   circumstances	   connects	  cause	   with	   its	   effect	   and	   thereby	   an	   outcome	   on	   the	   dependent	   variable.	   The	   aim	   of	  process	  tracing	  is	  to	  identify	  these	  mechanisms	  in	  the	  process	  (Checkel	  2008,	  pp.	  2-­‐3).	  In	  this	   study,	   the	   mechanisms	   can	   be	   said	   to	   be	   e.g.	   the	   specified	   organisational	   key	  variables,	  but	  also	  other	  concrete	  examples	  of	  how	  the	  behaviour	  of	  individuals,	  groups	  and	  organisations	  are	  controlled	  according	  to	  the	  theoretical	  perspectives,	   for	  instance	  how	  the	  logic	  of	  action	  works.	  	  One	  of	  the	  strengths	  with	  process	  tracing	  is	  that	  of	  identifying	  a	  causal	  chain	  and	  present	  stronger	  evidence	  for	  causality	  than	  what	  statistical	  analysis	  or	  other	  methods	  are	  able	   to	  do.	  Process	   tracing	  means	   that	  you	  need	   to	   identify	  as	  many	  variables	  and	  observations	  as	  possible	  in	  that	  process.	  This	  helps	  narrowing	  the	  list	  of	  potential	  causes	  for	  a	  certain	  outcome,	  but	  even	  so	  it	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  eliminate	  all	  other	  explanations	  but	  one.	  “But	  process	  tracing	  forces	  the	  investigator	  to	  take	  equifinality	  into	  account	  […]	  and	  it	  offers	  the	  possibility	  of	  mapping	  out	  one	  or	  more	  potential	  causal	  paths	  that	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  outcome	  and	  the	  process	  tracing	  evidence	  in	  a	  single	  case”	  (George	  &	  Bennett	  2005,	  p.	   207).	  By	   identifying	   as	  many	   steps	   as	  possible	   in	   the	   causal	  process,	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one	  can	  also	  put	  these	  in	  to	  a	  causal	  diagram.	  This	  “forces	  the	  author	  to	  make	  a	  précis	  and	   explicit	   statement	   of	   her	   argument”,	   and	   combined	  with	   a	   description	   in	   prose	   it	  makes	  one	  of	  the	  strengths	  with	  process	  tracing	  (Gerring	  2007,	  p.	  182).	  The	  strength	  is	  also	   the	   pitfall	   of	   process	   tracing.	   If	   you	   cannot	   present	   consistent	   and	   well-­‐founded	  assumptions	   about	   the	   correlations	   of	   variables	   and	  what	  mechanisms	   that	   has	   been	  operative	   in	   the	  predicted	  cases,	   the	  risk	   is	   that	   the	  analysis	  becomes	  weak	  (George	  &	  Bennett	  2005,	  pp.	  208,	  222).	  Process	  tracing	  is	  a	  method	  that	  requires	  a	  lot	  of	  time	  and	  it	  is	   therefore	   also	   costly	   because	   it	  means	   that	   you	   need	   to	   collect	   and	   analyse	   a	   great	  amount	  of	  data.	  	  One	  of	  the	  great	  risks	  when	  processing	  the	  data	  is	  that	  you	  lose	  the	  big	  picture	   and	   focus	   too	  much	   on	   the	   details.	   It	   is	   therefore	   crucial	   to	   keep	   the	   broader	  structural	  context	  in	  mind	  to	  be	  able	  to	  sort	  out	  what	  is	  relevant	  and	  not.	  However,	  even	  if	  you	  need	   to	  collect	  much	  data,	   the	   strength	  of	   this	  method	   is	  also	   that	   itself	  defines	  when	  enough	  data	  is	  collected	  (Checkel	  2008,	  pp.	  10-­‐13).	  This	  argument	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind.	  In	  this	  study,	  the	  list	  of	  source	  documents	  from	  the	  EP	  is	  around	  80,	  and	  in	  total	   they	  make	  up	  hundreds	  of	  pages.	   It	   is	   impossible	   to	   account	   for	   and	  describe	  all	  details	  in	  these	  documents,	  given	  the	  limits	  in	  time	  and	  space.	  Therefore	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  be	  able	  to	  pick	  out	  the	  essential	  pieces,	  the	  ones	  that	  really	  affected	  the	  reform	  processes	  in	  a	  significant	  way.	  	  In	  a	  process	  tracing	  case	  study,	  the	  presumed	  context	  of	  the	  case	  constitutes	  the	  frames	   for	   both	  what	   kind	   of	   data	   one	   need	   and	   how	   it	   is	   obtained	   (Gerring	   2007,	   p.	  181).	   As	   shown	   in	   the	   theory	   chapter,	   the	   instrumental	   and	   institutional	   perspectives	  have	   different	   assumptions	   of	   how	   public	   organisations	   work,	   which	   actors	   that	   are	  relevant,	  on	  what	  basis	   they	  act	  and	  where	  the	  driving	   force	  of	  change	  comes	   from,	   in	  other	  words,	   they	   frame	   the	   study	  differently.	  The	  purpose	  of	   this	   study	   is	  not	   to	   test	  which	  of	  these	  perspectives	  that	  are	  the	  most	  relevant,	  but	  rather	  to	  be	  able	  to	  answer	  my	   research	   question	   by	   applying	   these	   elaborate	   perspectives	   on	   the	   changes	   in	   the	  formal	  structure	  of	  the	  EP-­‐administration.	  	  
3.2 Data	  sources	  The	   relevant	   documents	   to	   structure	   and	   analyse	   the	   evolvement	   of	   the	  organisation	  of	  the	  EP-­‐administration	  are	  annual	  reports/activity	  plans	  from	  the	  EP,	  the	  EU-­‐budget,	   internal	   audit	   reports,	   the	   parliament’s	   establishment	   plan,	   minutes	   from	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relevant	   bodies,	   investigations	   and	   reports	   as	   well	   as	   other	   documentation	   from	   the	  political	  processes	  that	  lead	  to	  the	  changes	  that	  has	  been	  made	  in	  the	  EP-­‐administration.	  The	  data	  from	  the	  EP	  itself	  will,	  when	  applicable,	  be	  supplemented	  by	  research	  made	  by	  others.	  To	  answer	  my	  research	  question,	  I	  have	  collected	  as	  much	  documentation	  about	  the	  organisation	  and	  re-­‐organisation	  processes	  in	  the	  EP	  administration	  as	  possible.	  The	  studied	   time	  period	   covers	   the	   time	   from	  1999	   and	  until	   2012,	   however	   the	   data	   are	  mostly	   focusing	   on	   the	   period	   from	   1999-­‐2003.	   Bigger	   changes	   in	   the	   organisational	  structure	  in	  the	  parliaments	  administration	  happened	  during	  this	  time.	  	  There	   is	   no	   consolidated	   document	   that	   can	   be	   studied	   when	   describing	   the	  changes	  in	  the	  parliament’s	  organisational	  structure.	  Consequently	  I	  searched	  in	  depth	  in	   the	   archives	   and	   registries	   of	   the	   EP	   to	   find	   documents	   that	   can	   describe	   the	  organisational	  changes	  and	  the	  process	  behind	  them.	  To	  find	  the	  data	  I	  have	  red	  a	  first	  set	   of	   reform	   documents	   and	   relevant	   scientific	   articles,	   and	   from	   these	   I	   have	   found	  links	  and	  references	  to	  other	  documents,	  a	  kind	  of	  snowball	  method.	  In	  a	  larger	  study	  it	  would	  have	  been	  preferable	  to	  be	  able	  to	  study	  all	  minutes	  from	  the	  Bureau,	  which	  is	  the	  competent	   body	   within	   the	   EP	   that	   has	   the	   formal	   responsibility	   for	   administrative	  reform.	  However,	  this	  is	  a	  task	  too	  big	  for	  this	  study.	  I	  have	  therefore	  chosen	  to	  use	  the	  snowball	  method.	   This	   has	   lead	   to	   the	   focus	   on	   the	   period	   between	   1999-­‐2003	  were	  Vice-­‐President	   Provans	  Working	   documents	   were	   processed,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   following	  ‘Raising	   the	  Game’-­‐proposals	   from	   the	  Secretary	  General.	  These	   two	   reform	  processes	  will	  be	  central	  in	  this	  study.	  A	  larger	  study	  would	  have	  made	  it	  possible	  to	  follow	  up	  all	  changes	  that	  have	  happened	  after	  2003	  as	  well,	  I	  hope	  other	  researchers	  will	  do	  this	  in	  the	  future.	  	  The	   documents	   studied	   includes	   minutes	   from	   the	   bureau	   meetings,	   some	   of	  them,	  mostly	   from	   the	   first	   period,	   are	   going	   in	  depth	   and	  directly	   referrers	  what	   the	  bureau	  members	   has	   said	   in	   the	  meetings,	   but	   others	   only	   refers	   the	   actual	   decisions	  that	   were	   made	   and	   nothing	   more	   than	   that.	   Other	   documents	   are	   internally	   and	  externally	  produced	  studies	  and	  working	  documents	  of	  the	  organisation,	  official	  rules	  of	  procedure	   and	   the	   official	  website	   of	   the	  EP.	   I	  will	   analyse	   the	   documents	   by	   reading	  them	  both	  out	  from	  the	  theoretical	  perspectives	  presented	  above,	  and	  according	  to	  the	  process	  tracing	  method.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  content	  of	  the	  documents	  will	  be	  related	  to	  the	   organisational	   key	   variables	   and	   the	   perspectives	   on	   change,	   with	   emphasis	   on	  changes	   in	   the	   organisational	   structure.	   The	   documents	   will	   also	   be	   presented	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chronologically	   to	   uncover	   causal	   mechanism	   and	   identify	   relevant	   actors,	   their	  behaviour	  and	  logic	  of	  action,	   to	  the	  extent	  that	  this	   is	  possible	  through	  the	  reading	  of	  these	  documents.	  	  As	   Tansey	   argues,	   “particularly	   in	   political	   science,	   process	   tracing	   frequently	  involves	   the	  analysis	  of	  political	  developments	  at	   the	  highest	   level	  of	  government,	  and	  elite	  actors	  will	  often	  be	  critical	  sources	  of	  information	  about	  the	  political	  processes	  of	  interest”	   (Tansey	   2007,	   p.	   766).	   Since	   the	   organisation	   of	   the	   EP-­‐administration	   is	   a	  matter	   decided	   by	   the	   political	   leadership	   in	   the	   parliament,	   it	   would	   be	   relevant	   to	  complement	  the	  document	  analysis	  with	  elite	  interviews.	  However,	  due	  to	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  scope,	  time,	  and	  their	  availability,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  is	  a	  rather	  new	  case	  to	  study,	  I	  have	  chosen	  not	  to	  perform	  interviews,	  but	  rather	  put	  more	  emphasis	  on	  the	  formal	   processes	   and	   how	   the	   organisation	   has	   developed	   during	   the	   studied	   period.	  Formal	   documents	   are	   a	   common	   source	   of	   information	   when	   performing	   process	  tracing	   and	   especially	   when	   focusing	   on	   the	   formal	   process	   and	   the	   formal	  organisational	   changes	   as	   this	   study	   does.	   This	   also	   means	   that	   this	   study	   does	   not	  provide	  much	  evidence	  of	  the	  type	  that	  you	  need	  to	  analyse	  the	  institutional	  perspective	  in	  depth.	  These	   theories	  do	  however	   serve	  as	  angles	  of	  approach	  also	  when	  analysing	  and	   explaining	   the	   formal	   process.	   Traces	   of	   restraint	   to	   change	   one’s	   own	  organisational	  unit	   can	  be	  part	  of	   a	  path	  dependency,	   an	  attitude	   to	  do	  as	  one	  always	  have	  done.	  This	   is	   the	  way	   that	   these	  perspectives	  are	  used	  empirically	   and	   therefore	  these	  perspectives	  are	  included	  in	  this	  study.	  	  I	   argue	   that	   the	   documents	   used	   in	   this	   study	   can	   be	   used	   to	   reveal	   relevant	  information	  of	  the	  formal	  processes	  in	  the	  EP,	  which	  and	  how	  different	  actors	  played	  a	  role	  in	  these	  processes,	  how	  the	  outcome	  was	  shaped,	  and	  what	  the	  outcome	  looked	  like.	  Hence	   to	   investigate	  how	  the	   formal	  organisational	   structure	  of	   the	  EP-­‐administration	  has	  changed	  over	  time	  and	  how	  these	  changes	  can	  be	  explained.	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  the	   EP-­‐administration	   has	   not	   gained	  much	   attention	   by	   the	   academic	   sphere	   earlier.	  Therefore,	  many	  more	   studies	   than	   this	   one	  would	   be	   required	   to	   cover	   all	   sides	   and	  perspectives	  on	  such	  a	   complex	  and	  elaborate	   institution	  as	   the	  world’s	   first	  and	  only	  supranational	  and	  directly	  elected	  legislative	  assembly.	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3.3 Validity	  and	  reliability	  As	   in	   all	   social	   studies	   it	   is	   important	   to	   value	   and	   discuss	   the	   validity	   and	  reliability	  of	   the	  study.	  A	  good	  validity	   is	  achieved	  when	   the	  examination	  corresponds	  with	   what	   we	   really	   want	   to	   study.	   Therefore,	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   study,	   research	  question	  and	  operationalisation	  must	  be	  strongly	  connected	  with	  the	  choice	  of	  method	  to	   avoid	   systematic	   errors.	   Reliability	   means	   that	   the	   study	   should	   be	   able	   to	   be	  repeated	  at	  another	   time	  by	  another	  person,	  but	  with	  approximately	   the	  same	  results.	  Therefore,	  we	  carefully	  have	  to	  describe	  how	  the	  research	  process	  is	  carried	  out	  to	  avoid	  unsystematic	   errors	   (Essaiasson	   2002,	   p.	   13;	   see	   also	   Adcock	   and	   Collier	   2001:231;	  Babbie	  2001,	  144-­‐5;	  Carmines	  and	  Zeller	  1979,	  14–5;	  Yin	  45).	  	  Yin	  draws	  up	  the	  concepts	  of	  validity	  into	  three	  different	  types	  of	  tests;	  construct	  validity,	   internal	   validity	   and	   external	   validity.	   All	   these	   are	   commonly	   used	   tests	   to	  establish	  the	  quality	  of	  empirical	  social	  research	  (Yin	  2009,	  p.	  40).	  Construct	  validity	  is	  defined	  as	  “identifying	  correct	  operational	  measures	  for	  the	  concepts	  being	  studied	  (Yin	  2009,	  p.	  40).	  This	   is	   in	   line	  with	  Adcock	  and	  Collier	   (2001,	  p.	  230),	   that	  organises	   the	  discussion	  around	  measurement	  validity	  in	  to	  four	  levels,	  and	  claims	  that	  the	  task	  is	  to	  refine	  the	  validity	  through	  these	  four	  levels.	  The	  authors	  define	  the	  levels:	  	  
At	  the	  broadest	  level	  is	  the	  background	  concept,	  which	  encompasses	  the	  
constellation	  of	  potentially	  diverse	  meanings	  associated	  with	  a	  given	  concept.	  
Next	  is	  the	  systematized	  concept,	  the	  specific	  formulation	  of	  a	  concept	  adopted	  
by	  a	  particular	  researcher	  or	  group	  of	  researchers.	   It	   is	  usually	   formulated	   in	  
terms	  of	  an	  explicit	  definition.	  At	   the	   third	   level	  are	   indicators	  which	  are	  also	  
routinely	  called	  measures.	  This	  level	  includes	  any	  systematic	  scoring	  procedure,	  
ranging	  from	  simple	  measures	  to	  complex	  aggregated	  indexes.	  It	  encompasses	  
not	  only	  quantitative	  indicators	  but	  also	  the	  classification	  procedures	  employed	  
in	  qualitative	   research.	  At	   the	   fourth	   level	  are	   scores	   for	   cases,	  which	   include	  
both	   numerical	   scores	   and	   the	   results	   of	   qualitative	   classification	   (Adcock	   &	  
Collier	  2001,	  p.	  230).	  Adcock	   and	   Collier	   (2001,	   p.	   231)	   further	   argues	   that	   the	   discussion	   about	  measurement	   validity	   should	   “focus	   on	   the	   relation	   between	   observations	   and	   the	  systematized	  concept;	  any	  potential	  disputes	  about	   the	  background	  concept	  should	  be	  set	  aside	  as	  an	  important	  but	  separate	  issue”.	  As	  regards	  to	  this	  study,	  the	  background	  concept	  is	  changes	  in	  formal	  organisational	  structure,	  which	  also	  is	  a	  rather	  well	  defined	  concept.	  The	  indicators	  that	  it	  is	  operationalized	  to	  are	  the	  organisational	  key	  variables	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and	   the	   causal	  mechanisms	   of	   the	   theoretical	   perspectives	   as	   they	   are	   defined	   in	   the	  theory	  chapter.	  The	  theoretical	  perspectives	  all	  have	  a	  unique	  definition	  of	  what	  that	  is	  the	   logic	  of	  action	   for	   that	  perspective.	  To	   identify	   these	   in	   the	   formal	  documents,	  one	  has	  to	  look	  into	  the	  arguments	  of	  the	  actors	  and	  also	  put	  them	  in	  relation	  to	  background	  factors	   and	   the	   actors’	   organisational	   position.	   These	   indicators	   are	   of	   a	   qualitative	  nature	  and	  therefore	  not	  measurable	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  you	  can	  quantify	  them	  or	  put	  in	  scores	  on	  a	  scale.	  It	  is	  important	  that	  researchers	  are	  aware	  that	  in	  a	  qualitative	  analysis	  such	  as	  this	  one,	  one	  has	  to	  make	  interpretations	  and	  "read	  between	  the	  lines"	  in	  order	  to	   capture	   the	   essence	   of	   the	   data.	   An	   obvious	   pitfall	   with	   this	   is	   that	   there	   is	  misinterpretation.	   Consequently	   it	   is	   crucial	   to	   have	   a	   clear	   theory	   and	  methodology	  where	  you	  anchor	  the	  interpretations	  in	  the	  work	  of	  the	  empirical	  analysis	  (Runfeldt	  &	  Wramner	  2009,	  p.	  4).	   I	  argue	  that	  the	  method	  of	  process	  tracing	   is	  best	  suited	  for	   this	  study	   because	   it	   is	   a	  method	   to	   identify	   the	   complete	   causal	   process	   and	   identify	   the	  operative	   causal	   mechanisms.	   The	   chosen	   indicators	   come	   from	   a	   well-­‐tested	   and	  established	   theoretical	   framework	   in	  organisational	   studies,	  and	   I	  will	   therefore	  argue	  that	  they	  are	  well	  suited	  to	  measure	  the	  chosen	  concept.	  	  Internal	   validity,	   Yin	   defines	   as	   “seeking	   to	   establish	   a	   causal	   relationship,	  whereby	   certain	   conditions	   are	   believed	   to	   lead	   to	   other	   conditions,	   as	   distinguished	  from	   spurious	   relationships”	   (Yin	   2009,	   p.	   40).	   This	   is	   a	   general	   problem	   in	   social	  sciences,	  and	  therefore	   important	   to	  be	  cautious	  of.	   	  However,	  as	  discussed	  above,	   the	  ability	  to	  identify	  and	  come	  close	  to	  the	  causal	  mechanisms	  is	  one	  of	  the	  strengths	  with	  the	  process	  tracing	  case	  study.	  That	  is	  because	  it	  focuses	  on	  identifying	  all	  relevant	  steps	  in	   a	   process	   and	   addresses	   both	   rival	   explanations	   and	   use	   a	   logic	   model	   to	   explain	  outcomes.	  Together	  with	  the	  well-­‐established	  theoretical	  framework	  used	  in	  this	  study	  I	  therefore	   argue	   that	   this	   study	  has	   got	   tools	   to	  deal	  with	  many	  of	   the	  pitfalls	  when	   it	  comes	  to	  internal	  validity.	  	  Some	  of	  the	  authors	  to	  the	  scientific	  articles	  and	  texts	  that	  are	  used	  as	  a	  second	  source	  of	   information	   in	   this	   study	  does	  or	  did,	  at	   the	   time	  of	   their	  writing,	  also	  work	  inside	  the	  EP	  administration.	  The	  strength	  of	  these	  texts	  is	  also	  their	  weakness.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  authors	  have	  worked	  inside	  de	  EP-­‐administration	  provides	  them	  with	  closeness	  to	   the	   studied	   object	   in	   this	   study	   in	   a	  way	   that	  wouldn’t	   be	   possible	   otherwise.	   The	  closeness	  is	  strengthening	  the	  validity	  because	  it	  means	  that	  the	  authors	  have	  seen	  the	  parliament	  in	  action	  and	  can	  therefore	  easier	  identify	  the	  causal	  mechanisms	  from	  their	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perspectives.	  These	  circumstances	  also	  opens	  for	  a	  risk	  for	  biased	  texts	  because	  of	  the	  loyalty	  these	  persons	  might	  have	  towards	  their	  employer.	  However,	  the	  texts	  are	  written	  for	  and	  published	  in	  scientific	  books	  and	  settings.	  	  External	   validity	   is	   the	   task	  of	   “defining	   the	  domain	   to	  which	  a	   study’s	   findings	  can	  be	  generalised”	  (Yin	  2009,	  p.	  40).	  Generalisation	  in	  this	  case	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  statistical	  sense	  “in	  which	  a	  sample	  is	  intended	  to	  generalise	  to	  a	  larger	  universe”.	  In	  analytical	   generalisation,	   Yin	   writes,	   “the	   investigator	   is	   striving	   to	   generalise	   a	  particular	  set	  of	  results	  to	  some	  broader	  theory”	  (Yin	  2009,	  p.	  43).	  In	  this	  study,	  the	  set	  of	  theories	  that	  are	  used	  are	  broad	  theories	  on	  public	  organisations	  in	  general,	  therefore	  it	  would	  be	  easy	  to	  think	  that	  the	  results	  of	  this	  study	  could	  be	  generalised	  into	  such	  a	  broadly	   defined	   concept.	   However,	   there	   are	   some	   restrictions	   that	   makes	  generalisation	  more	  difficult.	  The	   first	  one	   is	   that	  parliaments	  have	  some	  quite	  unique	  features	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   organisation.	   Legislatures	   have	   the	   power	   to	   organise	  themselves,	  no	  outside	  authority	  can	  decide	  upon	  their	  organisation.	  The	  members	  of	  a	  legislature	  are	  formally	  equal	  to	  each	  other	  and	  they	  do	  not	  stand	  in	  the	  relationship	  of	  authority	  or	   subordination	  of	  each	  other,	   as	  members	  of	  hierarchical	  organisations	  do	  (Loewenberg	  &	  Patterson	  1979,	  p.	  164).	  Secondly,	  the	  case	  in	  this	  study	  is	  not	  just	  any	  parliament;	   it	   is	   the	   EP,	   which	   is	   the	   first	   and	   only	   directly	   elected	   supranational	  representative	   institution	   in	   the	  world.	   This	  means	   that	   the	  EP	  has	   got	   some	   features	  that	  might	   restrict	   the	   possibility	   to	   generalise	   the	   results	   of	   this	   study.	   One	  must	   be	  cautious	   about	   these	   restrictions	   and	   keep	   them	   in	   mind.	   However,	   I	   still	   argue	   that	  some	  generalisation	   is	  possible	   since	   there	  are	   connections	   to	   the	   situation	   that	  other	  legislative	   assemblies	   face,	   and	   that	   the	   administrative	   side	   of	   the	   EP	   is	   structured	   in	  similar	   ways	   as	   administrative	   organisations	   in	   general,	   which	   in	   turn	   are	   formal	  organisations.	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4 Organising	  the	  European	  Parliament	  staff	  This	   chapter	  will	  present	   the	  empirical	   results	   from	   the	   study.	  The	  chapter	  will	  start	   with	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   EP	   from	   1999-­‐2012,	   together	   with	   a	  presentation	  of	  the	  general	  structure	  in	  the	  EP,	  with	  emphasis	  on	  the	  administration	  and	  the	  bodies	   that	   takes	  decisions	  on	   its	   structure.	   Following,	   the	   roles	   that	   the	  different	  types	  of	  administrative	  units	  play	  in	  the	  EP	  and	  its	  legislative	  process	  will	  be	  presented.	  The	  recruitment	  and	  staffing	  policies	  are	  then	  presented.	  The	  starting	  point	  for	  this	  first	  part	   of	   the	   chapter	   is	   the	   organisational	   key	   variables.	   The	   changes	   to	   the	   formal	  organisational	  structure	  will	  be	  presented	  in	  this	  part	  as	  two	  strikes	  in	  the	  history;	  how	  the	  structure	  was	  in	  2000	  and	  how	  it	  was	  in	  2012.	  	  Moving	  to	  the	  second	  part	  of	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  go	  through	  the	  identified	  reform	  processes,	  where	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  many	  of	  the	  structural	  changes	  happened.	  The	  findings	  from	  the	  process	  tracing	  will	   form	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  part	  of	  the	  chapter.	  Emphasis	   is	  on	  how	  these	  processes	  were	  initiated,	  shaped	  and	  carried	  out,	  which	  actors	  that	  played	  an	  important	  role	  and	  how	  they	  did	  so.	  	  
4.1 The	  structure	  of	  the	  EP	  staff	  The	  MEPs	  have	  three	  types	  of	  assistance	  available	  for	  their	  service;	   from	  the	  EP	  itself	  (General	  Secretariat	  &	  Committee	  secretariats),	  from	  the	  political	  groups	  and	  from	  the	  MEPs	  own	  personal	  assistants.	  The	  first	  of	  these	  categories	  was	  clearly	  dominant	  for	  many	   years,	   but	   this	   position	   has	   changed	   since	   the	  mid-­‐1990s	   (Neunreither	   2002,	   p.	  46).	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  major	  changes	  that	  have	  happened	  to	  the	  EP	  as	  regards	  to	  its	  political	  role	  in	  the	  EU	  system,	  the	  EP-­‐administration	  remained	  basically	  untouched	  until	  around	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  millennium.	  (Neunreither	  2002,	  p.	  55	  and	  Kungla	  2007:77).	  	  In	   a	   dichotomy	   between	   a	   more	   European	   administrative	   system	   based	   on	   an	  impartial	  professional	  service,	  distanced	  from	  political	  interference,	  on	  one	  hand,	  and	  on	  the	  other	   is	  an	  American	   ‘spoils’	   system	  based	  on	  majority	   rule,	   the	  EP	  system	  clearly	  places	   itself	   in	   an	   European	   tradition.	   The	   EU	   administrative	   system	   “was	   built	  according	   to	   French	   traditions	   and	   conceptions.	   The	   backbone	   of	   this	   system	   is	  recruitment	  on	   the	  basis	   of	   general	   competition,	   high	  degree	  of	   tenure,	   and	  a	  broadly	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objective	   promotion	   system	   with	   a	   tendency	   to	   favour	   seniority	   over	   merit”	  (Neunreither	  2002,	  p.	  46).	  	  The	   EP	   administrative	   support	   has	   developed	   to	   a	   non-­‐partisan	   and	   respected	  service	  with	  a	   strong	  General	  Secretariat.	  One	  of	   the	   reasons	   for	   this	  goes	  back	   to	   the	  time	   before	   the	   MEPs	   was	   elected	   directly	   by	   the	   people	   in	   the	   member	   states	  (Neunreither	  2002,	  p.	   46).	   “Before	   the	   first	  EP	  elections	   in	  1979,	   the	   chamber	  was	  an	  unelected	   assembly	   composed	  of	   delegated	  members	   of	   the	  national	   parliaments	  who	  had	   to	   split	   their	   time	  between	   their	  original	  mandate	  and	   the	  EP	   (and	   in	   some	  cases	  also	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe).	   This	   provided	   for	   considerable	   independence	   of	   the	  secretariat	  during	  MEPs’	  absence	  and	  for	  ‘desk	  officers’	  to	  become	  experts	  on	  legislative	  files,	  with	  little	  chance	  for	  the	  members	  to	  acquire	  comparable	  knowledge”	  (Neunreither	  2002,	  p.	  46).	  	  When	  the	  direct	  elections	  were	  introduced,	  the	  number	  of	  MEPs	  was	  doubled	  and	  most	  of	  them	  worked	  full-­‐time	  in	  the	  parliament.	  This	  made	  it	  possible	  for	  the	  MEPs	  to	  acquire	  more	  knowledge	  and	  to	  “become	  proficient	   in	  policy	  matters”	   themselves.	  The	  independence	  of	  the	  General	  Secretariat	  has	  however	  never	  been	  reduced	  or	  limited	  by	  this,	  mostly	  because	  of	  the	  security	  of	  tenure	  of	  its	  senior	  officials.	  Career-­‐movements	  in	  the	  EP	  tend	  to	  happen	  rather	  slowly;	  many	  of	  its	  senior	  officials	  have	  worked	  in	  the	  GS	  for	  some	  30-­‐40	  years	  before	  receiving	  a	  high-­‐ranked	  position.	  This	  has	  provided	   for	  a	  good	  breeding	  ground	  where	  the	  staff	  has	  been	  integrated	  and	  institutionalised	  step	  by	  step	   into	   the	  unwritten	   rules	   that	   are	   important	   for	   an	   independent	   and	  non-­‐partisan	  service	  (Neunreither	  2002,	  pp.	  46-­‐47).	  	  As	   a	   result	   of	   a	  political	   compromise,	   the	   activities	   of	   the	  EP	   is	   spread	   to	   three	  European	   cities;	   Strasbourg	   in	   France	   is	   the	   formal	   seat	   and	   the	   place	   for	   the	  Parliaments	   plenary	   sessions	   that	   are	   held	   one	   week	   every	   month.	   During	   the	   other	  weeks,	   the	  political	  work	   is	   located	  to	  Brussels,	  were	  the	  EPs	  committees	  and	  political	  groups	  meet	   and	   extra	   sessions	   can	   also	   be	   held	   here.	   Finally,	   the	   greater	   part	   of	   the	  General	  Secretariat	  is	  located	  in	  Luxembourg	  (Tallberg	  2013,	  p.	  91).	  	  
4.1.1 The	  leadership	  of	  the	  EP	  administration	  The	  leadership	  of	  the	  EP	  consists	  of	  an	  elected	  president,	  and	  14	  Vice-­‐Presidents,	  that	  oversee	  all	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Parliament	  and	  its	  constituent	  bodies	  (the	  Conference	  of	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Presidents	   and	   the	   Bureau),	   as	  well	   as	   the	   debates	   in	   plenary.	   The	   president	   and	   the	  Vice-­‐presidents	   are	   nominated	   and	   elected	   directly	   by	   the	   parliament.	   After	   electing	  those,	   the	   parliament	   elects	   five	   so	   called	   Quaestors,	   that	   are	   responsible	   for	  administrative	   and	   financial	   matters	   directly	   concerning	   MEPs	   (European	   Parliament	  2012b	  Rules	  20-­‐25).	  	  The	  Conference	  of	  Presidents	   is	   the	  political	  body	   in	  Parliament	  responsible	   for	  the	   organisation	   of	   Parliament’s	   business	   and	   legislative	   planning,	   deciding	   the	  responsibilities	   and	   membership	   of	   committees	   and	   delegations	   and	   the	   external	  relations	  of	  the	  EP,	  such	  as	  other	  EU	  institutions,	  the	  national	  parliaments	  and	  non-­‐EU	  countries.	  The	  Conference	  of	  Presidents	  consists	  of	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Parliament	  and	  the	  political	  group	  chairmen	  (European	  Parliament	  2012b	  Rules	  20-­‐25).	  	  The	   Bureau	   is	   the	   regulatory	   body	   that	   is	   responsible	   for	   taking	   financial,	  organisational	   and	   administrative	   decisions	   on	   matters	   concerning	   the	   internal	  organisation	  of	  Parliament,	   its	  Secretariat	  and	  its	  bodies.	  The	  Bureau	  therefore	  plays	  a	  central	   role	   in	   the	   change	   processes	   within	   the	   EP-­‐administration.	   Members	   of	   the	  Bureau	  are	  the	  president	  and	  the	  14	  vice-­‐presidents,	  also	  the	  Quaestors	  may	  participate	  in	  the	  Bureau,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  have	  the	  right	  to	  vote.	  All	  of	  the	  members	  have	  one	  vote	  each,	   and	   if	   the	   voting	   results	   in	   a	   tie,	   the	   President	   shall	   have	   the	   casting	   vote	  (European	  Parliament	  2012b	  Rules	  22-­‐33).	  	  
Table	  1	  	  	  Main	  duties	  of	  the	  Bureau	  
• Takes	  financial,	  organisational	  and	  administrative	  decisions	  on	  matters	  concerning	  the	  internal	  organisation	  of	  Parliament,	  its	  Secretariat	  and	  its	  bodies.	  
• Takes	  decisions	  on	  matters	  relating	  to	  the	  conduct	  of	  sittings.	  	  
• Decides	  the	  establishment	  plan	  of	  the	  Secretariat	  and	  lay	  down	  regulations	  concerning	  the	  administrative	  and	  financial	  situation	  of	  officials	  and	  other	  servants.	  	  
• Draws	  up	  Parliament's	  preliminary	  draft	  budget	  estimates.	  	  
• It	  is	  the	  authority	  responsible	  for	  authorising	  meetings	  of	  committees	  away	  from	  the	  usual	  places	  of	  work,	  hearings	  and	  study	  and	  fact-­‐finding	  journeys	  by	  rapporteurs.	  	  	  
• Appoints	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  	  
• Lays	  down	  the	  implementing	  rules	  relating	  to	  Regulation	  (EC)	  No	  2004/2003	  of	  the	  EP	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  on	  the	  regulations	  governing	  political	  parties	  at	  European	  level	  and	  the	  rules	  regarding	  their	  funding.	  	  Source:	  (European	  Parliament	  2012b	  Rules	  22-­‐33)	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As	   seen	   in	   table	   1,	   the	   Bureau	   decides	   the	   so	   called	   establishment	   plan	   for	   the	  Secretariat,	  however	  there	  is	  no	  consolidated	  process	  for	  doing	  so.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  procedure	   of	   deciding	   on	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   Secretariat	   is	   made	   case	   by	   case.	   	   For	  instance,	   if	   a	   new	   Directorate	   has	   to	   be	   created,	   the	   Secretary	   General	   submits	   a	  proposal	  to	  the	  Bureau	  and	  the	  Bureau	  decides	  on	  the	  proposal.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	   Bureau	   adopts	   an	   updated	   establishment	   plan	   every	   time	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   EP	  changes,	   but	   rather	   makes	   a	   decision	   to	   establish	   that	   particular	   directorate	   or	   unit	  (Caus	  Galvez	  2012).	  	  
4.1.2 The	  General	  Secretariat	  The	  General	  Secretariat	  (GS)	  is	  the	  decidedly	  largest	  part	  of	  the	  EP-­‐administration	  and	   its	   organisational	   design	   is	   elaborate.	   Its	   tasks	   are	   wide-­‐ranged	   and	   include	  coordinating	   legislative	   work	   and	   organising	   plenary	   sittings	   and	   meetings.	   It	   also	  provides	   technical	   and	   expert	   assistance	   to	   parliamentary	   bodies	   and	   Members	   of	  Parliament	  to	  support	  them	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  their	  mandates,	  and	  managing	  the	  finances	  and	  budget	  of	  the	  EP.	  (European	  Parliament	  2012c)	  	  The	   EP	   establishment	   plan	   provides	   the	   General	   Secretariat	   with	   5647	   posts	  (figures	   as	   of	   01.01.2012,	   (European	   Parliament	   2012a,	   p.	   8));	   compared	   to	   national	  parliaments	  the	  GS	  is	  much	  bigger.	  This,	  according	  to	  Corbett	  et	  al.,	  can	  to	  a	  large	  degree	  be	  explained	  by	   two	   facts;	   first	   the	  GS	  has	   to	  ensure	   that	  all	  parliamentary	  bodies	  can	  operate	  in	  all	  23	  official	  working	  languages	  of	  the	  EU,	  and	  secondly	  that	  the	  EP	  is	  spread	  over	  three	  main	  places.	  These	  two	  facts	  account	  for	  around	  half	  of	  the	  annual	  EP	  budget.	  Of	   all	   the	   GS-­‐staff	   just	   above	   90%	   of	   the	   posts	   are	   divided	   almost	   equally	   between	  Brussels	   and	   Luxembourg,	   the	   rest	   work	   in	   either	   Strasbourg	   or	   in	   the	   information	  offices	   that	   the	   parliament	   have	   in	   all	   member	   states	   (Corbett,	   Jacobs	   &	   Shackleton	  2011,	  pp.	  218-­‐219).	  Translation	  and	  publishing	  is	  a	  big	  task	  for	  the	  General	  Secretariat,	  and	  about	  one	  third	  of	  the	  staff	  is	  translators	  (IOHRPU	  2009,	  p.	  8).	  The	  political	  groups	  and	  MEPs	  have	  relatively	   little	   influence	  over	   the	  appointment	  of	  new	  staff,	  except	   for	  the	  top	  positions	  (Corbett,	  Jacobs	  &	  Shackleton	  2011,	  pp.	  219-­‐220).	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Secretary-­‐General	  and	  his	  Cabinet	  The	  head	  of	  the	  organisation	  is	  the	  Secretary-­‐General,	  who	  is	  also	  the	  most	  senior	  official	   of	   the	   parliament.	   To	   perform	   his	   tasks,	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   has	   a	   Private	  Office	  that	  supports	  him	  in	  coordinating	  the	  work	  of	  the	  secretariat.	  In	  the	  parliament’s	  60	  year	  old	  history,	   there	  have	  only	  been	  seven	  secretaries-­‐general	   (Corbett,	   Jacobs	  &	  Shackleton	   2011,	   p.	   222).	   The	   Secretary-­‐General	   performs	   all	   his	   tasks	   under	   the	  political	   leadership	   of	   the	   President,	   the	   Bureau	   of	   the	   EP	   and	   the	   Conference	   of	  Presidents	  of	  the	  EP.	  In	  order	  to	  carry	  out	  his	  tasks,	  the	  Secretary-­‐general	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  Cabinet,	  which	  is	  organised	  in	  various	  teams.	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  a	  few	  sensitive	  services	  come	  under	  the	  direct	  supervision	  of	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  The	  organisation	  of	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  and	  his	  Cabinet	  had	  not	  changed	   in	  any	  of	   the	  reform	  processes	  that	  this	  study	  covers.	  However,	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  making	  of	  these	  reforms.	  	  
	  
The	  Directorates-­‐General	  As	  of	  today,	  the	  GS	  is	  divided	  into	  ten	  Directorates-­‐General,	  the	  EP	  Legal	  Service	  and	  the	  Secretary	  General’s	  office	  (Corbett,	  Jacobs	  &	  Shackleton	  2011,	  pp.	  222-­‐223).	  The	  division	   of	   tasks	   between	   them	   are	  mainly	  made	   on	   sectorial	   and	   functional	   grounds.	  While	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  has	  the	  leader	  role	  in	  the	  GE,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  work	  
Table	  2	  	  	  Units	  and	  services	  under	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  
	  Source:	  (European	  Parliament	  2012c)	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in	   the	   General	   Secretariat	   is	   made	   by	   the	   Directorates-­‐General,	   or	   DGs.	   Before	   1973,	  there	  were	  only	  four	  DGs,	  but	  this	  has	  grown	  gradually	  and	  today	  there	  are	  ten	  DGs,	  plus	  a	   separate	   Legal	   Service	   (Corbett,	   Jacobs	  &	   Shackleton	   2011,	   p.	   222).	   The	   DGs	   play	   a	  central	  role	  in	  supporting	  the	  MEPs	  in	  their	  work.	  This	  is	  especially	  valid	  for	  the	  DGs	  for	  Internal	  and	  External	  policies,	  where	  the	  committee	  secretariats	  and	  policy	  support	  for	  all	  political	  committees	  in	  the	  EP	  are	  organised.	  	  
	  
4.1.3 The	  staff	  of	  the	  EP’s	  political	  groups	  The	  EP’s	  budget	  allocates	  money	  to	  the	  Political	  Groups,	  both	  as	  direct	   financial	  support,	   and	  as	   staff	   entitlements,	   office	   space,	  meeting	   rooms	  and	   technical	   facilities.	  The	  EP	  has	  established	  precise	  rules	  regarding	  the	  amount	  of	  financial	  support	  as	  well	  as	   the	   number	   of	   staff	   to	   which	   Political	   groups	   are	   entitled.	   The	   most	   important	  criterion	  is	  the	  number	  of	  members	  in	  each	  Group,	  but	  the	  number	  of	  working	  languages	  also	  plays	  a	  role	  (Corbett,	   Jacobs	  &	  Shackleton	  2007,	  p.	  99).	  The	  number	  of	  staff	   in	  the	  Groups	   has	   grown	   greatly	   in	   recent	   years.	   In	   2012,	   1015	   post	  were	   budgeted	   for	   the	  Groups	  as	  compared	  with	  285	   in	  1982.	  This	  represents	  a	   far	  higher	   increase	  than	  that	  for	   the	   Parliament’s	   permanent	   staff	   (Corbett,	   Jacobs	   &	   Shackleton	   2007,	   p.	   100	   and	  European	   Parliament	   2012a,	   p.	   8).	   The	   majority	   of	   Political	   Group	   staff	   are	   hired	   as	  temporary	  staff	  and	  are	  therefore	  not	  hired	  under	  the	  inter-­‐institutional	  rules	  that	  cover	  the	   permanent	   staff	   (Corbett,	   Jacobs	  &	   Shackleton	   2007,	   p.	   100	   and	   Staff	   Regulations	  2004	  Section	  II,	  Title	  I,	  Article	  2).	  The	  staff	  are	  recruited	  directly	  by	  the	  Groups	  (with	  the	  
Table	  3	  	  	  The	  directorates	  
• Directorate-­‐General	  for	  the	  Presidency	  (DG	  PRES)	  
• Directorate-­‐General	  for	  Internal	  Policies	  of	  the	  Union	  (DG	  IPOL)	  
• Directorate-­‐General	  for	  External	  Policies	  of	  the	  Union	  (DG	  EXPO)	  
• Directorate-­‐General	  for	  Communication	  (DG	  COMM)	  
• Directorate-­‐General	  for	  Personnel	  (DG	  PERS)	  
• Directorate-­‐General	  for	  Infrastructure	  and	  Logistics	  (DG	  INLO)	  
• Directorate-­‐General	  for	  Translation	  (DG	  TRAD)	  
• Directorate-­‐General	  for	  Interpretation	  and	  Conferences	  (DG	  INTE)	  
• Directorate-­‐General	  for	  Finance	  (DG	  FINS)	  
• Directorate-­‐General	  for	  Innovation	  and	  Technological	  Support	  (DG	  ITEC)	  Source:	  (European	  Parliament	  2012c)	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national	  delegations	  playing	  an	  important	  role)	  and	  therefore	  they	  do	  not	  need	  to	  pass	  the	  open	  competitions	  that	  apply	  for	  Parliament’s	  permanent	  officials.	  They	  do	  however	  enjoy	  de	   facto	   if	  not	  de	   jure	   job	   security	   as	   relatively	   few	  are	  dismissed	  as	   a	   result	  of	  election	   defeats,	   political	   disappointments	   or	   Group	   reorganisations.	   The	   recruitment	  process	  is	  sometimes	  based	  on	  political	  and	  personal	  contacts,	  but	  especially	  the	  larger	  groups	  has	  established	  more	  objective	  methods	  with	  oral	  and	  written	  exams	  as	  well	  as	  language	   tests,	   however,	   naturally,	   political	   affinity	   and	   political	   experience	   are	   taken	  into	  account	  (Corbett,	  Jacobs	  &	  Shackleton	  2007,	  p.	  100).	  The	  groups	  have	  the	  right	  to	  choose	  by	  themselves	  how	  they	  should	  be	  organised	  and	  therefore	  has	  it’s	  own	  internal	  structure.	  Some	  general	  patterns	  do	  however	  occur.	  They	  have	  a	  Bureau	  composed	  of	  a	  chair,	  vice-­‐chairs,	  treasurer	  and	  others.	  In	  the	  larger	  groups,	   the	   bureau	   plays	   a	   more	   important	   role	   in	   preparing	   and	   coordinating	  discussions,	   positions	   etc.	   Group	   chairs	   are	   the	   political	   leadership	   and	   represent	   the	  group	   both	   outside	   the	   parliament	   and	   inside,	   in	   major	   debates,	   the	   Conference	   of	  Presidents	  and	  in	  informal	  Group	  chair	  meetings,	  where	  many	  deals	  are	  made	  (Corbett,	  Jacobs	  &	  Shackleton	  2007,	  p.	  101).	  	  	  The	  political	  groups	  have	  historically	  played	  a	  rather	  technical	  role,	  even	  though	  their	  focus	  on	  the	  work	  in	  the	  committees	  has	  been	  rising	  and	  nowadays	  they	  are	  used	  to	  coordinate	  their	  members	   in	  the	  committees	  and	  work	  out	  possible	  amendments	  to	  reports	   in	   the	   name	   of	   the	   political	   groups	   (Neunreither	   2002,	   p.	   49).	   According	   to	  insiders,	   the	   level	  of	   coordination	   from	   the	  different	  political	   groups	  vary	  quite	  much,	  where	   the	   S&D	  group	  has	   a	   larger	  degree	  of	   central	   party	   coordination	   than	   the	  EPP-­‐group	  has,	  where	  the	  different	  MEPs	  more	  clearly	  votes	  according	  to	  their	  home	  country	  (Nordmark	  2013).	  	  The	  work	   in	   the	  Groups	  are	  organised	  both	  based	  on	   functions	  and	   sectors,	   for	  instance	  administrative	  or	  press	  work,	  or	  responsibility	  for	  urgency	  debates	  in	  plenary	  or	  a	  specific	  policy	  area.	  In	  the	  large	  groups	  there	  can	  be	  as	  many	  as	  three	  staff	  following	  the	  same	  committee,	  whilst	   in	   the	  small	  groups	   the	  same	  person	  might	  have	   to	   follow	  three	  committees	  at	  once.	  The	  staff	  help	  prepare	  Group	  meetings	  and	  Group	  positions	  before	   the	  plenary	   sessions.	  They	  may	  also	  prepare	  background	   information,	  draw	  up	  whips	  both	  in	  committee	  and	  plenary	  as	  well	  as	  rounding	  up	  Group	  members	  from	  other	  Committees	  to	  help	  in	  tight	  votes.	  They	  contribute	  to	  maintaining	  contacts	  with	  national	  parties,	  national	  governments	  where	  the	  party	  is	  in	  power,	  Commissioners	  of	  their	  own	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tendencies	   as	  well	   as	   other	   organisations.	   They	  must	   also	   take	   account	   of	   the	   various	  national,	   sectoral,	   or	   constituency	   considerations	   that	   are	   of	   importance	   to	   individual	  members.	   Group	   staff	   often	   go	   on	   to	   political	   careers	   as	  MEPs	   both	   in	   the	   EP	   and	   in	  national	  parliaments	  (Corbett,	  Jacobs	  &	  Shackleton	  2007,	  pp.	  100-­‐101).	  	  
4.1.4 The	  MEPs’	  personal	  assistants	  The	  MEP’s	  personal	  assistants	  are	  the	  third	  component	  of	  the	  EP	  administration,	  besides	  the	  General	  Secretariat	  and	  the	  political	  groups.	  They	  are	  hired	  by	  the	  individual	  MEPs	  as	  part	  of	  their	  secretarial	  allowance,	  and	  the	  MEPs	  can	  to	  a	   large	  degree	  decide	  over	  their	  assistants’	  terms	  of	  employment	  and	  how	  they	  are	  used.	  This	  staff	  tends	  to	  be	  junior	  personnel	  with	  high	  turnover	  (Michon	  2008;	  Egeberg	  et	  al.	  2011,	  p.	  3)	  The	  MEPs	  have	  a	  large	  degree	  of	  freedom	  to	  decide	  how	  to	  use	  their	  allowances,	  some	  MEPs	  prefer	  to	  have	  only	  one	  or	  two	  highly	  qualified	  (and	  better	  paid)	  assistants	  while	  others	  have	  less	  qualified	  assistants,	  but	  then	  can	  afford	  to	  hire	  more.	  They	  can	  be	  placed	  either	  in	  Brussels,	   the	  MEPs	   constituency	  or	   in	   the	  national	   capital.	   In	   some	  cases,	   the	  national	  delegations	   from	   a	   party	   decides	   to	   hire	   the	   assistants	   together	   and	   use	   them	   as	   a	  unified	   office	   where	   the	   assistants	   can	   help	   different	   MEPs	   depending	   on	   their	  competences	  and	  the	  MEPs	  needs.	  	  Typical	  tasks	  include	  arranging	  meetings	  with	  Commission	  officials,	  organisations	  and	   lobbyists,	   handle	   correspondence	   (including	   several	   hundreds	   of	   e-­‐mails	   a	   day),	  draft	   letters,	   articles	   or	   reports.	   Some	   assistants	   are	   also	   used	   to	   draft	   and	   write	  proposals	   to	   the	   parliament,	   and	   are	   in	   that	   sense	   directly	   included	   in	   the	   legislative	  process	  (Corbett,	   Jacobs	  &	  Shackleton	  2007,	  pp.	  67-­‐68).	  The	  assistants	  can	  play	  a	  very	  important	   role	   in	   their	   function	   to	   filter	   information	   from	   external	   sources	   and	   their	  possible	  impact	  on	  legislative	  proposals	  (Neunreither	  2002,	  p.	  51)	  	  
4.2 Roles	  in	  the	  EP	  To	   understand	   the	   EPs	   internal	   life	   and	   the	   roles	   of	   the	   three	   sources	  administrative	   support	   to	  MEPs,	   one	  must	   know	   some	   things	   about	  what	   the	   normal	  political	  law-­‐making	  processes	  look	  like,	  the	  so	  called	  "Ordinary	  Legislative	  Procedure",	  as	  well	  as	  the	  documents	  that	  regulates	  this.	  In	  this	  context	  the	  Rules	  of	  Procedure	  (RoP)	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plays	   an	   important	   role.	   It	   is	   the	   EPs	   “constitution”	   and	   structures	   the	   internal	  organisation	   of	   the	   Parliament,	   the	   relationship	   between	   individual	   members,	   the	  various	  party	  groups	  and	  increasingly	  the	  relationship	  and	  interactions	  between	  the	  EP	  and	   the	   other	   institutions	   of	   the	   EU	   both	   formally	   and	   informally.	   The	   RoP	   also	  establishes	  the	  hierarchical	  structures	  that	  govern	  the	  EP	  and	  serve	  to	  structure	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	   activities	   of	   the	   Parliament	   including	   all	   activities	   related	   to	   the	   policy-­‐making	  process.	  Because	  of	   the	   importance	  of	   this	  document,	   the	  EP	  has	   also	  made	   it	   hard	   to	  change	  its	  content,	  both	  formally	  and	  practically.	  Any	  modification	  to	  the	  RoP	  requires	  an	  absolute	  majority	  of	  component	  members	  voting	  in	  support	  (currently	  378	  votes	  out	  of	  754).	  The	  practical	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  EP	  has	  a	  high	  level	  of	  absence	  among	  its	  MEP’s.	  Hence,	   to	   change	   the	   RoP,	   the	   two	   largest	   party	   groups,	   the	   EPP	   (European	   Peoples	  Party,	   centre-­‐right)	   and	   the	   S&D	   (Socialists	   and	   Democrats,	   centre-­‐left)	   must	   work	  together.	  The	   two	  party	  groups	  share	  a	  common	   interest	   in	   the	  sense	   that	   they	  are	  so	  dominating	   in	   the	  European	  party	   landscape.	  Ever	   since	   the	   first	  direct	   elections	   took	  place	  in	  1979	  the	  two	  groups	  has	  controlled	  60-­‐70percent	  of	  the	  seats	  in	  the	  EP,	  while	  neither	   of	   them	  has	   controlled	   an	   absolute	  majority	   by	   itself	   (Kreppel	   2003,	   pp.	   893-­‐894).	  	   The	   Ordinary	   Legislative	   Procedure	   works	   in	   the	   way	   that	   the	   European	  Commission	  proposes	  new	  laws,	  in	  fact	  it	  is	  the	  only	  body	  that	  can	  do	  that,	  and	  then	  the	  Parliament	   and	  Council	   adopt	   them.	   The	   Commission	   and	   the	  member	   countries	   then	  implement	   them.	   The	   Commission	   also	   has	   the	   role	   of	   ensuring	   that	   the	   laws	   are	  properly	   applied	   and	   implemented.	   In	   the	   legislative	   process,	   this	  means	   that	   the	   EP,	  Commission	   and	   Council	  must	   come	   to	   an	   agreement	   on	   the	   content	   of	   a	   new	   law	   in	  order	   to	   adopt	   it.	   Inter-­‐institutional	   negotiations	   are	   therefore	   necessary.	   In	   order	   to	  coordinate	   the	  negotiations	   inside	   the	  EP,	   the	  committee	   that	   is	   responsible	   for	  a	  new	  proposal	   from	  the	  Commission	  always	  elects	  a	   rapporteur	   for	  each	   legislative	  act.	  The	  rapporteur	   is	  one	  of	   the	  MEPs	   in	   the	  committee	   in	  question,	  and	  his	  or	  hers	   role	   is	   to	  coordinate	  and	  write	  the	  committees	  amendments	  to	  the	  act,	  together	  with	  motivations	  for	   these	   amendments	   (European	   Parliament	   2013d	   and	   European	   Parliament	   2012c	  Rules	  45-­‐74).	  This	  gives	  the	  rapporteur	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  legislative	  process.	  	  In	  order	  to	  carry	  out	  his	  or	  her	  work,	  the	  rapporteur,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  other	  MEP:s,	  needs	  assistance,	  which	  can	  be	  provided	  from	  various	  places,	  as	  Neunreither	  (2002,	  pp.	  49-­‐50)	   writes:	   “The	   rapporteur	   selects	   his	   assistants	   himself,	   and	   he	   can	   choose	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between	  various	  options	  –	  some	  of	  whom	  are	  more	  expert-­‐orientated	  and	  non-­‐partisan	  than	  others.	  If	  he	  cooperates	  closely	  with	  someone	  from	  the	  committee’s	  secretariat	  he	  opts	   for	   professionalism,	   assuming	   that	   possible	   personal	   differences	   of	   political	  opinions	  will	  not	  hamper	   loyal	  services”.	  Historically,	   the	  dominant	  choice	  has	  been	  to	  cooperate	   closely	   with	   the	   committee	   secretariats.	   No	   official	   figures	   exists,	   but	   an	  internal	  study	  from	  the	  early	  1990s	  shows	  that	  this	  was	  the	  case	  in	  around	  80	  per	  cent	  in	   all	   parliamentary	   reports.	   “Insiders	   agree	   that	   direct	   assistance	   via	   the	   committee	  secretariats	  has	  decreased	  over	   the	   last	  decade.	  A	  rough	  guess	   for	   the	  main	   legislative	  committees	  might	  see	  their	  involvement	  now	  at	  about	  50	  per	  cent”	  (Neunreither	  2002,	  pp.	  49-­‐50).	  	  Neunreither	   explains	   this	   decrease	   with	   the	   “increased	   availability	   of	  documentation	  and	  background	  material,	  especially	  via	  electronic	  means,	  and	  the	  more	  focused	   action	   of	   interest	   groups	   that	   have	   appeared	   on	   the	   scene	   as	   voluntary	  legislative	  assistants”.	  The	  higher	  use	  of	  interest	  groups	  and	  lobbyists	  has	  strengthen	  the	  role	   of	   the	   assistants	   in	   their	   function	   to	   filter	   information	   from	  external	   sources	   and	  their	   possible	   impact	   on	   legislative	   proposals.	   “This	   can	   strengthen	   the	   position	   of	   a	  rapporteur	   while	   keeping	   the	   option	   of	   close	   co-­‐operation	   with	   internal	   EP	   services	  open”,	  Neunreither	  (2002,	  p.	  51)	  writes.	  	  
4.3 Staffing	  and	  recruitment	  The	  permanent	  officials	  in	  the	  EP	  are	  employed	  under	  the	  same	  conditions	  as	  all	  staff	   working	   in	   other	   EU	   institutions	   (Official	   Journal	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   2010	  Article	  298	  and	  336).	  Consequently,	  the	  EU	  has	  developed	  an	  administration	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  European	  Civil	  Service	  where	  the	  officials	  of	  the	  EP	  are	  covered	  by	  the	  same	  statue	  as	  the	  ones	   in	  for	   instance	  the	  Commission	  and	  Council.	  This	   leads	  to	  an	  easy	  mobility	  between	  the	  institutions,	  but	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  it	  does	  not	  distinguish	  the	  executive	  and	  the	   legislative	   services	  of	   the	  EU.	  Binding	   the	  officials	   to	   a	   specific	   institution,	   such	  as	  countries	   like	   France	   and	   Great	   Britain	   does,	   would	   be	   in	   line	  with	   the	   separation	   of	  powers	   theory	   (Pegan	   2011,	   pp.	   2-­‐3).	   In	   Western	   Europe	   the	   development	   of	   a	  comprehensive	   legal	   framework	   over	   public	   administrations	   has	   indicated	  professionalisation	   and	   been	   a	   way	   to	   guarantee	   against	   clientelism	   and	   corruption	  
41	  	  
(Pegan	   2011,	   p.	   2).	   The	   EP	   has	   followed	   in	   this	   tradition	   by	   developing	   such	   a	   legal	  framework	  in	  the	  form	  of	  Staff	  regulations	  and	  Rules	  of	  procedure.	  	  The	  most	  recent	  version	  of	  the	  Staff	  Regulations	  for	  the	  EU	  was	  implemented	  in	  2004.	  According	  to	  the	  Staff	  regulations,	  the	  officials	  working	  in	  the	  EU	  can	  be	  divided	  based	  on	  two	  aspects:	  group	  and	  function	  (Staff	  Regulations	  2004).	  The	  staff	  working	  in	  the	  General	   Secretariat	   is	  permanent	  officials	  whilst	   the	   staff	  working	   for	   the	  political	  group	  secretariats	  and	  the	  personal	  assistants	  to	  the	  MEP’s	  are	  temporary	  officials.	  All	  staff	  working	   in	   the	  EP	  have	  some	   important	  aspects	   in	  common:	  1)	  They	  assist	  MEPs	  and	   other	   political	   figures	   in	   the	   EP	   2)	   they	   form	   the	   internal	   source	   of	   information	  within	  the	  EP,	  compared	  to	  external	  sources	  such	  as	  the	  Commission,	  national	  or	   local	  government,	  NGOs	  and	  interest	  groups	  3)	  they	  are	   financed	  from	  the	  budget	  of	   the	  EP	  (Pegan	  2011,	  p.	  2).	  	  The	   second	   aspect	   that	   characterise	   the	   staff	   in	   the	   EP	   is	   “the	   nature	   and	  importance	   of	   the	  duties	   to	  which	   they	   relate”	   (Staff	  Regulations	  2004	  Article	   5).	   The	  regulations	   divide	   the	   staff	   into	   two	   categories:	   administrators	   (AD)	   and	   assistants	  (AST).	  The	  AD	  category	  staff	  perform	  administrative,	   advisory,	   linguistic	  and	  scientific	  duties,	   i.e.	   translators,	   interpreters,	   economists,	   lawyers,	   medical	   officers,	   scientists,	  researchers,	   financial	  officers	  and	  auditors.	  Executive,	   technical	  and	  clerical	  duties	  are	  carried	  out	  by	  AST	  officials,	  i.e.	  personal	  assistants,	  filing	  clerks,	  technical	  attendants,	  IT	  attendants,	  parliamentary	  ushers,	  IT	  operatives	  and	  technicians	  (Staff	  Regulations	  2004	  Article	  5	  and	  Annex	  I).	  	  Compared	  to	  the	  US,	  where	  each	  committee	  has	   its	  own	  employment	  policy,	   the	  EP	  has	  got	  a	  centralised	  system	  for	  all	  these	  issues	  (European	  Parliament	  2000a,	  p.	  225).	  	  The	  committee	  staff	  in	  the	  US	  may	  have	  very	  strong	  partisan	  preferences,	  as	  recruitment	  is	   left	   to	   the	   committee	   chairmen,	   whilst	   the	   recruitment	   in	   the	   EU	   is	   built	   up	   to	  guarantee	   non-­‐partisanship	   and	   independence	   (Pegan	   2011,	   p.	   2).	   	   All	   secretariat	  officials	   are,	   as	   the	   general	   rule,	   since	   2010	   recruited	   through	   the	   common	  European	  Personnel	   Selection	  Office,	  which	   arranges	   yearly	   open	   competitions,	   common	   for	   the	  European	  Civil	  Service	  in	  all	  main	  EU	  Institutions	  (EPSO	  2013).	  	  The	  recruitment	  process	   is	  based	  on	  strategic	  human	  resource	  (HR)	  planning	   in	  all	  EU	  institutions,	  meaning	  that	  the	  institutions	  and	  units	  must	  report	  a	  forecast	  of	   its	  staffing	   needs	   for	   the	   coming	   3	   years.	   The	   competitions	   and	   testing	   are	   supposed	   to	  evaluate	  the	  thousands	  of	  applicants	  against	  a	  competence	  framework.	  The	  framework	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includes	  testing	  of	  skills	  like	  analysis	  and	  problem	  solving,	  communication,	  prioritising	  and	   organisation,	   leadership	   and	   team	   work	   etc.	   This	   means	   that	   EU-­‐specific	   and	  domain-­‐specific	  knowledge	  is	  only	  of	  secondary	  importance.	  The	  exams	  are	  announced	  and	  arranged	  on	  a	  yearly	  cycle	  and	  the	  duration	  of	  each	  cycle,	  from	  announcement	  to	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  reserve	  list,	  should	  not	  exceed	  9	  months.	  The	  reserve	  list	  is	  a	  list	  of	  all	   candidates	   that	  has	  passed	   the	   testing	  and	   thereby	   is	  validated	   for	   a	   job	   in	   the	  EU.	  From	  this	  list,	  the	  candidates’	  competence	  profiles	  are	  then	  matched	  against	  the	  actual	  needs	   of	   the	   EU	   institutions.	   The	   recruitment	   system	   is	   mainly	   based	   on	   merit	   and	  competence;	  the	  Staff	  Regulations	  however	  provides	  that	  officials	  are	  to	  be	  “recruited	  on	  the	  broadest	  possible	  geographical	  basis	  from	  among	  nationals	  of	  Member	  States	  of	  the	  Communities.	   No	   posts	   shall	   be	   reserved	   for	   nationals	   of	   any	   specific	   Member	   State”	  (Staff	   Regulations	   2004,	   Title	   III,	   Chapter	   1,	   Article	   27).	   This	   explains	   why	   some	  recruitment	   aimed	   specifically	   towards	   new	   or	   underrepresented	   member	   states	   is	  announced	  some	  times.	  Yet,	  there	  are	  no	  hard-­‐coded	  quotas	  for	  any	  nationality	  (Baneth	  2012,	   pp.	   13-­‐20).	   Personal	   assistants	   to	   the	   MEPs	   and	   political	   group	   officials	   are	  recruited	   directly	   by	   the	   individual	   MEPs	   and	   political	   groups.	   The	   practice	   for	  employment	   differs	   between	   the	   different	  MEPs	   and	   the	   political	   groups.	   Common	   is	  that	   political	   ties	   and	   loyalty	   is	   taken	   to	   consideration,	   but	   also	   professional	   and	  technical	  competences	  count	  (Pegan	  2011,	  p.	  2).	  The	  assistants	  are	  however	  employed	  and	  paid	  directly	  by	  the	  EP.	  The	  assistants	  are	  hired	  as	  temporary	  staff	  and	  do	  not	  need	  to	  pass	  any	  official	  recruitment	  competition,	  but	  the	  selection	  is	  entirely	  up	  to	  the	  MEP	  in	  question	  (Baneth	  2012,	  pp.	  5-­‐6).	  	  
4.4 Overall	  organisational	  changes	  During	  the	  studied	  period	  there	  has	  been	  several	  changes	  as	  regards	  to	  the	  formal	  organisational	  structure	  of	  the	  EP.	  These	  changes	  will	  here	  be	  presented	  and	  structured	  according	  to	  the	  organisational	  key	  variables.	  	  
4.4.1 Formal	  structure	  Within	   the	   General	   Secretariat	   there	   has	   been	   changes	   made	   as	   regards	   the	  organisation	   and	   horizontal	   specialisation	   of	   the	   Directorate-­‐Generals.	   The	   changes	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themselves	   and	   the	   ideas	   and	  processes	   behind	   them	  will	   be	   further	   investigated	   and	  presented	  in	  chapter	  4.5,	  but	  I	  will	  here	  present	  them	  on	  an	  aggregated	  level.	  	  The	   old	  DG	   2	   –	   Committees	   and	  Delegations	   and	   the	  DG4	   –	   Research	   has	   been	  transformed	   into	   DG	   for	   Internal	   policies	   and	   DG	   for	   External	   policies	   (Secretary-­‐General	   2003,	   pp.	   1-­‐2).	   The	   DG	   for	   internal	   policy	   organises	   the	   secretariats	   for	   the	  committees	   regarding	   for	   example	   budget,	   economy,	   environment,	   employment,	  agriculture,	   and	   internal	   affairs.	   Whilst	   the	   DG	   for	   external	   policy	   organises	   the	  secretariats	   for	   the	   committees	   regarding	   for	   instance	   security,	   foreign	   affairs,	   trade,	  and	   development	   aid.	   (European	   Parliament	   2013c	   and	   European	   Parliament	   2013a).	  The	   idea	   by	   doing	   this	   has	   been	   to	   “bring	   together	   all	   those	   who	   can	   contribute	   to	  improving	  all	   aspects	  of	  drafting	  quality	  of	   texts,	   and	  at	   the	  earliest	   stage”	   (Secretary-­‐General	  2003,	  p.	  1).	  This	  was	  made	  through	  merging	  the	  committee	  staff	  from	  DG2	  and	  the	  more	  research-­‐focused	  experts	  from	  DG4	  into	  new,	  policy-­‐based,	  directorates.	  These	  changes	  aimed	  at	  pooling	  the	  experts	  closer	  and	  make	  them	  more	  involved,	  and	  easier	  available	  to	  the	  MEPs,	  in	  the	  parliamentary	  reading	  of	  the	  proposals	  on	  an	  earlier	  stage	  than	  before.	  	  One	  other	  change	  is	  that	  the	  DG6	  –	  Administration	  has	  been	  split	   into	  two	  DG:s,	  one	  for	  Infrastructure	  and	  Logistics	  and	  one	  for	  Innovation	  and	  Technological	  Support.	  Hence,	   the	   DG	   for	   Infrastructure	   and	   Logistics	   now	   handles	   the	   “management	   of	  Parliament's	   buildings	   in	   Brussels,	   Strasbourg	   and	   Luxembourg	   and	   the	   information	  offices	   in	   the	   Member	   States”,	   as	   well	   as	   “management	   of	   equipment	   and	   practical	  arrangements	   for	  meetings”	   (European	  Parliament	  2013a).	  The	  DG	   for	   Innovation	  and	  Technological	   Support,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   “provides	   the	   EP	   with	   information	   and	  communication	   technology	   services	   as	   well	   as	   printing	   and	   distribution	   services.	   It	  implements	   Parliament's	   policy	   of	   transparency	   and	   access	   to	   information	   […]”	  (European	  Parliament	  2013b).	  	  The	  old	  DG	   for	  Translation	  has	  been	  divided	   into	  one	  DG	   for	   Interpretation	  and	  Conferences	   and	   one	   DG	   Translation.	   The	   new	   DG	   for	   Translation	   ensures	   that	  Parliament's	   documents	   are	   available	   in	   all	   the	   23	   official	   languages	   of	   the	   European	  Union.	  This	  means	  translating	  documents	  out	  of	  and	  into	  the	  official	  languages	  of	  the	  EU,	  thus	  the	  new	  DG	  for	  Translation	  only	  works	  with	  the	  translation	  of	  written	  text.	  The	  DG	  for	   Interpretation	  and	  Conferences,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  works	  with	   the	  organisation	  of	  interpretation	  for	  all	  Parliaments’	  meetings	  in	  and	  outside	  the	  three	  places	  of	  work.	  	  
44	  	  
	  These	  horizontal	  changes	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  GS	  has	  been	  motivated	  as	  a	  way	  to	   adapt	   to	   a	   “changing	   environment”	   that	   had	   “resulted	   in	   a	   situation	   where	   that	  administrative	  location	  of	  certain	  services	  [was]	  not	  optimal”	  (Secretary-­‐General	  2003,	  
Figure	  1	  	  	  General	  Secretariat	  2000	  
	  Source:	  (European	  Parliament	  2000b)	  
Figure	  2	  	  	  General	  Secretariat	  2012	  
	  Source:	  (European	  Parliament	  2012c)	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p.	  2).	  These	  organisational	  changes	  are	  to	  some	  extent	  covered	  in	  the	  following	  review	  of	  the	   reform	   processes.	   However,	   as	   mentioned	   before,	   this	   review	   does	   not	   cover	   all	  changes	  that	  have	  been	  made	  to	  the	  administrative	  structure	  of	  the	  EP,	  but	  it	  covers	  the	  biggest	  and	  most	  extensive	  review	  of	  EP-­‐administration	  that	  has	  been	  made	  by	  the	  EP	  so	  far,	  and	  focuses	  on	  the	  way	  these	  changes	  were	  carried	  out.	  	  
4.4.2 Staff	  structure	  In	   the	   tables	   3	   and	  4,	   presented	  hereunder,	  we	   can	   see	   a	   graphical	   view	  of	   the	  size,	  measured	  as	  per	  cent	  of	   the	  number	  of	  employees,	  of	   the	  DGs	   in	   relation	   to	  each	  other.	   The	   number	   of	   DGs	   has	   changed	   from	   the	   year	   2000	   to	   2012	   and	   a	   direct	  comparison	   can	   therefore	   be	   problematic	   since	   staff	   groups	   have	   been	   transferred	  between	   the	   respective	   DGs.	   However	   most	   staff	   has	   remained	   the	   same	   or	   been	  transferred	   to	   only	   one	   of	   the	   new	   DGs,	   since	   their	   functions	   fit	   that	   DG	   best.	   I	   have	  therefore	  grouped	  and	  coloured	  the	  DGs	  in	  order	  to	  make	  a	  comparison	  easier.	  	  The	   Current	   DG	   for	   Communication	   is	   basically	   the	   same	   as	   the	   old	   DG	  Information,	   just	   with	   a	   new	   name.	   The	   current	   DG	   for	   Translation	   and	   DG	   for	  Interpretation	  and	  Conferences	  mostly	  consists	  of	  staff	  that	  earlier	  was	  stationed	  in	  the	  old	   DG	   Translation.	   In	   the	   same	   way	   the	   current	   two	   DGs	   for	   Internal	   and	   External	  Policies	   of	   the	   Union	  mostly	   consists	   of	   staff	   that	   earlier	  was	   stationed	   in	   the	   old	   DG	  Research	   and	   DG	   Committees	   and	   Delegations,	   whilst	   the	   DG	   for	   Innovation	   and	  Technological	   Support	   and	  DG	   for	   Infrastructure	   and	  Logistics	  mostly	   consists	   of	   staff	  that	  earlier	  was	  stationed	  in	  the	  old	  DG	  Administration.	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Figure	  3	  	  	  Distribution	  of	  staff	  among	  DGs	  -­‐	  2000	  
	  percentage	  of	  total	  number	  of	  employees	  
	  Source:	  (European	  Parliament	  2000b)	  
Figure	  4	  	  	  Distribution	  of	  staff	  among	  DGs	  -­‐	  2012	  
	  percentage	  of	  total	  number	  of	  employees	  
	  Source:	  (European	  Parliament	  2012c)	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As	  we	  can	  see	  in	  the	  table	  5,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  doubling	  of	  the	  number	  of	  staff	  in	  the	  General	   Secretariat	   over	   the	   studied	   period.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  only	  change	  that	  has	  happened.	  The	  ratio	  between	  administrative	  and	   assistant	   staff	   has	   also	   clearly	   changed.	  Today,	   44.1	   per	   cent	   of	   all	   GS	   staff	   is	   in	   the	  AD-­‐category,	  compared	  to	  only	  13.8	  per	  cent	  in	  year	  2000.	  These	  calculations	  are	  based	  on	  documents	   provided	   by	   the	   EP	   itself	  (European	  Parliament	  2000b	  and	  2012).	  The	  calculations	  are	  based	   the	  relevant	  numbers	  in	   these	   documents.	   During	   the	   studied	  period	  of	  time,	  the	  categorisation	  of	  staff	  has	  changed;	  this	  means	  that	  a	  reclassification	  of	  the	  staff	   into	   the	  current	  AD/AST	  categories	  has	   been	   necessary.	   This	   change	   was	  reflecting	   a	   move	   to	   recruiting	   staff	   with	  higher	   level	   of	   competence	   to	   match	   new	  requirements	   within	   the	   institution.	   The	  salary	   structure	   and	   terms	   of	   conditions	   of	  service	   were	   also	   substantially	   revised	   in	  response	  to	  calls	  to	  modernise	  the	  European	  civil	   service,	  particularly	   in	   the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Santer	  Commission	  in	  1999,	  as	  Corbett,	   Jacobs	   and	   Shackleton	   (2011,	   p.	  218)	  writes.	  	  The	   results	   of	   my	   calculations	   shows	  that	   in	   2000	   there	   was	   6.3	   assistants	  employed	   per	   every	   administrator.	   In	   2012	  the	   number	   is	   1.3.	   Hence,	   there	   has	   been	   a	  significant	   increase	   in	   the	  percentage	  of	  AD-­‐
Table	  4	  	  	  	  Classification	  of	  staff	  The	   old	   system	   was	   dividing	   staff	   into	  five	  categories	  (A	  for	  administrative	  staff,	  LA	  for	  translators	  and	  interpreters,	  B	  for	  executive	   assistants,	   C	   for	   clerical	   staff	  and	  secretaries	  and	  D	  for	  manual	  service	  staff),	  whilst	  the	  new	  system	  has	  got	  two	  function	   groups:	   AD	   for	   administrators,	  including	   linguistics,	   and	   AST	   for	  assistants	  (i.e.	  all	  other	  support	  staff).	   In	  fact	  AD	  is	  the	  equivalent	  of	  the	  old	  A/LA	  (Administrators/Linguistic	  Administrators)	   and	   AST	   (Assistant)	   is	  the	  equivalent	  of	  the	  old	  B,	  C	  and	  D.	  AST	  embodies	   now	   the	   whole	   range	   of	  assistants	   that	   before	   was	   divided	   in	   B	  (Higher	   level),	  C	   (middle	   level)	  D	   (lower	  level)	  	   (European	  Parliament	  Registre	  2013)	  
Figure	  5	  	  	  Staff	  categories	  
	  	  (European	  Parliament	  2000b	  2012c)	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category	  staff.	  If	  these	  numbers	  are	  broken	  down	  into	  Directorate-­‐General	  (DG)-­‐level	  we	  can	  ,	  in	  figure	  6	  and	  7,	  see	  that	  the	  most	  significant	  increase	  in	  administrators	  has	  been	  in	  the	  DG	  Translation	  and	  DG	  for	  Interpretation	  and	  Conferences.	  	  The	  recruitment	  system	  changed	  dramatically	  (Baneth	  2012,	  p.	  13),	  when	  the	  EU	  institutions	   introduced	   The	   European	   Personnel	   Selection	   Office	   (EPSO)	   and	   the	  Concour	  as	  we	  know	  it	  today.	  The	  EPSO	  is	  responsible	  for	  selecting	  staff	  to	  work	  for	  the	  Institutions	  and	  Agencies	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  the	  Institutions	  and	  Agencies	  can	  then	  recruit	   its	   staff	   from	   the	   pool	   of	   candidates	   that	   has	   passed	   the	   EPSO	   selection	  procedure,	  known	  as	  the	  Concour	  (EPSO	  2013).	  	  	  	  
Figure	  6	  	  	  Distribution	  of	  staff	  among	  DGs	  and	  category	  
	  in	  numbers,	  2000	  figures	  











Figure	  7	  	  	  Distribution	  of	  staff	  among	  DGs	  and	  category	  
	  in	  numbers,	  2012	  figures	  
	  (European	  Parliament	  2012c)	  












4.4.4 Summary	  To	  sum	  up	  the	  main	  changes	  in	  the	  overall	  structure	  of	  the	  EP,	  we	  can	  note	  some	  general	   characteristics.	   This	   summary	   is	   made	   based	   on	   the	   research	   question	   and	  demarcations	   of	   it,	   namely	   that	   this	   study	   focuses	   on	   the	   organisation	   of	   the	  administration	   in	   the	   EP,	   and	   especially	   on	   the	   administrations	   role	   of	   assisting	   the	  Parliaments	  Members.	  	  The	   first	   change	   we	   can	   note	   is	   that	   the	   DGs	   that	   organises	   the	   committee	  secretariats	  has	  been	  reformed.	  Earlier	  all	   committee	  secretariats	  were	  organised	   into	  the	  DG	  for	  Committee	  and	  Delegations	  (DG	  2),	  but	  now	  this	  DG	  has	  been	  split	  up	  to	  two	  new	  DGs;	  one	  for	  internal	  policies	  and	  one	  for	  external	  policies.	  These	  new	  directorates	  has	  also	  been	  complemented	  with	  the	  staff	  that	  earlier	  worked	  in	  the	  DG	  for	  Research.	  The	  staff	  from	  DG	  for	  Research	  has	  been	  transferred	  to	  the	  relevant	  policy	  units	  in	  the	  new	  DGs.	  Their	  tasks	  has	  also	  changed	  from	  that	  they	  earlier	  produced	  deep	  analyses	  on	  a	   long-­‐term	  basis,	   to	  producing	  quicker	  and	  more	  easily	  accessible	  texts	  on	  topics	  that	  are	  of	  immediate	  interest	  to	  the	  MEPs	  and	  relevant	  to	  the	  legislative	  acts	  of	  the	  day.	  This	  change	   has	   also	   involved	   transferring	   staff	   posts	   from	   Luxemburg,	   where	   the	   DG	   for	  Research	  was	  located	  to	  Brussels	  where	  the	  new	  DGs	  are	  located.	  	  The	   second	   change	   is	   that	   the	   number	   of	   staff	   in	   the	   General	   Secretariat	   has	  almost	  doubled	  during	  the	  studied	  period.	  The	  distribution	  of	  the	  staff	  between	  the	  DGs	  has	  been	  basically	  unchanged.	  	  Thirdly,	  we	  can	  note	  that	  this	  is	  not	  the	  only	  change	  that	  has	  happened	  to	  the	  staff	  structure.	  The	  ratio	  between	  administrative	  and	  assistant	  staff	  has	  also	  clearly	  changed.	  Today,	  44.1	  per	  cent	  of	  all	  GS	  staff	  is	  in	  the	  AD-­‐category,	  compared	  to	  only	  13.8	  per	  cent	  in	   year	   2000.	   When	   broken	   down	   on	   respective	   DG,	   we	   can	   see	   that	   this	   change	   is	  especially	  notable	  for	  the	  language	  services.	  	  Fourth,	   we	   can	   note	   that	   there	   have	   been	   transfers	   of	   staff	   posts	   towards	  Brussels.	   These	   changes	   has	   however	   clearly	   been	   restrained	   by	   the	   political	  compromises	  between	  the	  Member	  States	  of	  the	  EU,	  as	  we	  will	  see	  more	  of.	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4.5 The	  reform	  processes	  	  So	   now	   we	   have	   seen	   what	   that	   has	   changed	   to	   the	   formal	   organisational	  structure	  of	  the	  EP.	  Now	  I	  will	  move	  on	  to	  describing	  how	  the	  reform	  processes	  has	  been	  carried	  out,	  in	  order	  to	  answer	  the	  second	  part	  of	  my	  research	  question:	  How	  can	  these	  changes	  be	  explained?	  	  To	   answer	   this	   question	   I	   will	   look	   in	   to	   the	   two	   big	   reform	   attempts	   and	  processes	   that	   the	   Parliament	   has	   gone	   through	   during	   the	   period	   examined.	   Each	  reform	   process	   and	   its	   rationale	   will	   be	   presented	   hereunder.	   The	   reform	   processes	  have	  been	  carried	  out	  over	  2-­‐3	  years,	  and	  I	  have	  decided	  to	  name	  the	  processes	  after	  the	  person,	  Vice-­‐President	  James	  Provan	  in	  the	  first	  process	  and	  later	  the	  Secretary	  General	  Julian	   Priestley	   in	   the	   second,	   that	  was	   central	   in	   driving	   the	   process	   and	  writing	   the	  proposals	   to	   the	   Bureau.	   Since	   there	   is	   only	   about	   six	   months	   between	   the	   Provan	  process	  ended	  until	  the	  Priestley	  process	  starts,	  one	  can	  discuss	  whether	  this	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  two	  separate	  processes	  or	  as	  one	  single	  reform	  process.	  Even	  so,	  since	  they	  can	  be	   separated	   by	   a	   clear	   and	   final	   proposal	   to	   the	   Bureau	   I	   will	   present	   them	   as	   two	  processes.	   It	   is	   however	   necessary	   to	   underline	   that	   the	   processes	   are	   closely	   linked	  together.	  	  As	  written	  earlier,	  this	  study	  focuses	  on	  the	  organisation	  of	  the	  administration	  in	  the	  EP,	  and	  especially	  on	  the	  administrations	  role	  of	  assisting	  the	  Parliaments	  Members.	  This	   is	   a	   kind	   of	   autonomous	   and	   scientific	   research	   support	   that	   not	   all	   national	  parliaments	   provide	   to	   their	   MEPs.	   In	   2000	   the	   Directorate-­‐General	   for	   research	  performed	  an	  in-­‐depth	  comparison	  of	  all	  the	  national	  parliaments	  in	  the	  EU,	  as	  well	  as	  the	   US	   Congress	   to	   see	   how	   these	   were	   structured	   in	   both	   their	   political	   and	  administrative	  work.	  This	   study	   showed	   that	  only	   some	  parliaments	  have	   this	  kind	  of	  scientific	  support	  (European	  Parliament	  2000a).	  Among	  these	  is	  the	  German	  Bundestag,	  which	  has	  a	  research	  department	  with	  about	  60	  experts	  working	  (European	  Parliament	  2000a,	   p.	   87).	   	   The	   French	   National	   Assembly	   does	   not	   have	   any	   kind	   of	   unit	   or	  department	  working	  on	  these	   issues,	  hence	  all	   research	  made	   is	  based	  on	  the	  political	  staff	  (European	  Parliament	  2000a,	  p.	  64).	  The	  Greek	  and	  Swedish	  parliaments	  have	  both	  got	  a	  research	  department	  of	  about	  25	  experts,	  while	  the	  Irish	  parliament	  has	  got	  two	  staff	  working	  on	  research	  (European	  Parliament	  2000a,	  pp.	  103,	  116	  and	  192).	   	   In	  the	  case	   of	   the	   Swedish	  Parliamentary	  Research	   Service,	   the	  EP	   study	  underlines	   that	   the	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Swedish	   parliament	   has	   clear	   rules	   stating	   that	   studies	   provided	   by	   the	   autonomous	  service	   “must	   be	   objective,	  well	   founded	   and	   presented	   in	   a	   form	   that	   is	   concise	   and	  easily	  accessible”	  (European	  Parliament	  2000a,	  p.	  192).	  
4.5.1 The	  first	  part	  of	  the	  reform	  process	  (main	  actor	  James	  Provan)	  In	  1999,	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	  a	  very	   long	   time,	  or	   ever,	   there	  was	  an	  attempt	   to	  take	   a	   holistic	   approach	   to	   the	   parliament’s	   way	   of	   working,	   not	   just	   in	   the	  administrative	  support	  but	  also	  on	  how	  the	  MEPs	  were	  working,	  the	  voting	  procedures	  etc.	   As	   we	   will	   see,	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   administrative	   side	   of	   the	   EP,	   this	   reform	  proposal	  did	  not	  get	  the	  necessary	  support	  from	  the	  Bureau.	  I	  will	  here	  look	  closer	  in	  to	  the	  actual	  reform	  suggestions,	  but	  also	  on	  the	  process	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  proposal	  to	  see	  what	  explanations	  that	  can	  be	  found.	  	  The	   Internal	   Organisation	   Unit	   of	   the	   Directorate-­‐General	   for	   Personnel	   had	  performed	   a	   study	   on	   which	   the	   Secretary	   General	   lays	   down	   a	   document	   where	   he	  proposed	   measures	   intended	   to	   “clarify	   and	   strengthen	   the	   role	   played	   by	   DG	   4	  (Directorate-­‐General	   for	   Research)	   in	   Parliament’s	   secretariat	   by	   ensuring	   that	   the	  products	   and	   services	   provided	   by	  DG4	   fully	  meet	   the	   needs	   of	   those	  who	   use	   them”	  (Secretary	  General	  1999).	  These	  proposals	  will	  be	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  first	  reform	  initiative.	  	  The	  reform	  proposal	  is	  motivated	  for	  five	  reasons;	  1)	  Legal	  obligations	  to	  ensure	  transparency	  and	  public	   access	   to	  documents	  2)	   relocation	  of	   resources	  between	  DG4	  and	  the	  Parliamentary	  Documentation	  Centre	   in	  Brussels	  3)	  adaptation	   to	   the	  new	  IT-­‐structure	   in	   the	   EP	   4)	   clarify	   the	   roles	   of	   DG4	   and	   the	   DG	   for	   Committees	   and	  Interparliamentary	   Delegations	   5)	   Continue	   the	   work	   of	   The	   Science	   and	   Technology	  Options	   Assessment	   unit	   (STOA)	   to	   streamline	   methods	   and	   procedure.	   Out	   of	   this	  analysis	  of	  the	  situation,	  the	  Secretary	  General	  proposed	  some	  changes,	  where	  the	  most	  important	  ones	  were	   the	  establishment	  of	   a	   steering	  committee	   for	  DG4,	   consisting	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  central	  political	  bodies	  of	  the	  EP	  (the	  College	  of	  Quaestors	  together	  with	   the	   presidents	   of	   the	   Conference	   of	   Committee	   Chairmen	   and	   Conference	   of	  Chairmen	   of	   Interparliamentary	   Delegations	   and	   Join	   Parliamentary	   Committees)	   to	  ensure	  that	  “the	  services	  and	  products	  provided	  meet	  the	  needs	  of	  those	  for	  whom	  they	  are	   intended”	   (Secretary	   General	   1999,	   pp.	   1-­‐2).	   These	   changes	   lead	   to	   a	   stronger	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political	  control	  over	  the	  administration,	  and	  were	  also	  adopted	  by	  the	  bureau,	  however	  the	  basic	  organisational	  framework	  was	  left	  intact.	  	  Following	   these	   decisions	   a	   general	   awareness	   of	   the	   need	   for	   administrative	  reform	   was	   rising	   (Kungla	   2007,	   p.	   75).	   Vice-­‐President	   James	   Provan	   (UK,	   EPP)	   was	  assigned	  with	  the	  task	  of	  being	  rapporteur	  for	  these	  issues	  in	  the	  EP.	  As	  Vice-­‐President	  of	  the	  EP,	  Provan	  was	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Bureau,	  which	  is	  the	  competent	  body	  for	  these	  kinds	   of	   decisions.	   During	   the	   following	   months	   he	   presented	   a	   set	   of	   working	  documents	  on	   internal	   reform,	   in	   total	   there	  are	   six	  of	   them,	   that	  were	   circulated	  and	  discussed	  among	  the	  central	  actors	  in	  the	  EP	  (Provan	  1999,	  pp.	  1-­‐3	  and	  Kungla	  2007,	  p.	  76).	   	   The	   documents	   had	   a	   broad	   approach,	   covering	   issues	   such	   as	   the	   work	   of	   the	  plenary,	   rules	   of	   procedure,	   status	   and	   members’	   allowances,	   status	   of	   personal	  assistants	  etc.	  (Provan	  1999	  -­‐	  2001b).	  	  
Provans	  first	  working	  documents	  In	   his	   first	  Working	   document	   “Areas	   of	   reform”,	   published	   1	   December	   1999,	  	  Provan	   acknowledges	   that	   the	  mandate	   of	   his	   task,	   to	   develop	   a	   strategy	   for	   internal	  reform,	  is	  long.	  Therefore,	  he	  writes,	  he	  will	  use	  this	  first	  document	  to	  define	  the	  starting	  points	   for	   his	   work.	   Provan	   clearly	   states	   that	   the	   subject	   of	   internal	   reform	   is	  “horizontal”,	   and	   that	   “discussion	   of	   subject	   areas	   for	   which	   responsibility	   has	   been	  attributed	  to	  other	  members	  of	  the	  bureau”	  is	  inevitable.	  He	  further	  underlines	  the	  need	  of	  an	  open	  discussion	  and	  consensus-­‐based	  decision-­‐making	  in	  order	  for	  the	  task	  to	  bear	  fruit.	   In	  some	  areas	   it	  will	  be	  possible	  to	  come	  forward	  with	  concrete	  proposals	   in	  the	  relatively	   near	   future,	   whilst	   in	   others	   change	   will	   inevitably	   be	   a	   long-­‐term	   affair,	  Provan	  (1999,	  p.	  2)	  writes.	  The	  rapporteur	  further	  lists	  all	  areas	  that	  are	  susceptible	  to	  reform	  and	  their	  rationale,	  among	  these	  this	  study	  will	  cover:	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  Following	  these	  proposals	  set	  out	  by	  Mr	  Provan,	  the	  Bureau	  had	  a	  meeting	  on	  the	  14th	   of	   February	   2000	   where	   the	   Working	   Document	   no	   1	   was	   discussed.	   Some	  interesting	  points	  taken	  up;	  	  
“[Provan]	   suggested	   that	   Parliament,	   first	   of	   all,	   should	   become	   less	  
bureaucratic	   so	   as	   to	   be	   able	   to	   handle	   its	   new	   powers,	   particularly	   in	   the	  
context	  of	   the	  conciliation	  procedure,	  and	  be	   in	  a	  position	   to	  exercise	  greater	  
influence.	   In	  this	  connection,	  Mr	  Provan	  cited	  the	  example	  of	  the	  US	  Congress,	  
Table	  5	  	  	  Areas	  susceptible	  to	  reform	  and	  their	  rationale	  	  • Attribution	  of	  activities	  to	  Brussels	  and	  Strasbourg	  
o Possible	  geographical	  concentration	  of	  certain	  activities	  
o Enhance	  visibility	  of	  activities	  • Structure	  of	  secretariat	  
o Review	  overall	  staffing	  levels,	  increase	  or	  decrease	  as	  appropriate,	  rationalise	  the	  allocation	  of	  staff	  to	  different	  functions,	  with	  priority	  to	  the	  political	  needs	  of	  Parliament	  
o Rationalise	  the	  geographical	  deployment	  of	  staff	  • Assistance	  to	  members	  
o Reassess	  the	  requirements	  of	  members	  in	  terms	  of	  staff	  assistance;	  
o Review	  the	  structure	  and	  role	  of	  committee	  secretariats	  
o Review	  the	  role	  of	  the	  directorate-­‐general	  for	  research	  vis-­‐a-­‐vis	  members	  and	  committee	  secretariats	  
o Review	  relations	  between	  secretariat	  staff,	  political	  group	  staff	  and	  members'	  assistants;	  
o Review	  personal	  assistance	  to	  office-­‐holders(notably	  vice-­‐presidents)	  
o Consider	  move	  towards	  staffing	  by	  member	  (personal	  staff)	  rather	  than	  by	  parliamentary	  function.	  • Employment	  status	  of	  staff	  
o Review	  and	  possibly	  modify	  in	  accordance	  with	  conclusions	  drawn	  above	  • Support	  resources	  for	  members	  
o Enhance	  documentary/information	  technology	  facilities	  available	  to	  members	  
o Reassess	  physical	  environment	  for	  political	  activities	  • Administration/budget	  
o Look	  into	  possibility	  of	  managing	  certain	  categories	  of	  administrative	  activity	  and	  expenditure	  on	  an	  inter-­‐institutional	  basis	  (buildings,	  linguistic	  services,	  etc.)	  
o Focus	  use	  of	  Parliament	  budget	  on	  on-­‐going	  Parliamentary	  activities	  (Provan	  1999)	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which	  he	  thought	  was	  an	  interesting	  case,	  and	  the	  number	  of	  officials	  of	  which	  
was	   considerably	   smaller	   than	   that	  working	   for	   the	   EP	   (1350,	   as	   opposed	   to	  
3260	   posts	   at	   the	   EP,	   excluding	   the	   Language	   Service).	   He	   said	   that	   at	   this	  
stage	   he	   was	   not	   aiming	   at	   reducing	   the	   number	   of	   staff,	   but	   that	   he	  
recommended	  shifting	  the	  focus	  of	  their	  work.”	  (Bureau	  2000a,	  p.	  14).	  In	  the	  following	  debate,	  a	  general	  agreement	  develops	  about	  how	  to	  relate	  to	  the	  need	  to	  restructure	   the	  EP	  and	   in	  which	  order	   things	  are	   to	  be	  made.	  Mrs	  Lienemann,	  Vice-­‐President,	  can	  illustrate	  this	  general	  agreement	  with	  her	  statement:	  	  
The	   European	   Parliament	   should	   first	   of	   all	   clarify	   the	   priorities	   for	  
change.	  By	  way	  of	  example,	  she	  referred	  to	  the	  need	  to	  draw	  up	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  
the	  European	  Parliament's	  different	  functions	  […].	  Only	  then,	  in	  the	  light	  of	  its	  
priorities	   for	   change,	   should	   the	   European	   Parliament	   equip	   itself	   with	  
appropriate	  staffing	  resources	  (high	  level	  of	  skills	  in	  new	  technology,	  mastery	  of	  
technical	  data)	  (Bureau	  2000a,	  p.	  16).	  Following	   the	   discussions,	   the	   second	  Working	   Document	   (Provan	   2000a)	   was	  published	  on	  19	  April	  2000	  and	  was	  aimed	  at	  developing	  and	  articulating	  the	  ideas	  that	  were	  developing	  among	  the	  Members	  of	  Bureau.	  VP	  Provan	  here	  identifies	  the	  principal	  objectives	  of	  reform,	  broken	  down	  into	  subcomponents,	  broadly	  defined	  measures	  that	  could	  be	  used	  to	  achieve	  those	  goals	  and	  a	  timetable	  where	  the	  measures	  are	  ordered.	  Provan	   underlines	   though,	   that	   this	   paper	   is	   presented	   as	   part	   of	   the	   development-­‐process	   leading	   to	   the	  actual	  measures	  being	  presented	   later	  on,	   the	  measures	   should	  therefore	  not	  be	   regarded	  as	   final.	   Provan	  had	   identified	   two	   fields	   that	  were	  directly	  linked	  to	  the	  improvement	  of	  assistance	  to	  the	  MEPs;	  research	  support	  and	  legal	  advice.	  	  As	   regards	   research/scientific	   support	   there	   is	   a	  need	   from	   the	  MEPs	   for	   “quick,	  concise	  and	  reliable	  information	  on	  the	  subjects	  on	  which	  they	  are	  required	  to	  form	  an	  opinion	  or	  express	  a	  view”.	  Today	  they	  usually	  rely	  on	  committee	  secretariat	  staff,	  also	  where	   it	   could	   not	   be	   “reasonable	   to	   expect	   the	   secretariat	   staff	   to	   be	   in	   ready	  possession	  of	  all	  the	  technical	  knowledge	  required	  […]”.	  This	  can	  push	  members	  to	  rely	  on	   information	   from	   sources	   whose	   neutrality	   (political	   or	   institutional)	   is	   not	  guaranteed,	  such	  as	  lobby	  groups,	  consultants,	  economic	  operators	  or	  the	  Commission”	  (Provan	  2000a,	  p.	  11).	  A	  reformed	  DG	  for	  Research	  (DG	  4)	  could	  meet	  the	  new	  need,	  Provan	  argued.	  At	  this	   time,	   DG4	   was	   performing	   two	   main	   tasks:	   1)	   running	   the	   Parliamentary	  Documentation	   Centre	   (PDC),	   which	   Provan	   called	   a	   “well-­‐equipped	   and	   modern	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parliamentary	  library”	  however	  it	  was	  also	  “an	  under-­‐used	  resource,	  which	  suffers	  from	  a	   surprisingly	   low	   level	   of	   awareness	   within	   the	   institution”.	   2)	   Involvement	   in	  “relatively	   long-­‐term	   research	   activities”	   both	   internally	   from	   it’s	   around	   70	   high-­‐qualified	   staff	   and	   from	  external	   consultants.	  The	  DG	   for	   research	   “produces	   a	  quality	  product”	   but	   it	   does	   not	   adequately	   respond	   to	   the	   MEPs	   needs.	   Therefore	   Provan	  proposed	  that	  the	  DG	  4s	  activities	  should	  be	  “recast	  as	  a	  rapid	  delivery	  service	  of	  short	  briefings	  and	  information	  packs”.	  	  The	   paper	   identified	   that	   this	   change	   would	   “undoubtedly	   cause	   a	   series	   of	  organisational	  difficulties,	  not	  least	  because	  of	  the	  language	  aspect	  (the	  notion	  of	  rapid	  delivery	   essentially	   rules	   out	   translation)	   or	   indeed	   the	   fact	   that	   most	   of	   the	   staff	  concerned	   are	   Luxembourg	   based”.	   Provan	   argues	   that	   the	   best	   way	   to	   organise	   the	  “new”	  DG	   for	  Research	  would	  be	   to	   combine	   its	   Parliamentary	  Documentation	  Centre	  (PDC)	  with	   the	   research	   services	   and	  make	   the	  PDC	   the	   ‘interface’	   between	   the	  MEPs	  and	  the	  research	  staff.	  MEPs	  “would	  then	  turn	  to	  the	  PDC	  with	  their	  specific	  needs	  and	  requests”.	  The	  PDC	  staff	  would	  then	  decide	  either	  to,	  provide	  an	  immediate	  response	  if	  possible,	   or	   refer	   the	   request	   to	   a	   researcher	   who	   would	   prepare	   the	   briefing.	   This	  would	   also	   lead	   to	   “substantial	   redeployment	   towards	   Brussels”,	   something	   that	   is	  known	  to	  be	  fraught	  with	  difficulty	  (Provan	  2000a,	  pp.	  12-­‐13).	  	  Regarding	  legal	  advice	  on	  legislative	  acts	  Provan	  (2000a,	  p.	  13)	  writes	  that	  in	  the	  post-­‐Amsterdam	  period,	   there	   is	   a	   convincing	   case	   for	   the	   need	   to	   boost	   Parliament’s	  legal	   “quality	   control”,	   not	   least	   to	   ensure	   that	   legislation	   passed	   in	   the	   Parliament	  should	  be	  able	  to	  stand	  a	  challenge	  in	  the	  courts	  after	  adoption.	  This	  type	  of	  service	  did	  not	  exist	  at	  all	   at	   this	   time.	  The	  only	   legal	  expertise	  was	   the	  Legal	  Service,	  whose	  role	  was	  and	  is	  to	  advice	  the	  Parliament	  as	  an	  institution	  and,	  if	  needed,	  to	  represent	  the	  EP	  in	  the	  Courts.	  The	  envisaged	  need	  in	  the	  Working	  Document	  is	  something	  else,	  namely	  to	  –	   “in	   a	   technical	   sense”-­‐	   be	   involved	   in	   the	   political	   process	   (Provan	   2000a,	   p.	   13).	  Provan	  draws	  up	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  central	  service,	  functioning	  as	  a	  “quality-­‐control”,	  “close	  to	  the	   committees	   and	   conciliations	   departments	   within	   DG2	   (Committees	   and	  Delegations)”.	   Provan	   argues	   that	   the	   Parliament	   “is	   relatively	   well-­‐endowed	   with	  officials	  in	  possession	  of	  a	  legal	  background,	  but	  these	  are	  dispersed	  in	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  nonspecific	   activities.	   Some	   of	   this	   staff,	   including	   complementary	   new	   recruitments,	  could	  form	  this	  new	  service.	  (Provan	  2000a,	  pp.	  13-­‐14).	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The	   paper	  moves	   on	   into	   other	   areas	   of	   how	   the	   administration	   functions,	   and	  under	   this	   point	   Provan	   especially	   focuses	   on	   Management	   Culture	   within	   the	  
Secretariat.	   Provan	   begins	   with	   stating;	   “Needless	   structural	   changes	   can	   often	   be	  introduced	   for	   cosmetic	   or	   presentational	   reasons	   without	   there	   being	   any	   genuine	  change	   in	   the	   lines	   of	   responsibility	   and	   command	   (or	   the	   underlying	   management	  culture)”	  (Provan	  2000a,	  p.	  16).	  	  Provan	   writes	   that	   a	   recent	   Committee	   of	   Independent	   expert	   within	   the	  Commission	   had	   identified	   that	   the	   Commission	  was	   lacking	   a	   “genuine	  management	  culture”.	  “The	  same	  could	  be	  said	  about	  the	  Parliament,	   though	  with	  the	  rider	  that	  the	  Parliament	  is	  not	  intended	  to	  be	  a	  management	  organisation,	  but	  the	  administration	  of	  a	  political	  institution”	  Provan	  (2000a,	  pp.	  16-­‐17).	  Even	  so,	  management	  skills	  are	  needed	  and	  Provan	  argues	  that	  they	  are	  “not	  sufficiently	  recognised,	  valued	  or	  rewarded	  within	  today’s	  secretariat”.	  On	  this	  background	  Provan	  (2000a,	  pp.	  16-­‐17)	  suggest	  that	  the	  EP	  should	  establish	  “clear	   job	  descriptions	   for	  each	  position”,	  but	  also	   to	  weight	   these	  “in	  order	   to	   establish	   a	   clear	   equivalence	   of	   value	   and	   responsibility	   between	   posts	   of	  different	  nature”.	  The	  personnel	  policy	  of	  the	  institution	  also	  needs	  to	  be	  more	  proactive	  to	   better	   match	   individuals’	   careers	   with	   their	   personal	   capacities.	   He	   calls	   for	   the	  introduction	   of	   “Modern	   personnel	   management	   techniques,	   such	   as	   psychological	  profiling	  and	  aptitude	  assessment	   (combined	  with	  appropriate	   training)”.	   	  These	  have	  proven	   successful	   in	   many	   other	   large	   public	   and	   private	   organisations	   and	   are	   “the	  unfinished	   business	   of	   the	   institution’s	   new	  personnel	   policy”	   (Provan	   2000a,	   pp.	   16-­‐17).	  	   Moving	  on	   to	   the	  ethics	   in	   the	  Parliament,	  Provan	  (2000a,	  pp.	  17-­‐18).	   	   criticises	  the	   political	   authorities	   for	   seeing	   appointments	   in	   the	   “higher	   reaches	   of	   the	  administration	  as	  a	  political	  balancing	  act	  and	  a	  way	  of	   installing	  “their”	  people	   in	  key	  positions.	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  reasons	  why	  it	  today	  “exists	  a	  certain	  confusion	  within	  the	   institutions”.	   Some	   officials	   has	   also	   “neglected	   to	   distance	   themselves	   from	   the	  political	  business	  of	  the	  House”	  (Provan	  2000a,	  pp.	  17-­‐	  18).	  “The	  issue	  has	  become	  one	  of	   urgency	   and	   one	   where	   the	   political	   authorities,	   who	   are	   responsible	   for	   top	  appointments,	   must	   assume	   their	   responsibilities”	   (Provan	   2000a,	   p.	   18).	   The	  rapporteur	  holds	  dear	  “the	  ideal	  of	  a	  neutral	  and	  non-­‐partisan	  administration	  enjoying	  the	  trust	  of	  all	  political	  players”.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  civil	  servants	  are	  forbidden	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to	   have	   their	   own	   political	   allegiances,	   but	   it	   “does	   mean	   that	   they	   should	   not	   allow	  these	  views	  to	  colour	  the	  exercise	  of	  their	  official	  functions”	  Provan	  (2000a,	  p.	  18).	  	  For	  exactly	  the	  same	  reasons,	  Provan	  (2000a,	  p.	  18)	  argues	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  political	  group	  staff	  and	  the	  staff	  of	  the	  Parliament	  must	  be	  reviewed.	  The	  two	  types	  of	   staff	  has	  got	   “completely	  different	   functions.	  At	  present	   there	   is	  an	  unhealthy	  degree	  of	  crossover	  between	  the	  two	  groups”,	  Provan	  argues.	  Provan	  further	  writes	  that	  the	   “ramifications	   of	   this	   proposal	   are	   of	   course	   vast	   […]”.	   “However,	   […]	   the	   present	  moment	   provides	   a	   unique	   opportunity	   at	   least	   to	   raise	   matters	   which	   normally	   be	  considered	  taboo.	  It	  is	  this	  open-­‐minded	  spirit	  that	  he	  would	  ask	  his	  colleagues	  to	  reflect	  on	  this	  area”	  (Provan	  2000a,	  pp.	  18-­‐19).	  	  The	   plenary	   sessions	   are,	   as	   known,	   divided	   between	   Brussels	   and	   Strasbourg.	  Provan	   lifts	   this	   as	   a	   factor	   that	   many	   people	   and	   MEPs,	   sees	   as	   an	   example	   of	   the	  ineffectiveness	  of	  the	  EU	  bureaucracy.	  Even	  so,	  Provan	  (2000a,	  p.	  4),	  writes	  that	  he	  “has	  no	   proposals	   to	   make	   at	   present	   concerning	   the	   number,	   duration	   and	   location	   of	  Parliament’s	   plenary	   sessions.	   Whatever	   inconveniences	   and	   discomforts	   (not	   to	  mention	  expense)	   inflicted	  by	   the	   current	  arrangements,	   they	  must	  be	   considered,	   for	  the	  time	  being	  at	  least,	  a	  fact	  of	  life	  which	  is	  not	  in	  Parliaments	  power	  to	  change.”	  	  Following	  these	  proposals	  set	  out	  by	  Mr	  Provan,	  the	  Bureau	  had	  a	  meeting	  on	  the	  2	   May	   2000	   where	   the	   proposals	   of	   Working	   Document	   no	   2	   were	   discussed.	   The	  discussions	   mainly	   concerned	   issues	   not	   covered	   in	   this	   study,	   however	   some	  interesting	   points	   were	   taken	   up;	   Provan	   did	   say	   in	   his	   introductory	   speech	   that	   he	  wished	   to	   avoid	   “at	   all	   costs	   discussion	   being	   side-­‐tracked	   by	   debate	   on	   Parliament's	  seat”.	  Further	  on	   in	   the	  discussion,	   the	  Secretary-­‐General	   said	   that	  almost	  none	  of	   the	  proposals	  put	  forward	  would	  present	  major	  problems	  for	  the	  Administration	  in	  terms	  of	  implementation.	  In	  the	  minutes,	  most	  of	  the	  discussions	  regard	  the	  political	  side	  of	  the	  institution.	  According	  to	  the	  minutes	  there	  was	  also	  a	  discussion	  regarding	  “a	  study	  to	  be	  carried	  out	  on	  job	  evaluation	  and	  personnel	  management”	  (Bureau	  2000a).	  Following	  the	  discussion,	  the	  Bureau	  decided	  to	  invite	  Provan	  to	  get	  back	  to	  the	  Bureau	  with	  a	  new	  Working	   Document	   were	   he	   would	   “set	   out	   proposals	   for	   reform	   for	   rationalising	  parliamentary	  business	  and	  improving	  assistance	  to	  Members”	  (Bureau	  2000a).	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More	  actors	  get	  involved	  These	  new	  proposals	  were	  set	  out	  in	  Provans	  “Working	  Document	  no	  3”	  which	  he	  presented	  to	  the	  Bureau	  members	  on	  the	  9	  May	  2000.	  The	  document	  was	  then	  discussed	  on	   a	   Bureau	  meeting	   on	   the	   15	   and	   16	  May.	   On	   this	  meeting,	   the	   Bureau	   decided	   to	  approve	  Provans	  proposals	  of	  how	  to	  use	  the	  €300,000,	  that	  had	  already	  been	  included	  in	  the	  EP	  budget,	  to	  perform	  an	  external	  study.	  Provan	  (2000a	  Annex	  II)	  had	  proposed	  that	   this	   money	   should	   be	   used	   to	   perform	   a	   study	   regarding	   the	   papers	   section	   3.2	  Management	  Culture	  in	  the	  Secretariat,	  and	  in	  particular	  two	  areas	  under	  this	  section,	  I	  quote:	  	  
–	   “Job	   evaluation:	   The	   assessment	   and	   weighting	   of	   different	   tasks	   within	   the	  
secretariat,	   in	   order	   to	   establish	   their	   actual	   degree	   of	   difficulty,	  
responsibility,	   intellectual	   content,	  management	   content	   etc.	   The	   objective	  
would	  be	  to	  establish	  equivalence	  and	  make	  recommendations	  if	  necessary,	  
(i)	   to	   regrade	   specific	   functions	   better	   to	   match	   the	   degree	   of	   seniority	  
needed	   and	   (ii)	   to	   restructure	   specific	   services	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   effective	  
management	  criteria,	  by	  either	  adding	  or	  removing	  hierarchical	  levels”.	  	  
–	   “Introduction	   of	   modern	   personnel	   management	   techniques:	   An	   outside	  
consultant	   could	   advice	   the	   Parliament	   on	   the	   introduction	   of	   modern	  
personnel	   methods	   such	   as	   aptitude	   testing	   and	   psychological	   profiling	  
within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  introduction	  (in	  the	  2001	  budget)	  of	  a	  new	  careers	  
advisory	  service”.	  	  
	  Following	   this	  meeting,	   a	   revised	   version	   of	   the	  Working	  Document	   no	   3	  were	  sent	   to	   the	   political	   group	   chairmen.	   Within	   the	   relevant	   areas	   for	   this	   study,	   the	  Working	  Document	  no	  3	  basically	  passes	  on	  the	  proposals	  from	  Working	  Document	  no	  2.	  That	  is,	  to	  reform	  the	  parliaments	  research	  support,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  legal	  advice	  to	  the	  MEPs.	  The	  document	  does	  not	  go	  further	  in	  depth	  with	  the	  proposals,	  but	  Provan	  invites	  the	  political	  groups	  to	  meet	  him	  in	  person	  to	  further	  exchange	  views	  on	  the	  proposals.	  (Provan	  2000b,	  pp.	  10-­‐12).	  The	  latter	  fact	  means	  that	  the	  full	  reactions	  from	  the	  Political	  Groups	   are	   not	   available	   to	   the	   public,	   and	   therefore	   not	   able	   for	  me	   to	   study.	   Some	  reactions	  were	  however	  discussed	  at	   the	  meeting	  of	   the	  Conference	  of	  Presidents	  of	  8	  June	   2000,	  were	  Mr	   Provan	   also	  was	   present.	   On	   this	  meeting,	  Mr	   Provan	   gave	   three	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main	  reasons	  for	  his	  broad	  reform	  proposals;	  first	  the	  “low	  turnout	  at	  the	  last	  European	  elections”,	  secondly	  the	  fact	  that	  “much	  of	  the	  Parliament's	  working	  methods	  dated	  from	  the	   time	   prior	   to	   the	   directly	   elected	   Parliament”,	   and	   thirdly	   he	   “stressed	   that	  Parliament's	  workload	  would	  increase	  dramatically	  in	  the	  near	  future”	  (CoP	  2000).	  The	  meeting	  moved	  on	  to	  Provans	  proposals,	  were	  Mr	  Provan	  repeated	  his	  suggestions	  for	  reforming	  research/scientific	  support	  and	  legal	  advice	  services.	  	  The	   reactions	   to	  Mr	   Provans	   proposals	  were	  mixed,	   but	  mostly	   positive	  where	  many	   of	   the	   Political	   Group	   Presidents	   said	   they	   shared	   Provans	   view	   of	   what	   was	  necessary	  to	  do,	  but	  not	  always	  shared	  the	  same	  view	  on	  what	  solutions	  to	  chose.	  On	  the	  matter	  of	  the	  organisation	  of	  the	  EP	  staff	  ad	  administrative	  support,	  most	  of	  the	  Group	  Presidents	   agreed	   on	   the	   need	   to	   modernise	   and	   improve	   the	   research	   and	   legal	  support.	  Mr	  Karas	  (AT,	  EPP)	  also	  did	  so,	  however	  he	  said	  he	  was	  completely	  opposed	  to	  modifying	  the	  statute	  for	  group	  staff,	  a	  proposal	  that	  was	  put	  forward	  in	  Provans	  WD	  2.	  The	   decision	   made	   was	   that	   further	   discussions	   were	   to	   be	   held	   inside	   the	   political	  groups,	   in	   a	   dialogue	   with	   Mr	   Provan,	   and	   that	   Mr	   Provan	   were	   to	   present	   new	  documents	   after	   the	   summer	   period	   where	   his	   ideas	   were	   further	   developed.	   The	  upcoming	  documents	  were	  to	  be	  presented	  in	  three	  parts:	  a	  document	  presented	  in	  July	  setting	   out	   ways	   to	   apply	   more	   effectively	   the	   current	   rules,	   a	   second	   document	   in	  September	  on	  plenary	  and	  committee	  reform	  and	  later	  a	  third	  document	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  other	  issues	  raised	  in	  his	  Working	  Documents	  (CoP	  2000,	  pp.	  10-­‐15).	  On	  23	  June	  2000,	  Mr	  Provan	  presented	  his	   fourth	  Working	  Document.	  This	  document	  was	  only	  covering	  the	  “political	  side”	  of	  the	  EP	  and	  is	  therefore	  not	  part	  of	  this	  study.	  	  
Provan	  puts	  forward	  proposals	  –	  but	  only	  regarding	  the	  political	  side	  of	  the	  EP	  Following	   the	   summer	   period,	   the	   Bureau	   further	   discussed	   Provans	   proposals	  and	  decided	  to	  call	  on	  Mr	  Provan	  to	  put	  forward	  “very	  detailed	  proposals	  for	  decisions”	  (Bureau	  2000b).	  In	  November	  2000	  Provan	  therefore	  presented	  his	  Working	  Document	  5,	  based	  on	  the	  feedback	  and	  the	  discussions	  in	  the	  Bureau,	  “but	  also	  in	  the	  Conference	  of	   Presidents,	   the	   Conference	   of	   Committee	   Chairmen,	   the	   Conference	   of	   Delegation	  Chairmen,	   the	   political	   groups,	   besides	   in	   numerous	   bilateral	   meetings”.	   The	   paper	  responds	   to	   the	   Bureaus	   decision	   that	   “the	   time	   was	   ripe	   for	   firm	   proposals	   to	   be	  formulated”	   (Provan	   2000c,	   p.	   3).	   The	   proposals	   cover	  matters	   falling	   both	   under	   the	  competence	  of	  the	  Bureau	  and	  other	  bodies.	  It,	  as	  Provan	  writes,	  “relates	  to	  areas	  where	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in-­‐depth	  discussions	  have	  taken	  place	  and	  where	  a	  consensus	  has	  emerged	  –	  notably	  in	  the	   field	   of	   Parliament’s	   procedures	   and	  working	  methods”	   (Provan	  2000c,	   p.	   3).	   It	   is	  important	   to	   note	   that	   the	   Parliament’s	   procedures	   and	   working	   methods	   are	   the	  biggest	   part	   of	   Provans	   reform	   proposals.	   However,	   these	   procedures	   and	   working	  methods	  regards	  the	  political	  side	  of	   the	  parliament,	  and	  are	  therefore	  not	  part	  of	   this	  study.	   Indirectly,	   Provan	   here	   says	   that	   no	   consensus	   had	   emerged	   regarding	   the	  administrative	  reform	  of	  the	  EP.	  	  Further	  on,	  Provan	  writes	  that	  “in	  several	  other	  areas,	  where	  discussions	  have	  not	  yet	   been	   exhaustive	   (e.g.	   administrative	   reforms,	   the	   relationship	  between	  permanent	  and	   political	   group	   staff,	   certain	   aspects	   of	   assistance	   to	   Members),	   the	   rapporteur	  reserves	   his	   position,	   hopes	   to	   engage	   in	   further	   discussions	   and	  will	   return	   to	   these	  subjects	   in	   due	   course”	   (Provan	   2000c,	   p.	   3).	   Provan	   also	   noted	   that	   several	  matters	  raised	  in	  the	  earlier	  Working	  Documents	  are	  being	  addressed	  in	  other	  contexts.	  Among	  these	  we	  can	  note:	  	  
• A	   new	   inter-­‐institutional	   recruitment	   system	  was	   prepared.	   (This	   is	   the	  process	  that	  resulted	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  EPSO)	  
• The	   Bureaus	   decision	   on	   re-­‐orientation	   of	   DG4.	   (The	   process	   that	   this	  chapter	  4.5.1	  started	  with)	  
• An	   extensive	   review	   of	   the	   Staff	   Policy,	   including	   the	   development	   of	  management	  skills	  and	  criteria	  for	  top	  appointments.	  	  	  The	  Bureau	  discussed	   the	   fifth	  Working	  Document	  on	   its	  meeting	  on	  11	  and	  13	  December	  2000,	  the	  reactions	  to	  Provans	  proposals	  were	  positive.	  Therefore	  the	  Bureau	  decided	  to	  adopt	  the	  draft	  Decision	  and	  address	  the	  recommendations	  to	  the	  competent	  bodies	  (Bureau	  2000c).	  In	  other	  words,	  Provan	  did	  get	  support	  for	  his	  reform	  proposals	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  ‘political	  side’	  of	  the	  EP.	  The	  discussions	  on	  the	  administrative	  side	  of	  Parliament	  continued,	  as	  we	  will	  see.	  	  In	   December	   2000,	   the	   Directorate-­‐General	   for	   Research	   published	   a	   thorough	  study	   that	   compared	   the	   organisational	   and	   budgetary	   arrangements	   in	   15	   of	   the	  national	   parliaments	   of	   the	   EU	  Member	   States.	   The	  DG	   also	  made	   a	   similar	   review	   of	  such	   arrangements	   in	   the	   US	   Congress.	   The	   study	  was	   prepared	   at	   the	   request	   of	  Mr	  Provan	  and	   is	   extensive;	   it	   is	   on	  over	  200	  pages,	   and	   focuses	  on	   “some	  aspects	  of	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  parliaments	  have	  organised	   themselves,	   in	  particular	   their	  budgets	  and	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staffing,	   but	   also	   to	   some	   extent	   their	   procedures”.	   The	   DG	   stresses	   “a	   comparison	   is	  sometimes	   very	   difficult,	   even	   of	   apparently	   simple	   matters	   such	   as	   the	   budgets	   of	  parliaments”	  (European	  Parliament	  2000a).	  As	   far	  as	  I	  can	  see,	   this	  document	  was	  not	  formally	  discussed	  in	  the	  Bureau	  or	  any	  of	  the	  other	  bodies	  that	  I	  have	  documentation	  from.	  	  
The	  ROME-­‐PE	  study	  Almost	  a	  year	  goes	  on	  were,	  at	  least	  the	  formal	  treatment	  of,	  the	  reform	  initiative	  stands	  still.	  During	  this	  period,	  the	  €	  300,000	  external	  study,	  which	  the	  Bureau	  decided	  in	   May	   2000,	   was	   executed.	   The	   study	   was	   called	   ROME-­‐PE	   (A	   French	   acronym	   for	  “Répertoire	   Opérationnelle	   des	   Métiers	   et	   Emplois	   –	   Parlement	   Européen”)	   and	   was	  performed	  by	  a	  consult	   firm	  following	  an	  open	   invitation	  to	   tender.	  The	  results	  of	   this	  study	  was	  presented	  in	  two	  reports;	  one	  interim	  report	  that	  was	  presented	  in	  June	  2001	  (Secretary-­‐General	  2001b),	  and	  the	  final	  report	  that	  was	  presented	  in	  November	  2001	  (Secretary-­‐General	  2001a,	  p.	  4).	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  study	  was	  to	  make	  an	  inventory	  of	  the	   staff	   skills	   and	   write	   job	   descriptions	   (profile	   of	   every	   post	   in	   the	   establishment	  plan),	  so	  that	  they	  could	  be	  matched	  better	  in	  the	  future.	  The	  study	  was	  thorough,	  and	  criticised	   the	   current	   situation	   in	   the	   EP-­‐administration	   in	   forcible	   words.	   The	  Introduction	  of	  the	  final	  report	  stated,	  "the	  issues	  at	  stake	  became	  clear	  gradually,	  if	  they	  ever	   became	   clear	   at	   all".	   .	   The	   parliament	   administration	   as	   of	   today	   is	   said	   to	   be	  fragmentised.	  This	  can	  be	  exemplified	  with	  that	  the	  study	  writes	  that	  “in	  the	  Secretariat,	  differing	   working	   methods	   and	   job	   descriptions	   ultimately	   disguise	   fairly	   similar	  activities.”	  (Secretary-­‐General	  2001a,	  p.	  4)	  Furthermore,	  the	  report	  states	  that	  the	  EP	  “has	  a	  number	  of	  characteristics	  which	  work	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   optimum	   human-­‐resource	   management.	   (Secretary-­‐General	  2001a,	  pp.	  7-­‐8).	  The	  report	  lists	  “constraints”	  for	  the	  “room	  of	  manoeuvre	  if	  change	  is	  to	  be	  introduced”.	  Some	  of	  these	  are	  fundamental	  factors	  that	  the	  report	  considers	  hard	  to	  change	  (with	  special	  address	  to	  the	  split	  working	  places,	  the	  layout	  of	  premises	  and	  the	  multilingualism).	   The	   report	   does	   however	   underline	   that	   these	   are	   a	   consequence	   of	  policy	  options	  that	  are	  “effectively	  set	  in	  stone,	  but	  they	  restrict	  the	  room	  for	  manoeuvre	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  HR	  management”	  (Secretary-­‐General	  2001a,	  pp.	  7-­‐8).	  So	  far	  the	  general	  notes	  and	  introduction	  from	  the	  study,	  now	  moving	  to	  the	  results.	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The	   study	   performed	   an	   extensive	   analysis	   of	   the	   existing	   situation	   in	   the	   EP	  administration,	  this	  included	  the	  jobs,	  tasks	  and	  skills	  inventory.	  The	  study	  also	  included	  a	  forecast	  of	  the	  future	  of	  jobs	  in	  the	  EP,	  where	  the	  consultant	  (Secretary-­‐General	  2001b,	  pp.	  4-­‐6)	  pointed	  out	  a	  number	  of	  current	  and	  upcoming	  challenges	  were	  the	  ROME-­‐PE	  study	  could	  be	  used	  to	  help	  parliament	  handle.	  Finally	  the	  study	  pointed	  out	  proposals	  for	  action	  to	  handle	  the	  issues.	  These	  proposals	  are	  set	  out	  with	  the	  “constraints	  of	  the	  organisation”	  in	  mind,	  and	  “starting	  from	  the	  hypothesis	  of	  a	  strategy	  of	  evolution	  rather	  than	   one	   of	   radical	   reform”	   (Secretary-­‐General	   2001a).	   The	   argument	   is	   that	   a	   full	  inventory	  of	  posts,	  tasks	  and	  competences	  is	  necessary	  to	  be	  able	  to	  handle	  these	  issues	  (Secretary-­‐General	  2001a,	  pp.	  2-­‐4).	  	  In	  short,	  it	  can	  be	  said	  that	  the	  ROME-­‐PE	  study	  came	  with	  some	  major	  criticism	  of	  how	  the	  parliament	  had	  worked	  so	  far.	  The	  presentation	  of	  the	  results	  hereunder	  will	  as	  a	  base	   follow	   the	  organisational	  key	  variables	   and	  will	  have	   the	   final	  proposals	  of	   the	  study	  as	  a	  starting	  point,	   these	  will	  be	  presented	  in	  bullet	  points.	  The	  proposals	  of	  the	  study	  mostly	  covers	  the	  formal	  organisational	  structure,	  hereunder	  the	  study	  proposes:	  	  
• Better	  control	  and	  management	  of	  staff	  
o Clarify	  expected	  tasks	  and	  duties	  for	  staff	  
o Give	  the	  managers	  a	  greater	  responsibility	  	  
o Strike	  a	  better	  balance	  between	  general	  skills	  and	  specialists	  (give	  greater	  prominence	  to	  multiskills	  on	  recruitment)	  
o Improve	  the	  professional	  training	  
o Professionalise	  the	  staff	  
• Improve	  the	  working	  methods	  and	  processes	  
o The	  organisation	  is	  to	  fragmented	  today	  
o Develop	  joint	  working	  methods	  and	  ‘best	  practise’	  
o The	  organisation	  needs	  a	  more	  integrated	  and	  horizontal	  approach	  instead	  of	  todays	  idea	  that	  ‘what	  we	  have,	  we	  hold’	  	  
• Empower	  and	  give	  the	  DG	  5	  (DG	  for	  personnel)	  new	  competences	  
o Draft	  HR	  master	  plans	  (including	  recruitment,	  training,	  mobility	  and	  organisation)	  
o Give	  it	  a	  strategic,	  proactive	  position	  in	  recruitment	  and	  training	  
o Make	  use	  of	  the	  staff	  databases	  built	  up	  by	  the	  ROME-­‐PE	  study	  
o Professionalise	  the	  training	  structure	  –	  think	  innovation	  and	  pre-­‐eminence	  of	  skills	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These	  proposals	  are	  motivated	  by	  the	  organisations	  “complexity	  and	  the	  difficulty	  of	   creating	   synergies”.	   Historically	   the	   parliament	   had	   “developed	   in	   the	   basis	   of	  expediency	   or	   ‘local’	   circumstances”.	   This	   had	   led	   to	   a	   situation	   were	   effort	   was	  duplicated,	  the	  direction	  of	  energies	  were	  not	  optimal,	  and	  a	  fragmented	  structure.	  This	  is	   explained	   by	   a	   “lack	   of	   clarity	   concerning	   their	   respective	   roles	   and	   a	   lack	   of	  administrative	   and	  management	   culture”.	   The	   report	   goes	   as	   far	   as	   saying	   that	   “it	   is	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  the	  Union	  can	  be	  enlarged	  without	  developing	  professionalism	  and	  a	  genuine	  administrative	  culture”	  (Secretary-­‐General	  2001a,	  p.	  8	  and	  11).	  	  	  As	   regards	   locus,	   the	   study	   does	   not	   have	   any	   concrete	   proposals	   to	   make,	  however	   it	   is	   mentioned	   as	   a	   factor	   to	   take	   into	   account	   when	   looking	   at	   the	  organisation	  of	  the	  EP	  staff.	  Parliament	  has	  several	  working	  places	  and	  this	  implies	  a	  lot	  as	   regards	   “travel,	   the	   lack	   of	   continuity	   in	   the	   implementation	   of	   measures	   and	   the	  dispersal	  of	   teams”	  (Secretary-­‐General	  2001a,	  p.	  7).	  Furthermore,	   the	  study	  notes	   that	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  shifting	  focus	  of	  the	  human	  resources	  towards	  Brussels,	  while	  “jobs	  in	  Luxembourg	  seem	  to	  be	  losing	  their	  substance”	  (Secretary-­‐General	  2001a,	  p.	  10).	  For	  this	  change,	  support	  is	  virtually	  unanimous,	  the	  report	  notes	  (Secretary-­‐General	  2001a,	  p.	  15)	  	  
Provans	  last	  document	  (last	  attempt?)	  	  During	   the	   same	   time	   that	   the	   ROME-­‐PE	   study	   presented	   its	   final	   report,	  November	   2001,	   Provan	   also	   presented	   his	   last	   paper	   on	   internal	   reform:	   Working	  document	  no	  6.	  As	  Provan	  writes,	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  was	  to	  “float	  options	  on	  how	  the	  relationship	  between	  members	  and	  the	  legislative	  support	  provided	  to	  them	  from	  a	  variety	   of	   sources	   might	   evolve”.	   The	   options	   focuses	   on	   the	   “assistance	   available	   to	  members	  in	  the	  committee	  context,	  where	  most	  legislative	  work	  is	  carried	  out”	  (Provan	  2001,	   p.	   4).	   The	   proposals	   (Provan	   2001,	   pp.	   5-­‐7)	   can	   be	   recognized	   from	   Provans	  earlier	  documents:	  	  –	  Multidisciplinary	  and	  project	  based	  support	  teams	  to	  the	  committees’	  members.	  A	   better	   definition	   of	   officials’	   roles,	   duties	   and	   obligations	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   support	  provided.	  	  –	   Reform	   the	   internal	   research	   capacities	   to	   deliver	   more	   “speedy	   hands	   on	  briefings”.	  This	  would	  include	  the	  integration	  of	  DG4	  staff	  into	  the	  committee	  structure.	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–	   Reorganise	   the	   verification	   service	   of	   DG2	   into	   a	   direct	   “legislative	   support	  service	   that	  would	   function	  as	  a	  compulsory	   “quality	  control	   filter”	   to	  check	   that	   texts	  intended	   to	   be	   tabled	   in	   committees	   “meet	   basic	   formal,	   legal	   and	   procedural	  requirements”.	  	  	  As	   regards	   economy	   and	   financial	   matters,	   Provan	   describes	   the	   resources	  available	  as	  “relatively	  abundant”.	  However	  he	  makes	  proposals	  regarding	  their	  use	  and	  allocation.	  One	  proposal	   is	   that	  each	  committee	   should	  have	   its	  own	  annual	  budget	   to	  decide	  upon	  and	  use	  for	  visits,	  short-­‐term	  expert	  contracts	  etc.	  In	  essence,	  anything	  that	  the	   committee	   might	   find	   necessary	   to	   improve	   its	   official	   activities.	   The	   same	   idea	  characterises	   the	   proposals	   on	   the	   allocation	   of	  money	   to	   the	  MEPs.	   Provan	  wants	   to	  collect	   all	   the	   sums	   that	   at	   this	   time	   were	   given	   equally	   to	   all	   MEPs	   (allowances	   for	  general	  expenditure,	  secretarial,	  travel,	  language	  training,	  and	  informatics	  training)	  into	  one	  amount	  that	  the	  MEP	  would	  be	  free	  to	  distribute	  among	  these	  purposes.	  Provan	  also	  wants	  the	  Parliament	  to	  encourage	  the	  members	  to	   ‘upgrade’	   their	  personal	  assistants	  and	  start	  using	  them	  more	  as	  political	  advisors.	  But	  he	  underlines	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  MEPs	  and	  says	  that	  this	  is	  up	  to	  them	  to	  decide	  on.	  The	  only	  restriction	  would	  therefore	  be	   a	  minimum	   percentage	   that	   would	   be	   assigned	   to	   employ	   at	   least	   one	   designated	  political	  advisor.	  All	   these	  allocations	  would	  of	  course	  be	  made	  under	  auditory	  control	  (Provan	  2001,	  pp.	  7-­‐9).	  	  Provan	  also	  repeats	  his	  strong	  commitment	  to	  a	  clearer	  “distinction	  the	  political	  sphere	  […]	  and	  an	  explicitly	  neutral	  civil	  service.	  This	  means	  that	  “all	  officials,	  especially	  those	  in	  senior	  positions,	  to	  obtain	  from	  all	  forms	  of	  political	  partisanship	  which	  might	  have	   a	   bearing	   on	   their	   professional	   activities”.	   He	   also	   calls	   for	   recognition	   “that	   a	  career	  in	  the	  political	  groups	  and	  a	  career	  in	  Parliament’s	  permanent	  administration	  are	  two	  separate	  things”.	  This	  should	  not	  make	  movement	  between	  the	  two	  impossible,	  but	  movement	   between	   the	   two	   must	   involve	   a	   “change	   in	   career	   (a	   “one	   way	   ticket”)”	  (Provan	  2001,	  p.	  10).	  	  The	   Bureau	   decided,	   on	   its	   meeting	   of	   10	   December	   2001,	   to	   postpone	   the	  treatment	   of	   this	   document	   to	   a	   forthcoming	  meeting	   (Bureau	   2001,	   p.	   6).	   I	   have	   not	  been	  able	  to	  see	  any	  further	  treatment	  of	  Mr	  Provans	  proposals.	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4.5.2 The	  second	  part	  of	  the	  reform	  process	  (main	  actor	  Julian	  Priestley)	  On	   15	   June	   2002	   the	   Secretary-­‐General,	   Julian	   Priestley,	   presents	   the	   note	  “Assisting	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  its	  Members:	  Raising	  the	  game”,	  which	  builds	  on	  the	  Bureaus	  discussions	  on	  the	  ROME-­‐PE	  study.	  The	  note	  was	  prepared	  after	  a	  Bureau	  decision	   in	   January	   were	   it	   had	   instructed	   the	   SG	   to	   prepare	   options	   concerning	  “support	   for	   Members	   in	   the	   area	   of	   legislative	   drafting”	   and	   “the	   verification	   of	  legislative	  texts”	  (Bureau	  2002b,	  p.	  22).	  	  The	   formal	   responsibility	   had,	   in	   other	   words,	   moved	   from	   one	   of	   the	   Vice-­‐Presidents	   to	   the	   Secretary-­‐General,	   hence	   one	   level	   up	   in	   the	   formal	   structure	   of	   the	  administration.	  As	  we	  can	   see	   in	   the	  documentation	   just	   about	   six	  months	  has	  passed	  since	   the	   last	   part	   of	   Provans	   reform	   proposals	   were	   presented	   to	   the	   Bureau.	   This	  means	  that	  Provans	  process	  is	  still	  fresh	  in	  memory.	  The	  Provan	  process	  did	  get	  a	  lot	  of	  positive	  feedback	  and	  the	  bulk	  of	  Provans	  proposals	  regarding	  the	  ‘political	  side’	  of	  the	  EP	  were	   adopted.	   Therefore	   they	   are	   not	   in	   the	   interest	   of	   this	   study.	   As	   regards	   the	  ‘administrative	   side’,	   Provans	   proposals	   were	   formally	   never	   treated	   in	   the	   Bureau.	  Instead,	  the	  Bureau	  discussed	  and	  focused	  on	  the	  proposals	  of	  the	  ROME-­‐PE	  study	  and	  on	   its	  meeting	  of	  8	  April	  2002	   it	   instructed	   the	  Secretary-­‐General	   to	  come	  back	   to	   the	  Bureau	  with	  an	  options	  paper,	  that	  is	  the	  paper	  that	  was	  presented	  on	  15	  June	  2002.	  	  This	  new	  part	  of	  the	  reform	  process	  can,	  as	  discussed,	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  first	  part.	  The	  process	  however	  differs	  from	  the	  former	  in	  some	  ways,	  among	  other	  things	   because	   the	   Priestley	   process	   only	   aims	   at	   changing	   the	   parliament’s	  administrative	   support.	   Another	   difference	   is	   that	   it	   is	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   himself	  who	  has	  developed	  the	  reform	  proposal	  this	  time,	  and	  not	  the	  Vice	  President	  Provan.	  	  The	   document	   sums	   up	   the	   reform	   process	   so	   far	   and	   states	   that	  much	   of	   the	  reforms	  needed	  are	  already	  on	  the	  way	  of	  being	  implemented.	  This	  regards:	  	  -­‐ The	   need	   to	   reform	   Parliaments	   political	   side,	   where	   Provans	   proposals	   had	  been	  received	  well	  and	  got	  support.	  	  -­‐ In	   the	   end	   of	   2001,	   a	   new	   department	   focusing	   on	   HR-­‐planning	   had	   been	  established	  -­‐ The	   mission	   of	   the	   DG	   for	   personnel	   was	   also	   being	   revised	   in	   order	   to	  transform	  the	  DG	  into	  a	  more	  active	  HR	  management	  service	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-­‐ A	   new	   staff	   policy	   were	   being	   drafted	   that	   were	   to	   be	   more	   “dynamic”	   and	  include	  a	  new	  survey	  of	  the	  existing	  skills	  and	  competences	  in-­‐house	  -­‐ An	  IT	  environment	   to	  support	  staff	  management	  was	  planned	  and	   to	  be	  built	  up	  	  However,	  as	  the	  Secretary	  General	  (SG)	  writes,	  the	  “Bureau’s	  attention	  was	  drawn	  to	  a	  certain	  number	  of	  problems	  which	  was	  highlighted	  during	  this	  work	  [the	  ROME-­‐PE	  study]	  –	  not	  least	  resulting	  from	  the	  interviews	  with	  Members	  –	  and	  which	  concern	  not	  the	  process	  of	  human	  resources	  management,	  but	  the	  service	  it	  [the	  General	  Secretariat]	  provides”	   (Secretary-­‐General	  2002b,	  p.	  2).	  The	  question	   that	  arises	   is:	   “Is	  Parliament’s	  secretariat	  providing	  the	  quality	  of	  services	  now	  needed	  by	  the	  institution	  to	  carry	  out	  its	   responsibilities?”	   The	   short	   answer	   to	   this	   question	   seems	   to	   be	   no,	   and	   the	  explanations	  to	  this	  is	  the	  same	  ones	  as	  were	  drawn	  up	  before	  by	  Mr	  Provan,	  and	  others	  (Secretary-­‐General	  2002b,	  p.	  2):	  	  -­‐ The	   parliament	   had	   gone	   through	   changes	   “almost	   beyond	   recognition”,	   it	   is	  now	   “immeasurably	   reinforced”	   and	   a	   “co-­‐legislator	   on	   the	   bulk	   of	   EU	  legislation”.	  	  -­‐ “The	   model	   for	   assisting	   parliamentarians	   was	   developed	   before	   the	   first	  elections	  in	  1979.	  Twenty	  years	  on,	  and	  the	  model	  has	  changed	  little	  on	  paper,	  but	  all	  the	  parameters	  have	  changed”.	  	  	  Even	   if	   the	  model	  works,	   in	   the	  sense	   that	   “business	   is	  got	   through	  Parliament”	  and	  the	  EP	  “continues	  on	  its	  upward	  trajectory”,	  there	  is	  a	  growing	  dissatisfaction	  both	  among	  MEPs,	  but	  also	  amongst	  staff	  and	  outside	  the	  institution,	  as	  regards	  what	  the	  SG	  calls	   a	   “growing	  quality	  gap”	  –	   the	  quality	  of	  decisions	  and	   legislation	   is	   generally	  not	  satisfactory.	  This	   is	   explained	  by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  EP	  did	  not	   always	  have	   “the	  people	  with	  the	  appropriate	  qualifications”.	  The	  MEPs	  felt	  that	  they	  could	  no	  longer	  “count	  on	  the	  relevance	  and	  reliability”	  of	  advice	  from	  the	  secretariat	  in	  the	  committees	  on	  more	  complicated	  issues.	  Even	  if	  this	  problem	  would	  be	  fixed,	  the	  SG	  writes,	  one	  more	  is	  still	  to	  deal	  with,	  namely	  the	  technical/legal	  quality	  of	  texts	  decided	  upon.	  A	  text	  voted	  on	  in	  the	   committees,	   and	   then	   in	   plenary,	   can,	   through	   the	   co-­‐decision	   procedure,	   become	  European	   law.	   Therefore	   the	   text	   needs	   to	   be	   “clear,	   precise	   and,	   as	   far	   as	   possible,	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legally	  watertight”,	  and	  equally	  important,	  it	  must	  “correspond	  as	  between	  the	  different	  working	  languages”	  of	  Parliament	  (Secretary-­‐General	  2002b,	  p.	  2).	  	  	  Hence,	  the	  quality	  problem	  drawn	  up	  has	  two	  sides:	  	  1. “The	   quality	   and	   availability	   of	   expert	   assistance	   to	   Members	   on	   the	   policy	  issues	  they	  now	  face	  in	  the	  parliamentary	  work.”	  2. “The	   technical	   quality	   of	   the	   legislative	   ‘product’,	   because	   of	   drafting	  difficulties,	  clearly	  compounded	  in	  the	  multilingual	  framework.”	  	  	  The	   main	   proposals	   that	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   puts	   forward	   were	   (Secretary-­‐General	  2002b):	  	  -­‐ Integrating	   the	   research	   and	   scientific	   services	   of	   DG4	   together	   with	   the	  committee	   and	  delegations	   secretariats	   of	  DG2,	   into	  new	  policy	  departments,	  following	  the	  policy	  divisions	  of	  Parliaments	  political	  work.	  	  -­‐ On	   the	   request	   of	   the	   member	   (especially	   Rapporteurs)	   setting	   up	   ‘Project	  Teams’	  of	   the	  officials	  designated	   to	  assist	   the	  Member	  on	  an	   issue	   (from	  the	  political	   group	   staff,	   the	   policy	   research	   department,	   the	   specialist	   advisers,	  Legal	  Service,	  language	  service	  etc.).	  	  -­‐ Giving	   the	   committees	   the	   option	   to	   buy	   in	   competence	   from	   the	   outside	   to	  these	  teams.	  	  -­‐ Constitution	  of	   a	   tabling	   service,	  where	   all	   amendments	  were	   to	  be	   tabled	   at	  “all	   stages	   of	   the	   parliamentary	   procedure”.	   This	   service	   would	   provide	  “formal,	  procedural	   and	   linguistic	   verification”	  as	  well	   as	   “a	   fully	  multilingual	  legislative	  drafting	  consultancy”.	  	  	  
The	  STEP-­‐study	  During	  the	  first	  half	  of	  2002,	  the	  EP	  had	  let	  a	  new	  consulting	  firm,	  STEP,	  perform	  another	  study;	  this	  one	  was	  based	  on	  in	  depth	  interviews	  with	  senior	  officials	  and	  MEPs.	  The	   focus	   was	   on	   how	   they	   experienced	   the	   services	   that	   provides	   assistance	   to	  members,	  both	  from	  the	  inside	  and	  outside.	  It	  tries	  to	  identify	  and	  present	  successes	  and	  shortcomings,	  and	  in	  the	  end	  recommendations	  to	  improve	  the	  services.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  this	   report	   points	   in	   the	   same	   direction	   as	   the	   other	   ones.	   The	   shortcomings	   are	   the	  same	  problems	  as	  pointed	  out	  before,	   roughly:	  The	   research	   services	   are	  hard	   to	  use,	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and	  its	  working	  procedures	  lead	  to	  a	  slow	  production	  of	  rigorous	  reports.	  This	  does	  not	  meet	   the	   needs	   of	   the	  MEPs	   that	   instead	  want	   short,	   reliable	   and	   quick	   briefings	   and	  PMs	  (STEP	  2002,	  p.	  11).	  	  The	  outlined	  principles	  for	  a	  new	  organisation	  is	  therefore	  (STEP	  2002,	  p.	  12):	  	  
• Skill	   centres	   structured	   around	   the	   areas	   covered	   by	   the	   remits	   of	   the	   various	  parliamentary	  committees	  
• Closer	  cooperation	  or	  merger	  with	  DG	  II	  	  
• Strengthening	  the	  Helpline	  and	  rapid	  reaction	  services	  
• Organising	  openness	  to	  the	  outside	  world	  (EU	  –	  world)	  
• Putting	  in	  place	  of	  a	  quality	  control	  service	  
• Working	  in	  project	  mode	  and	  improving	  expertise	  
• Setting	  up	  of	  a	  central	  unit	  to	  be	  responsible	  for	  resources	  control	  and	  planning	  of	  activities	  	  Following	   the	  presentation	  of	   this	   study,	  a	  debate	  had	  been	  raised	   in	  which	   the	  locations	  of	  the	  DGs,	  and	  the	  Parliament	  itself,	  were	  discussed.	  This	  was	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  at	   this	   time	   far-­‐reaching	   plans	   to	  move	   the	   posts	   of	   the	  DG	   5	   to	   Brussels.	  Mr	   Poos,	   a	  Luxembourgian	  MEP	  and	  Quaestor	  had	  sent	  a	   letter	  where	  he	  warns	  the	  Parliament	  of	  doing	  this	  as	  it	  would,	  in	  his	  view,	  breach	  an	  agreement	  which	  “has	  the	  force	  of	  a	  Treaty”	  that	  “stipulates	  that	  the	  Parliaments	  Secretariat	  and	  its	  departments	  should	  continue	  to	  be	   situated	   in	   Luxembourg”,	  more	   specifically	   this	   had	  been	   specified	   to	  mean	   that	   at	  least	  half	  of	  the	  Secretariat	  staff	  needed	  to	  be	  placed	  in	  Luxembourg	  (Poos	  2002,	  p.	  1).	  	  This	   debate	   led	   to	   that	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   decided	   to	  write	   a	   report	   “on	   the	  costs	  of	  maintaining	  three	  places	  of	  work”,	  and	  to	  ask	  for	  Bureaus	  permission	  to	  forward	  the	  report	  to	  the	  Convention	  on	  the	  Future	  of	  Europe,	  which	  was	  a	  body	  established	  to	  produce	  a	  draft	  constitution	  for	  the	  European	  Union.	  This	  report	  estimated	  the	  costs	  of	  “the	   geographical	   dispersion”	   to	   be	   €	   169	   million	   (Secretary-­‐General	   2002d).	   The	  Bureau	  decided	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  SGs	  proposal	  (Bureau	  2002a,	  p.	  12).	  	  During	  the	  fall	  2002	  the	  DG	  for	  research	  (DG	  4)	  had	  produced	  its	  own	  answer	  to	  the	   STEP	   report.	   The	   DG	   for	   research	   reacted	   on	   that	   the	   report	   took	   account	   of	   a	  number	   of	   critical	   comments.	   This	   criticism	   “could	   have	   been	   avoided	   or	   better	  presented	  if	  STEP	  had	  had	  an	  opportunity	  for	  a	  more	  in-­‐depth	  discussion	  of	  them	  with	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DG	   for	   research’s	  management”.	   The	   DG	   for	   research	   generally	   says	   the	   report	   is	   too	  generalising.	  However	  they	  do	  not	  comment	  on	  the	  proposals	  put	  forward	  in	  the	  STEP	  report	  (DG	  for	  Research	  2002).	  The	  Secretary-­‐General	  comments	  on	  this	  in	  a	  note	  to	  the	  Bureau	  were	  he	  calls	  the	  DG	  for	  research’s	  answer	  “objective”,	  and	  says	  it	  puts	  the	  DG	  in	  a	   “proper	   perspective”.	   Further	   on	  he	   calls	  DG	   for	   research’s	   approach	   “constructive”.	  This	   “enables	   us	   to	   conclude	   that,	   as	   things	   currently	   stand,	   almost	   all	   the	   staff	  most	  directly	  concerned	  support	  the	  recommendations”	  regarding	  restructuring	  the	  research	  support.	  The	  SG	  also	  says	  that	  the	  “objective	  difficulties	  linked	  to	  the	  different	  places	  of	  work	  are	  clearly	  apparent”	  (Secretary-­‐General	  2002a,	  pp.	  2-­‐3).	  Following	  this	  document,	  the	  SG	  presented	  another	  one	  on	  31	  October	  2002	  where	  he	  informed	  the	  Bureau	  of	  the	  conclusions	  of	  the	  three	  working	  groups	  that	  had	  been	  studying	  the	  Raining	  the	  Game-­‐	  proposals	  in-­‐depth.	  	  This	  report	  is	  around	  160	  pages	  long	  and	  thoroughly	  goes	  through	  the	   questions.	   Its	   conclusions	   are	   positive	   and	   the	   SG	   therefore	   proposes	   to	   move	  forward	   and	   that	   he	   should	   get	   back	   to	   the	  Bureau	  with	   “definitive	   proposals”	   on	   the	  issues.	  The	  SG	  also	  notes	  that	  a	  plenary	  reaction	  on	  the	  proposals	  had	  been	  made	  as	  part	  of	   the	  2003	  budgetary	  procedure,	  and	  also	   this	   reaction	   is	  positive	   (Secretary-­‐General	  2002c,	  pp.	  1-­‐3).	  	  
The	  Secretary-­‐General	  moves	  forward	  On	  23	  January	  2003,	  2	  years	  and	  9	  months	  since	  VP	  Provan	  had	  outlined	  almost	  the	  same	  proposals,	   the	  Secretary-­‐General	  presents	  his	   final	  proposals	   for	   the	   ‘Raising	  the	   Game’-­‐reform.	   The	   note	   is	   short	   and	   summarises	   the	   proses	   that	   lead	   to	   these	  proposals,	   starting	   from	   around	   a	   half	   year	   before,	   when	   the	   SG	   first	   presented	   the	  ‘Raising	   the	   Game’	   initiative.	   The	   Secretary	   Generals	   (2003)	   proposals	   “directly	  concerning	  legislative	  assistance”	  were:	  	  
• The	  creation	  of	  a	  Tabling	  Office	  in	  DG1,	  ultimately	  as	  a	  directorate	  
• The	   division	   of	   the	   current	   DG2	   into	   two	   directorates-­‐general,	   one	  handling	  internal	  policies,	  and	  thus	  with	  an	  essentially	  legislative	  vocation,	  and	  the	  other	  handling	  external	  policies	  
• The	  incorporation	  into	  the	  two	  new	  directorates-­‐general	  described	  above	  of	  the	  staff	   from	  the	  studies	  directorate	  of	  today's	  DG4,	  with	  the	  relevant	  posts	  being	  transferred	  to	  Brussels	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• The	   consequent	   reorganisation	   of	   the	   two	   new	   directorates-­‐general	   into	  policy-­‐based	   directorates	   grouping	   together	   committee	   secretariats	   and	  policy	  support	  departments	  	  The	   proposals	   was	   later	   on	   discussed	   and	   supported	   by	   the	   Conference	   of	  Presidents	   (CoP	  2003).	   Some	   issues	  were	  debated	  on	  during	   this	  meeting,	   but	   the	  SG,	  who	  was	  attending	  the	  meeting	  said	  none	  of	  the	  fears	  that	  came	  up	  were	  to	  worry	  about,	  and	   the	   two	   big	   party	   groups	   EPP	   and	   S&D	   were	   both	   eager	   to	   get	   the	   proposals	  accepted	   and	   implemented.	   The	   EPP	   representative	   had	   said	   “the	   Secretary-­‐General’s	  proposals	   sought	   to	   improve	   the	   assistance	   provided	   to	   Members.	   Accordingly,	   any	  delay	   in	   their	   adoption	   (pending	   the	   completion	   of	   the	   Convention's	  work)	  would	   do	  Members	  a	  disservice”	  and	  he	  also	  “expressed	  the	  hope	  that	  a	  decision	  would	  be	  taken	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible	  in	  the	  Bureau,	  the	  body	  competent	  to	  deal	  with	  this	  matter,	  so	  that	  Parliament	  could	  meet	  the	  challenge	  posed	  by	  the	  enlargement”	  (CoP	  2003,	  p.	  16).	  	  About	  a	  week	   later,	   the	  Bureau	  decided	  to	  adopt	  the	  full	  proposals	  put	   forward,	  both	  the	  ones	  referred	  here	  over	  and	  the	  others	  (Bureau	  2003,	  pp.	  21-­‐22).	  The	  Bureau	  had	  approved	  the	  Raising	  the	  game	  reform.	  	  
4.5.3 Summary	  To	  sum	  up	  the	  main	  findings	  from	  these	  two	  reform	  processes,	  we	  can	  note	  some	  general	   characteristics.	   In	   1999	   Vice-­‐President	   Provan	   was	   assigned	   with	   the	   task	   to	  prepare	   some	  documents	   regarding	   the	   internal	  organisation	  of	   the	  EP.	  Already	   in	  his	  first	  working	  document,	  Provan	  had	  identified	  the	  scientific	  and	  legal	  support	  as	  an	  area	  to	  reform.	  Provan	  further	  developed	  these	  proposals	   in	  his	  second	  working	  document,	  the	  proposals	  put	   forward	  here	  are	  very	  similar	   to	   the	  ones	   that	   later	  on	  are	  adopted.	  This	   includes	   recasting	   the	  DG	   for	   research	   into	   a	   rapid	   delivery	   service,	   and	   a	   legal-­‐technical	  quality	  control	  closely	  connected	  to	  the	  political	  processes.	  A	  slightly	  revised	  version	  of	  this	  document	  is	  presented	  in	  the	  third	  Working	  document.	  This	  document	  is	  also	  sent	  to	  other	  actors	  in	  the	  Parliament	  and	  is	  discussed	  on.	  	  Following	   these	   discussions	   Provan	   presents	   a	   fourth	   document,	   which	   only	  regards	  the	  political	  processes	  in	  the	  EP.	  Some	  months	  later,	  the	  Bureau	  calls	  for	  Provan	  to	  move	  forward	  and	  present	  concrete	  proposals.	  Provan	  does	  so	  in	  November	  2000,	  the	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proposals	  are	  however	  only	  covering	  the	  parts	  were	  a	  consensus	  has	  been	  reached.	  This	  was	  not	  the	  case	  for	  the	  reforms	  on	  the	  administrative	  side	  of	  the	  EP.	  The	  proposals	  that	  are	  put	  forward	  are	  adopted.	  	  During	   almost	   a	   year	   after	   this,	   no	   formal	   treatment	   of	   the	   reform	  proposals	   is	  made,	  but	  one	  external	  study,	  the	  ROME-­‐PE	  is	  made.	  When	  this	  study	  presents	  its	  final	  report	   in	   November	   2011,	   it	   criticises	   the	   EP	   on	   many	   points,	   especially	   for	   being	  fragmented	   and	   therefor	   not	   working	   optimal.	   The	   study	   mainly	   regards	   the	  management	  of	  staff	  in	  the	  EP.	  Around	  the	  same	  time,	  Provan	  puts	  forward	  his	  sixth	  and	  final	   Working	   document.	   In	   this	   document	   he	   lifts	   his	   proposals	   for	   administrative	  reform	  again.	  The	  Bureau	  discusses	   this	  document,	  but	  decides	   to	  postpone	  a	  decision	  on	  it.	  	   Instead,	   around	   six	  months	   later,	   the	   Secretary-­‐General,	  Mr	   Priestley,	   proposes	  his	  ‘Raising	  the	  Game’-­‐document.	  Priestley	  here	  draws	  on	  the	  conclusions	  of	  the	  ROME-­‐PE	   study	   and	   says	   there	   is	   a	   clear	   quality	   problem	   regarding	   the	   services	   that	   are	  provided	  by	  the	  administration.	  The	  problem	  is	  two-­‐sided	  and	  regards	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  expert	  assistance	  and	  the	  legislative	  product.	  During	  the	  same	  period	  a	  second	  external	  study	  is	  performed,	  the	  STEP	  study.	  This	  one	  focuses	  on	  interviewing	  senior	  officials	  and	  MEPs	  regarding	  the	  services	  provided	  by	  the	  EP.	  The	  results	  are	  clear:	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  services	  does	  not	  meet	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  MEPs	  and	  they	  are	  hard	  to	  use.	  On	  23	  January	  2003,	  2	  years	  and	  9	  months	  since	  Provan	  had	  outlined	  almost	  the	  same	  proposals,	   the	  Secretary-­‐General	   presents	   his	   final	   proposals	   for	   the	   ‘Raising	   the	   Game’-­‐reform.	   The	  note	   is	   short,	   but	   clear:	   A	   new	   legislative	   support	   structure	   should	   be	   set	   up.	   DG	   for	  Research	  in	  Luxemburg	  were	  closed	  down	  and	  the	  posts	  transferred	  to	  the	  new	  DGs	  for	  the	  committee	  secretariats,	  one	  for	  internal	  and	  one	  for	  external	  policies,	  these	  were	  to	  be	  located	  in	  Brussels.	  The	  proposals	  were	  adopted	  and	  implemented.	  	  This	  was	  a	   short	  summary	   to	  give	  an	  overview	  of	  what	  happened	   in	   the	   formal	  reform	   processes.	   The	   interesting	   part	   is	   to	   put	   these	   happenings	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  theories	  and	  put	  them	  in	  a	  context.	  That	  is	  what	  I	  will	  do	  now.	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5 Analysis	  
5.1 Introduction	  In	   the	  previous	  chapter	   I	  presented	  the	  empirical	   findings	   from	  my	  study	  based	  on	  the	  reading	  of	  the	  selected	  documents.	  The	  question	  now	  is	  what	  these	  findings	  can	  tell	  about	  the	  research	  question	  asked	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  study:	  	  
How	   has	   the	   formal	   organisational	   structure	   of	   the	   European	   Parliament-­‐
administration	  changed	  over	  time	  and	  how	  can	  these	  changes	  be	  explained?	  	  In	  order	  to	  answer	  this	  I	  will	  analyse	  the	  findings	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  theoretical	  framework.	  The	   first	   part	   of	   this	   analysis	  will	   be	   a	   shorter	   review	  of	   the	   changes	   and	  how	  they	  can	  be	  seen	  out	  from	  the	  theory.	  The	  second	  part	  of	  the	  analysis	  will	  focus	  on	  looking	   on	   the	   reform	   processes	   themselves.	   I	   will	   here	   look	   at	   the	   nature	   of	   these	  processes,	  how	  they	  were	  organised	  and	  what	  this	  tells	  us	  about	  the	  parliament.	  	  
5.2 The	  changes	  in	  the	  formal	  structure	  I	  will	   here	  draw	  up	   the	   central	   lines	   of	   the	   formal	   organisational	   changes,	  with	  focus	  on	  the	  direct	  support	  functions	  to	  the	  MEPs.	  I	  will	  also	  relate	  the	  changes	  to	  some	  of	  the	  problems	  that	  where	  identified	  in	  the	  reform	  processes.	  	  An	   instrumental	   analysis	   of	   the	   reforms	   indicates	   large-­‐scale	   changes	   in	   the	  organisational	   structures	   of	   the	   parliament.	   The	   proposals	   regarding	   the	   scientific	  support	  were	  extensive.	  Broadly	  outlined,	  the	  reforms	  led	  to	  that	  DGs	  were	  closed	  down	  and	  staff	  was	  transferred	  to	  new	  DGs	  where	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  tasks	  also	  was	  changed.	  Staff	  was	  also	  transferred	  from	  Luxemburg	  to	  Brussels.	  	  The	  results	  show	  that	  changes	  has	  been	  made	  in	  order	  to	  make	  the	  organisation	  more	  adapted	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  MEPs.	  This	  has	  been	  made	  through	  a	  reorganisation	  of	  the	   legal	  and	  the	  research	  units,	   to	  connect	   these	  closer	   to	   the	  political	  processes.	  The	  legal	   support,	   the	   Tabling	   Office,	   has	   been	   built	   up	   as	   a	   completely	   new	   part	   of	   the	  service	  and	  it	  is	  organised	  from	  a	  process-­‐based	  approach,	  where	  all	  legislative	  acts	  are	  to	  be	  validated	  by	   the	  Tabling	  Office.	  The	   research	  units,	   on	   the	  other	  hand,	  has	  been	  restructured	   and	   merged	   into	   new	   policy	   support	   units	   that	   are	   following	   the	   same	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structure	  as	   the	  committees	  of	   the	  parliament.	  These	  policy	  units	  have	   therefore	  been	  more	  adapted	  to	  its	  different	  clients.	  	  Given	  the	  frustration	  that	  many	  MEPs	  had	  expressed	  regarding	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  support	   services	   these	   changes	   were	   logical,	   seen	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	  organisational	  key	  variables.	  As	  Egeberg	  noted,	  one	  can	  expect	  issues	  to	  be	  coordinated	  better	  if	  they	  are	  organisationally	  placed	  in	  the	  same	  units.	  This	  is	  what	  the	  EP	  wanted	  to	  achieve	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   scientific	   support.	  The	  EP	  had	   the	  analysis	   that	   there	  already	  was	  competence	   inside	   the	  EP-­‐administration,	  which	  was	  possible	   to	  organise	  better	   and	   connect	   closer	   to	   the	  MEPs	   and	   their	   needs.	   Therefore,	   the	   EP	   decided	   to	  create	   new	   policy	   departments	   based	   on	   the	   divisions	   of	   the	   committees	   in	   the	  Parliament.	   This	   would,	   seen	   from	   an	   instrumental	   perspective,	   be	   a	   good	   way	   to,	  directly	   on	   an	   organisational	   level,	   integrate	   the	   research	   competence	   that	   the	  parliament	  already	  possessed,	  and	  bring	  it	  closer	  to	  the	  work	  of	  the	  MEPs.	  This	  change	  affects	  which	  primary	  affiliation	  that	  the	  concerned	  staff	  has.	  From	  being	  organised	  as	  a	  separate	  research	  team,	  they	  will	  now	  be	  organised	  into	  a	  new	  structure	  that	  are	  based	  on	   the	   same	   sectoral	   divisions	   as	   the	   MEPs	   already	   are	   organised	   in,	   namely	   the	  committees	  of	  the	  parliament.	  	  Similar,	   the	   setting	   up	   of	   Project	   Teams	   is	   a	   reform	   that	   would	   organise	   the	  different	   support	   functions	   closer	   to	   the	   client,	   the	   MEPs.	   The	   Project	   Teams	   are	  collecting	  the	  relevant	  staff	  from	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  parliamentary	  organisation,	  and	  sometimes	   also	   from	   external	   sources.	   These	   teams	   were	   to	   be	   put	   up	   on	   the	   MEPs	  request.	   Since	   they	  consisted	  of	   staff	   from	  different	  parts	  of	   the	  organisation,	   they	  are	  working	   as	   a	   temporary	   and	   secondary	   affiliation	   for	   the	   staff	   that	   forms	   the	   team.	  According	  to	  Egebergs	  theories	  on	  organisational	  affiliations,	  the	  staff	  could	  be	  therefore	  expected	   to	   act	   as	   representatives	   from	   their	   original	   organisational	   affiliation.	   One	  could	   therefore	  expect	   these	   teams	  to,	   to	  some	  degree,	  become	  arenas	   to	  negotiate,	  or	  broke	  deals,	  between	  the	  different	  organisational	  interests.	  The	  main	  task	  of	  the	  teams	  are	  however	  to	  provide	  advice	  to	  the	  MEP	  on	  a	  given	  legislative	  act.	  If	  used	  in	  the	  right	  way	  these	  teams	  could	  strengthen	  the	  rapporteur	  by	  giving	  him	  or	  her	  a	  proposal	  that	  already	   are	   supported	  by	  different	   actors	   in	   and	   around	   the	  parliament	  when	   coming	  back	  to	  the	  political	  treatment	  of	  the	  act.	  	  The	  formal	  organisational	  structure	  in	  the	  EP	  administration	  has	  also	  changed	  in	  the	  way	  that	   the	  number	  of	  staff	  has	  been	  growing	  substantially.	  The	  expansion	  of	   the	  
75	  	  
Parliaments	  tasks,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  enlargement	  of	  the	  EU	  to	  new	  member	  states	  has	  been	  used	  as	  explanations	  to	  the	  growth.	  This	  is	  a	  process	  that	  are	  connected	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  whole	  has	  growing	  from	  15	  to	  27	  member	  states	  during	  the	  studied	  period.	  This	  has	  led	  to	  that	  the	  number	  of	  parliamentarians	  in	  the	  EP	  has	  been	  growing	  and	  the	  translation	   service	   has	   had	   to	   increase	   its	   capacity	   in	   order	   to	   fulfil	   the	   new	  requirements.	   This	   change	   can	   therefore	   be	   described	   as	   a	   natural	   or	   incremental	  growth	  and	  does	  not	  necessary	  need	  to	  be	  part	  of	  a	  design	  or	  intentional	  reform.	  	  The	  structure	  of	  the	  staff	  did	  also	  change	  during	  the	  studied	  period.	  We	  have	  seen	  a	  clear	   increase	   in	  the	  share	  of	  AD-­‐category	  staff	  can	  both	  be	  seen	  as	  part	  of	   the	  same	  natural	  process,	  but	  it	  could	  also	  be	  part	  of	  the	  ambition	  to	  professionalise	  the	  staff	  and	  make	  them	  more	  able	  to	  meet	  the	  MEPs	  requirements.	  	  During	  the	  reform	  process	  there	  was	  an	  expressed	  criticism	  that	  political	  loyalties	  with	   the	  party	   groups	   in	   the	  parliament	  were	   affecting	   the	   administrations	  work.	  The	  reform	   processes	   and	   documents	   studied	   shows	   that	   the	   issue	   was	   discussed	  extensively	   through	   out	   the	   reform	  processes.	   Proposals	   to	   change	   this	  were	   also	   put	  forward	  and	  adopted,	  also	  much	  of	  the	  work	  of	  the	  ROME-­‐PE	  study	  was	  regarding	  staff	  management.	   We	   also	   know	   that	   new	   staff	   regulations	   were	   introduced	   during	   the	  studied	  period.	  These	  changes	  are	  not	  my	  main	  focus,	  but	  they	  are	  however	  interesting	  to	  see	  in	  relation	  to	  some	  other	  changes.	  When	  looking	  at	  the	  structural	  changes	  to	  the	  research	  support	  these	  changes	  are	  however	  not	  as	  logical	  seen	  from	  this	  problem.	  The	  changes	  were	  on	  an	  organisational	  level	  tying	  the	  staff	  closer	  to	  the	  political	  side	  of	  the	  parliament.	   According	   to	   the	   theoretical	   framework	   and	   the	   organisational	   key	  variables,	   this	  might	   lead	   to	  a	  situation	  were	   the	  staff	   is	  developing	  closer	  relations	   to	  the	  politicians.	   In	  that	  sense,	   the	  change	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  risk.	  This	   is	  however	  not	  a	  risk	  that	  is	  discussed	  in	  the	  studied	  documents.	  	  Throughout	  the	  reform	  processes,	  we	  can	  note	  an	  expressed	  frustration	  over	  the	  geographical	   separation	   of	   the	   EP.	   The	   frustration	   was	   founded	   in	   the	   logistical,	  economical	   and	   time-­‐consuming	   that	   the	   geographical	   division	   creates.	   It	   can	   also	   be	  understood	   from	   a	   theoretical	   perspective.	   One	   of	   the	   organisational	   key	   variables	  regards	  exactly	  this,	  locus.	  According	  to	  Egeberg,	  physical	  distance	  has	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	   contact	   and	   coordination.	   However,	   there	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   consensus	   in	   the	   EP-­‐administration	  on	   the	   fact	   that	   this	   is	   impossible	   to	   change.	  The	  geographical	  division	  has	   long	   traditions,	   are	   regulated	   in	   detail	   and	   specifies	   how	  many	   staff	   that	   is	   to	   be	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located	   in	   the	  different	  cites.	  During	   the	  reform	  processes	  we	  saw	  an	   indication	  of	   the	  tension	  on	  this	  issue	  in	  the	  reaction	  of	  one	  of	  the	  Luxembourgian	  MEPs	  and	  the	  reaction	  that	   the	   issue	   got	   in	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  Bureau.	   The	  ROME-­‐PE	   study	   clearly	   criticised	   the	  geographical	   division	   and	   connected	   it	   to	   the	   restraints	   of	   reforming	   the	   parliament	  institutions.	  	  
5.3 The	  reform	  processes	  The	   reform	   proposals	   by	   Mr	   Provan	   were	   a	   deliberate	   attempt	   to	   change	   the	  organisation.	   This	   was	   the	   first	   time	   were	   this	   type	   of	   holistic	   approach	   to	   the	  organisational	   structure	  was	   taken.	  From	  what	  my	   searches	  have	   found,	   this	  was	  also	  the	  only	  time	  that	  this	  has	  happened.	  	  The	  hierarchical	  variant	  of	  the	  instrumental	  perspective	  assumes	  the	  organisation	  to	   be	   homogenous	   with	   a	   clear	   leadership	   that	   evaluates	   the	   organisation	   from	   a	  functionalistic	  and	  problem-­‐solving	  perspective.	  Therefore	  changes	   in	   the	  organisation	  are	   expected	   to	   come	   as	   a	   result	   initiatives	   from	   the	   leadership.	   Furthermore,	   the	  hierarchical	  perspective	  expects	  organisations	  to	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  carry	  out	  rational	  actions.	  This	  is	  defined	  in	  four	  elements,	  specified	  in	  the	  theory-­‐chapter;	  A	  clear	  image	  of	  the	   goal	   or	   problem,	   an	   analysis	   of	   which	   alternatives	   that	   are	   possible	   and	   which	  consequences	   to	   expect	   from	   each	   alternative.	   In	   addition	   to	   this	   one	   expects	   the	  organisation	  to	  have	  rules	  for	  how	  to	  make	  decisions	  and	  choose	  between	  the	  specified	  alternatives.	  	  From	  the	  document	  study	  one	  can	  see	  that	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  the	  reforms	  are	  an	  analysis	  of	   a	  need	   to	   adopt	   the	  organisation	   to	  new	   conditions	   in	   the	   environment	  (increased	   power,	   upcoming	   enlargement	   etc.)	   and	   also	   to	   help	   out	  with	   the	   growing	  dissatisfaction	   that	  MEPs	   had	   felt.	   The	   general	   analysis	   is	   that	   the	   Parliament	   did	   not	  meet	  up	  to	  the	  requirements	  that	  the	  changed	  role	  and	  changed	  expectations	  had	  led	  to.	  Provan,	  and	   later	  Priestley,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  external	  consultants	  argued	  for	  a	   line	  where	  they	  lifted	  the	  need	  to	  reform	  the	  administration	  in	  order	  for	  it	  to	  become	  more	  adapted	  to	   the	   needs	   of	   the	   MEPs.	   Provan	   points	   out	   that	   it	   is	   from	   this	   situation	   that	   his	  proposals	   should	   be	   seen.	   In	   his	   review	   of	   the	   organisation	   and	   his	   motivations	   he	  describes	  a	  mismatch	  between	  the	  needs	  that	  the	  MEPs	  have	  and	  how	  the	  organisation	  actually	  works	  today.	  This	  can	  be	  exemplified	  with	  the	  wish	  to	  provide	  a	  neutral	  source	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of	  information,	  which	  is	  “quick,	  concise	  and	  reliable”.	  To	  change	  this	  situation,	  and	  also	  to	  prepare	  the	  parliament	  for	  the	  eastern	  enlargement,	  the	  Bureau	  initiated	  the	  reform	  processes.	  In	  that	  sense,	  the	  motive	  of	  the	  reforms	  can	  be	  explained	  from	  a	  hierarchical	  perspective.	  The	  reform	  proposals	  are	  also	  formally	  motivated	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  what	   is	   good	   for	   the	  MEPs.	   This	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   an	   indication	   that	   the	  MEPs	   are,	   in	   a	  formal	   sense,	   the	  owners	  of	   the	  organisation.	  The	  reforms	  are	  motivated	  out	   from	  the	  logic	  that	  the	  EP-­‐administration	  is	  to	  be	  a	  tool	  for	  the	  MEPs.	  	  The	   reform	   processes	   of	   the	   EP	   administration	   was	   however	   generally	   not	  characterised	   by	   the	   hierarchical	   logic.	   There	   is	   no	   sign	   of	   a	   rational	   evaluation	   of	  different	  alternatives	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  hierarchical	  perspective	  would	  assume.	  When	  the	  proposals	  are	  discussed	  in	  different	  bodies,	  or	  in	  the	  Bureau,	  they	  are	  not	  given	  any	  clear	  options	  or	  alternatives.	  Instead,	  the	  proposals	  are	  presented	  more	  as	  Provans	  own,	  based	  on	  his	  own	  understanding	  of	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  parliament.	  	  	  Already	  in	  his	  first	  document,	  Provan	  writes	  that	  his	  papers	  are	  to	  be	  circulated	  and	   discussed	   among	   central	   actors	   in	   the	   EP.	  He	   underlines	   a	   need	   for	   a	   consensus-­‐based	  decision-­‐making	   if	   the	   reforms	  are	   to	  give	   the	   intended	   results.	  This	   could	  be	  a	  sign	  that	  the	  leadership	  in	  the	  EP	  does	  not	  have	  the	  full	  control	  over	  the	  organisation	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  hierarchical	  variant	  of	  the	  instrumental	  perspective	  assumes.	  Provan	  indicates	   that	   it	   is	   not	   enough	   that	   the	   leadership,	   the	   Bureau	   in	   this	   case,	   makes	   a	  decision	  on	  the	  reform	  and	  then	   it	  will	  be	   implemented.	  This	  can	   instead	  be	  seen	  as	   if	  Provan	  presumes	  that	  the	  process	  will	  need	  to	  be	  negotiated	  between	  different	  actors.	  The	   factors	   of	   how	   the	   process	   were	   organised	   indicates	   that	   the	   negotiation-­‐based	  variant	   of	   the	   instrumental	   perspective	   is	  more	   likely	   to	   explain	   how	   the	   process	   are	  carried	  out.	  Relevant	  actors	  would	  be	  the	   leadership,	   the	  MEPs,	   the	  political	  groups	  as	  well	  as	  the	  staff	  in	  the	  administration	  itself.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  authority	  relationships	  in	  the	  parliament	  are	  complicated.	  A	  complicating	  factor	  is,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  political	  compromises	  that	  lie	  in	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  institution,	  this	  especially	  affects	  the	  physical	  location	  of	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  institution	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  staff	  between	  them.	  	  From	  an	   instrumental	  perspective,	  one	   can	  note	   that	   the	  EP,	  or	   the	  Bureau,	  did	  not	  at	  any	  time	  in	  the	  process	  put	  up	  any	  unit,	  committee	  or	  project	  team	  to	  coordinate	  or	   carry	  out	   the	   internal	   reforms.	  The	  Bureau,	   that	   is	   the	   competent	  body	  of	  handling	  most	  of	  the	  issues	  that	  are	  dealt	  with	  in	  these	  reform	  processes,	  handles	  a	   lot	  of	  other	  issues	  of	  a	  more	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  character.	  For	  instance,	  they	  make	  decisions	  on	  parliaments	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buildings,	  which	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  frequent	  theme.	  To	  mix	  issues	  of	  such	  different	  character	  could	  have	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  the	  processes,	  since	  the	  members	  have	  to	  change	  focus.	  The	  instrumental	  perspective	  builds	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  organisation	  matters	  for	  how	  it	  is	  reorganised	  too.	  If	  a	  unit	  had	  been	  put	  up,	  and	  it	  would	  have	  included	  other	  actors	  than	  the	  leadership,	  then	  that	  would	  have	  supported	  a	  negotiation-­‐based	  process.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  EP	  administration,	  no	  unit	  were	  set	  up,	  and	  a	  lot	  of	  different	  actors	  were	  included	  when	   the	  documents	  were	   to	   float	  as	  discussion	  papers.	  This	  means	   that	   the	  different	  actors	  inside	  the	  EP	  does	  not	  necessary	  need	  to	  have	  the	  same	  view	  of	  the	  organisation	  or	  which	   “collective	  problems”	   that	   it	   faces.	  These	   factors	  are	   likely	   to	  have	  played	  an	  important	   role	   for	   how	   the	   reform	   processes	   were	   carried	   out,	   why	   the	   negotiations	  were	  necessary	  and	  why	  the	  took	  so	  long.	  	  These	   negotiations	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	   special	   features	   that	  characterises	  a	  legislature.	  As	  noted,	  the	  members	  of	  a	  legislature	  are	  formally	  equal	  to	  each	   other	   and	   they	   do	   not	   stand	   in	   the	   relationship	   of	   authority	   or	   subordination	   of	  each	   other,	   as	   members	   of	   hierarchical	   organisations	   does.	   This	   means	   that	   the	  management	   and	   leadership	   of	   the	  EP	   are	   elected	  by	   the	  MEPs,	  which	   they	   are	   set	   to	  lead.	  To	  negotiate	  and	   form	  a	  consensus	  on	   important	  changes	   is	   therefore	  even	  more	  important	  than	   in	  a	  hierarchical	  organisation.	  This	   is	  also	  one	  of	   the	   factors	  that	  make	  rational	  design	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  organisation	  hard.	  	  The	   Provan	   documents	   should	   to	   a	   large	   degree	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   contribution	   to	   a	  much	  larger	  debate	  that	  Provan	  wished	  to	  start	  and	  also	  steer	  in	  a	  certain	  direction.	  This	  larger	  debate,	  is	  seen	  in	  some	  of	  the	  documentation	  studied,	  but	  only	  as	  small	  fragments,	  they	  can	  therefore	  only	  be	  seen	  as	  such	  and	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  indications	  of	  what	  that	  had	   been	   going	   on	   in	   the	   informal	   discussions	   in	   corridors	   etc.	   Different	   issues	   and	  proposals	  from	  the	  documents	  were	  also	  handled	  in	  different	  contexts,	  as	  it	  is	  noted	  in	  one	  of	   the	  documents.	  The	  working	  documents	  produced	  by	  Mr	  Provan	  are	   to	   a	   large	  degree	  produced	  by	  him	  as	  an	  individual	  member	  of	  the	  Bureau,	  and	  they	  were	  only	  to	  float	  as	  discussion	  papers.	  Provan	  was	  never	  given	  a	  clear	  mandate	  or	  timetable	  to	  drive	  a	  reform,	  or	  a	  goal	  to	  work	  for.	  	  This	  image,	  that	  no	  consolidated	  process	  or	  any	  clear	  goal	  for	  the	  reforms	  existed,	  was	   something	   that	   the	   external	   studies	   criticised.	   For	   instance,	   it	   can	   be	   exemplified	  with	  what	  the	  ROME-­‐PE	  study	  formulated	  in	  its	  report;	  “the	  issues	  at	  stake	  became	  clear	  gradually,	   if	   they	  ever	  became	  clear	  at	  all".	  This	   is	  an	   interesting	  notion	  as	   it	   indicates	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that	  the	  parliament	  did	  not	  have	  a	  clear	  goal	  picture	  or	  target	  when	  they	  decided	  on	  this	  study,	   it	   could	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   symptom	  of	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   central	   group	   to	   coordinate	   the	  reform	  process.	  	  Provans	  working	  documents	  were	   focusing	  on	  procedures	  and	  structures	   in	   the	  EP	   as	   a	   whole,	   both	   on	   the	   political	   side	   and	   the	   administrative	   side.	   The	   concrete	  proposals	  that	  his	  work	  ended	  in	  were	  adopted	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  political	  side	  of	  the	  union.	   On	   the	   reforms	   of	   the	   formal	   organisational	   structure	   of	   the	   administration	  however,	   this	   was	   not	   the	   case.	   The	   reason	   for	   this	   is	   not	   explicitly	   given	   in	   the	  documents,	   but	   Provan	  writes	   that	   he	  wishes	   to	   engage	   in	   further	   discussions	   on	   the	  matters.	  It	  lies	  near	  at	  hand	  to	  see	  this	  as	  a	  result	  of	  that	  the	  desired	  consensus	  did	  not	  exist.	  The	  Parliament	  had,	  however,	  discussed	  the	  matters	   for	  a	   long	  time.	  The	  EP	  had	  also	  invested	  money	  in	  an	  extensive	  external	  study,	  the	  ROME-­‐PE,	  which	  had	  criticised	  the	   EP	   administration	   from	   many	   perspectives	   and	   also	   stressed	   the	   importance	   of	  reforming	  the	  EP	  administration	  before	  the	  EU	  were	  to	  be	  enlarged	  again.	  As	  we	  know,	  the	  big	  eastern	  enlargement	  of	  the	  EU	  was	  coming	  closer.	  	  	  Following	  Provans	  reform	  attempts	  the	  Secretary-­‐General,	  Mr	  Priestley,	  took	  over	  as	  the	  central	  actor	  and	  driving	  force	  for	  reforming	  the	  EP	  Administration.	  When	  looking	  at	  the	  substantial	  content	  of	   the	  proposals,	   it	   is	  clear	  that	  Priestley	  builds	  on	  the	  same	  ideas	  as	  the	  ones	  put	  forward	  by	  Provan.	  From	  an	  organisational	  perspective	  this	  means	  that	  the	  reform	  process	  from	  now	  on	  was	  coordinated	  from	  the	  highest	  unit	  of	  the	  EP,	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  During	  this	  time	  a	  second	  external	  study	  was	  presented,	  this	  one	  strongly	   underlined	   the	   argument	   that	   the	  MEPs	  were	   not	   satisfied	  with	   the	  way	   the	  parliament	  worked	   and	  which	   support	   they	  were	   provided	  with.	   It	   also	   proposed	   the	  same	  type	  of	  measures	  as	  were	  presented	  earlier.	  	  The	  use	  of	  the	  external	  studies	  is	  interesting	  from	  an	  analytical	  perspective	  since	  they	   can	  be	   said	   to	   represent	   an	   outsiders	   view	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   they	   are	   not	   biased	  towards	  any	  of	  the	  different	  actors	  within	  the	  institution.	  They	  are	  an	  external	  expertise	  and	   as	   such	   they	   have	   a	   different	   legitimacy	   when	   they	   present	   their	   results	   and	  recommendations.	  	  It	  took	  the	  EP	  years	  of	  talks	  to	  reach	  a	  consensus	  on	  how	  to	  reform	  the	  institution,	  and	  in	  the	  end,	  the	  final	  reform	  is	  almost	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  initial	  proposals.	  The	  reasons	  for	  why	  the	  process	  took	  so	  long	  are	  hard	  to	  read	  out	  from	  the	  documents	  directly.	  Through	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the	   theoretical	   framework	   I	   have	   however	   been	   able	   to	   point	   out	   some	  of	   the	   central	  organisational	  factors	  that	  matters	  in	  these	  kinds	  of	  processes.	  	  From	   an	   institutional	   perspective	   one	   underlines	   the	   need	   of	   acceptance	  throughout	   the	   organisation	   to	   be	   able	   to	   make	   a	   reform	   happen.	   The	   need	   for	   this	  acceptance	  was	   also	   underlined	   by	   Provan	   in	   his	   first	   document.	   The	   Rome-­‐PE	   study	  showed	   that	   the	   Parliament	   has	   a	   strong	   organisational	   culture	   that	   is	   described	   as	  complex	   where	   there	   are	   difficulties	   of	   creating	   synergies,	   and	   this	   could	   also	   be	   an	  indication	  of	  why	   the	  process	  was	   taking	  so	   long.	  The	  Parliament	  did	  however	  reform	  itself	   and	   the	   reasons	   for	   this	   should	  be	   seen	   in	   connection	  with	   that	   the	  process	   and	  discussions	  had	  been	  going	  on	  for	  a	  couple	  of	  years	  and	  the	  arguments	  for	  the	  reforms	  had	  been	  built	  up	  and	  gotten	  support	  also	  from	  the	  external	  studies	  as	  well.	  One	  of	  the	  arguments	   for	   reforming	   the	  organisation,	   that	   the	  workload	  had	  been	   increasing	  and	  were	   to	   increase	   even	   more,	   was	   also	   getting	   more	   immediate	   as	   the	   eastern	  enlargement	  of	   the	  union	  were	  coming	  closer.	  This	  might	  have	  helped	   to	  push	   for	   the	  changes.	  	  Throughout	   the	   processes,	   the	   reactions	   from	   other	   stakeholders	   are	   badly	  documented	   in	   the	   formal	   documentation.	   However,	   what	   one	   can	   see	   is	   that	   some	  individuals	   in	   the	  management	   played	   a	   central	   role	   in	   the	   processes.	   By	   pushing	   for	  their	  ideas	  during	  almost	  three	  years,	  they	  built	  up	  an	  acceptance	  for	  the	  need	  to	  reform	  the	   organisation.	   This	   is	   also	   helped	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   argument	   of	   making	   the	  parliament	   ready	   for	   the	   increased	   workload	   that	   were	   expected	   in	   connection	   with	  Eastern	  Enlargement	  grew	  stronger.	  When	  this	  acceptance	  was	  reached,	  there	  was	  only	  one	  proposal	  that	  had	  been	  formally	  evaluated,	  and	  this	  proposal	  was	  also	  adopted.	  	  The	   external	   studies	   has	   also	   pointed	   on	   some	   constrains	   of	   reforming	   the	   EP	  administrations.	  This	  mainly	  regards	  the	  strong	  organisational	  culture	  in	  the	  Parliament,	  but	   also	   the	   geographical	   location	   has	   been	  mentioned.	   The	   administration	   has	   had	   a	  historically	   strong	   and	   independent	   position	   compared	   to	   administrations	   in	   other,	  national,	   parliaments.	   It	   has	   also	  developed	   it	   characteristics	   throughout	   the	   years,	   as	  the	  ROME-­‐PE	  study	  points	  out.	  From	  a	  theoretical	  perspective	   it	   is	  relevant	  to	  see	  this	  fragmented	  institutionalisation	  in	  relation	  with	  one	  of	  the	  other	  constrains	  of	  reforming	  the	  EP,	  namely	  the	  geographical	  location	  of	  the	  institutions.	  The	  question	  of	  the	  location	  has	  been	  present	  at	  several	  points	  in	  the	  reform	  process.	  It	   is	  clear	  that	  the	  leadership	  and	  majority	  in	  the	  parliament	  see	  this	  as	  an	  Achilles'	  heel	  of	  the	  EP.	  However	  they	  seem	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to	  acknowledge	  that	  it	  was	  out	  of	  the	  Parliaments	  control	  to	  change	  this	  and	  therefore	  they	  did	  not	  move	  forward	  with	  any	  proposals	  to	  change	  this	  radically.	  The	  proposal	  to	  move	  some	  of	  the	  staff	  from	  Luxemburg	  to	  Brussels	  was	  however	  enough	  to	  provoke	  the	  only	  formal	  protest	  during	  the	  whole	  reform	  processes.	  	  	  The	  process	  tracing,	  together	  with	  the	  two	  perspectives	  of	  how	  change	  happens,	  has	   indicated	   that	   individuals,	   rather	   than	   the	   organisation	   as	   a	   whole,	   mainly	   have	  driven	   the	   formal	  processes	   leading	   to	   the	   internal	  reforms.	  The	   individuals	   that	  were	  assigned	  with	   the	   task,	   first	  Mr	  Provan	  ant	   later	  on	  Mr	  Priestley,	  were	   formally	  never	  given	  any	  clear	  mandate	  or	  directive.	  They	  were	  asked	  to	  prepare	  a	  proposal	  on	  internal	  reform,	  but	  what	   this	  would	   lead	   to	  or	   from	  which	  perspective	   they	   should	  work	  was	  formally	   never	   decided	   upon.	   This	  was	   also	   the	   case	   for	   at	   least	   the	   ROME-­‐PE	   study,	  were	   the	   consultants	   deliberately	   said	   this	   in	   their	   report.	   From	   the	   formal	  documentation,	  this	  is	  one	  of	  my	  main	  conclusions	  about	  the	  process,	  and	  how	  to	  explain	  it.	  	   As	  noted	  in	  this	  analysis,	  the	  debate	  around	  the	  reform	  proposals	  has	  been	  going	  on	   in	  many	  different	   forums	  in	  the	  parliament	  throughout	  the	  whole	  process.	  This	  has	  also	  been	  explicitly	  written	  at	  some	  points	  in	  the	  documents	  studied.	  I	  have	  however	  not	  been	   able	   to	   find	   out	   what	   that	   has	   been	   said	   in	   these	   discussions	   or	   in	   the	   actual	  negotiations	  between	  different	   actors.	   Is	  has	   therefore	  also	  been	  hard	   for	  me	   to	   come	  back	   to	   the	   conflict	   lines	   that	  were	   outlined	   in	   the	   theory	   chapter.	   These	   dimensions	  might	  have	  been	  easier	  to	  find	  out	  more	  on	  if	  the	  formal	  documents	  were	  complemented	  with	  interviews.	  The	  research	  design	  was	  chosen	  out	  from	  a	  wish	  to	  put	  emphasis	  on	  the	  formal	  process	  and	  factors.	  This	  fact	  was	  also	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  three	  of	  this	  study.	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6 Conclusions	  As	  stated	  in	  the	  opening	  chapter	  of	  this	  study,	  the	  research	  question	  is	  about	  the	  organisation	  of	   change;	   how	   the	   structure	  of	   an	  organisation	   changes,	  why	   it	   does	   so,	  and	   the	   factors	   that	   shape	   organisational	   change	   processes.	   I	   have	   studied	   this	   in	   the	  context	   of	   the	  EP,	   the	   only	   directly	   elected,	   transnational	   representative	   institution	   in	  the	   world.	   The	   central	   conclusion	   from	   this	   study	   is	   that	   the	   formal	   organisational	  structure	  has	  changed	  in	  several	  ways,	  both	  as	  a	  result	  of	   intentional	  reforms	  and	  as	  a	  result	  factors	  that	  was	  not	  entirely	  up	  to	  the	  parliament	  itself.	  This	  study	  has	  especially	  paid	   attention	   to	   the	   reform	   processes	   and	   changes	   regarding	   the	   scientific	   and	   legal	  support	   functions.	   I	   will	   here	   summarize	   the	   results	   and	   relate	   them	   to	   the	   previous	  research.	  Finally	  I	  will	  give	  some	  ideas	  for	  further	  research	  on	  the	  EP	  administration.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  EP	  is	  a	  transnational	  parliament	  presents	  these	  kinds	  of	  change	  processes	  with	  some	  special	  features.	  	  As	  noted	  in	  the	  introductory	  chapter,	  a	  legislature	  has	  the	  power	  to	  organise	  itself.	  This	  is	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  valid	  also	  for	  the	  EP,	  with	  the	  clear	  exception	  of	   its	  geographical	   location,	  which	  I	  have	  pointed	  at	  also	  earlier	   in	  this	  study.	  	  The	  administration	  has	   grown	  substantially	  during	   the	   studied	  period.	  This	  has	  been	  made	  by	  decisions	  to	  expand	  the	  administration,	  but	  the	  factors	  that	  triggered	  the	  expansions	  come	  as	  a	  result	  of	   the	  enlargements	  of	   the	  EU	  as	  a	  whole.	  Therefore	   they	  come	  as	  a	  result	  of	  decisions	  that	  are	  not	  up	  to	  the	  EP	  themselves	  to	  decide	  upon.	  The	  EP	  administration	   have	   had	   to	   serve	   a	   growing	   number	   of	   MEPs	   and	   the	   translation	  services	  have	  had	  to	  deal	  with	  many	  new	  languages	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  enlargement	  of	  the	  EU.	  The	  requirements	  on	  the	  quality	  of	   the	  services	  have	  grown.	  This	  has	  also	   led	  to	  a	  growing	   dissatisfaction	   amongst	   the	   MEPs.	   Throughout	   the	   reform	   processes,	   these	  factors	  have	  been	  used	  to	  motivate	  the	  proposed	  changes.	  	  First,	  this	  study	  shows	  that	  the	  proposals,	  which	  were	  formulated	  at	  a	  very	  early	  stage	  in	  these	  processes,	  were	  discussed	  in	  many	  different	  forums,	  and	  they	  also	  gained	  support	  from	  the	  external	  studies.	  However,	  no	  other	  options	  were	  evaluated.	  Secondly,	  the	  reform	  was	  initiated	  and	  driven	  by	  central	  figures	  in	  the	  parliaments	  management.	  Even	   so,	   it	   took	   the	   parliament	   long	   time	   to	   reach	   a	   consensus;	   this	   might	   be	   an	  indication	  of	   the	  documented	  problems	  to	  create	  synergies,	  which	   the	  ROME-­‐PE	  study	  pointed	   at.	   Thirdly,	   the	   external	   studies	  were	   referred	   to	   at	  many	   stages	   and	   created	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legitimacy	   for	   the	   proposals.	   This	   indicates	   that	   the	   main	   focus	   was	   not	   on	   rational	  design	  of	  the	  organisation,	  but	  more	  on	  establishing	  a	  consensus	  around	  the	  proposals	  that	   was	   put	   forward	   by	   one	   individual,	   or	   a	   group	   of	   people.	   Hence,	   this	   was	   not	   a	  ground-­‐breaking	   new	   initiative,	   but	   rather	   a	   slow	   process	   that	   eventually	   led	   to	   a	  consensus.	  The	  instrumental	  factors	  was	  the	  ground	  for	  proposing	  the	  changes,	  whereas	  internal	  discussions	  and	  negotiations	  stands	  out	  as	  the	  important	  factors	  to	  explain	  the	  process	  that	  led	  to	  the	  decisions.	  	  These	  findings	  lead	  to	  the	  question	  whether	  institutional	  design	  is	  possible	  in	  an	  institution	  like	  the	  EP.	  As	  stated	  in	  the	  theory	  chapter,	  “many	  changes	  are	  not	  the	  result	  of	  reforms	  and	  many	  reforms	  never	  result	  in	  changes”.	  This	  study	  has	  shown	  this.	  Some	  of	  the	  changes	  listed	  has	  come	  as	  results	  of	  reform	  processes,	  like	  the	  ones	  studied	  here,	  but	  some	  of	  the	  changes	  has	  been	  part	  of	  a	  more	  natural	  process	  in	  the	  sense	  described	  above.	   The	   reforms	   and	   changes	   has	   also	   been	   limited	   by	   some	   factors	   that	   are	  completely	  out	  of	  reach	  for	  the	  Parliament	  itself	  to	  change,	  whilst	  other	  limitations	  lies	  within	  the	  parliament	  structures.	  	  Altogether	  the	  results	  indicate	  that	  the	  reforms	  in	  the	  organisation	  were	  initiated	  from	   an	   instrumental	   and	   problem	   solving	   perspective.	   The	   process	   that	   started	   can	  however	   best	   be	   described	   and	   explained	   from	   a	   negotiation-­‐based	   perspective.	   An	  essential	  notion	  is	  that	  the	  individuals,	  Provan	  and	  Priestley,	  have	  played	  a	  central	  role	  as	   advocators	   for	   reform.	   Even	   though	   I	   have	   been	   unable	   to	   directly	   identify	   the	  negotiations	  in	  the	  documents	  we	  can	  see	  that	  Provan	  builds	  the	  process	  around	  the	  fact	  that	   the	   documents	   are	   to	   be	   discussed	   and	   that	   a	   common	   agreement,	   a	   consensus,	  between	  the	  relevant	  actors	  is	  necessary.	  The	  long	  period	  of	  time	  used	  to	  reach	  a	  fruitful	  consensus	   indicates	   that	   the	   relevant	   actors	   did	   not	   have	   the	   same	   analysis	   of	   what	  problems,	  or	  solutions,	  that	  were	  relevant.	  	  Previous	   research	   on	   the	   EP	   and	   its	   internal	   structures	   has	   drawn	   attention	   to	  how	  the	  institutional	  resources	  affect	  the	  parliaments	  influence	  over	  policy	  and	  how	  the	  MEPs	  handle	  the	  informational	  deficit	  they	  might	  face	  when	  making	  policy-­‐choices	  and	  in	   their	   voting	   behaviour.	   In	   connection	   with	   this,	   some	   studies	   have	   pointed	   in	   the	  direction	  of	  the	  administrations’	  role	  in	  supporting	  the	  parliament’s	  power	  in	  relation	  to	  the	   executive.	   The	   reform	   processes	   could	   be	   seen	   as	   part	   of	   this	   strategy	   since	   they	  clearly	  has	  the	  ambition	  to	  empower	  the	  MEPs	  more	  by	  giving	  them	  easier	  access	  to	  new	  and	  stronger	  legislative	  support	  units	  from	  within	  the	  parliament.	  The	  name	  of	  the	  last	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reform	  process	  “Raising	  the	  Game”	  could	  also	  be	   indicating	  this	  ambition.	  The	  reforms	  could	   in	   the	   same	  way	   bee	   seen	   as	   part	   of	   the	   strategy	   that	   Kreppel	   identified	   in	   her	  studies,	   namely	   that	   the	   Parliament	   from	   the	   mid-­‐1990s	   had	   focused	   internally	   and	  ‘streamlined’	   its	   procedures	   and	   organisational	   structures	   to	   maximize	   efficiency.	  Kreppel	   goes	   further	   and	   linked	   the	   revisions	  of	   the	  Rules	  of	  Procedure	   to	   the	   treaty-­‐reforms	  and	  argued	   that	   the	  parliament	  consciously	  had	  been	  using	   these	  revisions	   to	  strengthen	  its	  own	  role.	  Just	  as	  Kreppel	  noted	  from	  her	  study,	  this	  link	  is	  not	  directly	  and	  explicitly	  marked	  in	  the	  reform	  processes	  I	  have	  studied.	  It	  is	  however	  not	  unthinkable	  that	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Nice,	  which	  was	  about	  to	  enter	  into	  force	  during	  this	  period,	  was	  in	  the	  minds	  of	   the	  actors	   in	   these	  reform	  processes.	  The	   indirect	   links	  are	  clearer;	   the	  main	  purpose	  of	   the	  Treaty	  of	  Nice	  was	  to	  prepare	  the	  EU	  for	   the	  Eastern	  enlargement,	  and	  this	   enlargement	   is	   explicitly	   mentioned	   at	   many	   stages	   throughout	   the	   reform	  processes.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  management	  pushed	  for	  the	  reforms	  to	  be	  made	  before	  the	  EU	   where	   enlarged.	   It	   is	   not	   unlikely	   that	   it	   would	   have	   been	   harder	   to	   reach	   a	  consensus	  on	  the	  reforms	  after	  such	  a	  big	  enlargement.	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